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Liberty in England: 
Its Past, Présent 
and Future Prospects 
By Sean Gabb 
Context Statement 
Introduction 
The works hère submitted were published at various times between 1988 and 1998. A i l except 
two were published by the Libertarian Alliance, either directly or in its quarterly journal, Free 
Life. 
The Libertarian Alliance is a think tank committed to the defence of free markets and civil and 
political liberties. Though dating under its présent name from the 1970s, the Libertarian Alliance 
can claim, by way of personal membership and of ideological héritage, a line of descent from the 
Liberty and Property Defence League, established in 1882. It publishes reports on a wide range 
of subjects by a wide range of authors - both Enoch Powell and Tony Benn are among other 
published authors, as are Antony Flew, John Gray, and Edward Pearce. 
One of the two other pièces (Chapter Eleven) was published by the Freedom Organisation for 
the Right to Enjoy Smoking Tobacco (FOREST). This is a movement established in 1979 to 
défend the rights of smokers against paternalist législation. The other pièce (Chapter Ten) was 
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published by the Adam Smith Institute. Established in 1978, this organisation was partly 
responsable for devising and explaining the Thatcher reforms of the 1980s. More recently, it has 
been active in consultancy work in Eastern Europe and in the Third World. It has also 
maintained close links during the past décade with what is now known as the Blairite wing of the 
Labour Party, Publishing reports on welfare reform by Frank Field who is now the Minister 
responsible for this area of activity. 
AU three organisations insist on the same standards of scholarship as any académie journal; and 
are held in high regard by académies and politicians across the political spectrum. Their reports 
are collected by university libraries and are included in university reading lists. 
My own works for thèse organisations deal with various issues. Sometimes, they are concerned 
with current issues (Chapters Two, Five, Six, Seven, etc), and sometimes with issues of more 
timeless importance (Chapters One and Eleven). But taken together, ail constitute an analysis 
of the English classical liberal tradition. A l l do consistently address a number of thèmes. These 
are: the meaning of classical liberalism, its émergence and its décline, and the possibility of its 
revival. 
One: The Meaning of Liberalism 
Terminology is one of the problems of political theory. The basic terms of political taxonomy -
conservative, liberal, socialist, fascist - have no fixed meaning. They have been endlessly 
redefined - sometimes by enemies, sometimes by ignorance, sometimes by simple fraud. It is 
possible for two writers to describe their opinions by a common name, yet for those opinions to 
have nothing eise in common. In the présent case, the confusion has been magnified by shifts 
over time in the terminology that I use without any change in the opinions being described. I use 
the words "liberal", "classical liberal", and "libertarian" interchangeably. There is good authority 
for claiming that these words all have the same meaning. However, for the avoidance of 
ambiguity, I will define my terms as carefully as I can. 
When I describe myself as a liberal, or a classical liberal, or a libertarian - and I will from now 
{iv} 
on in this Context Statement use the word "liberal" - I mean that I believe individuals to be 
happier, and the society in which they live to be more successful in common sense terms, when 
they are left so far as possible to their own choices. How they eam and spend their money, how 
they associate with each other, how they choose to act in their private lives - these matters are for 
individuals to décide. That in some cases individuals will choose wrongly in the eyes of other 
people - even that in some cases they will choose wrongly as those individuals themselves might 
eventually confess - is no warrant of any kind for coercive intervention (Chapter One, p.8; 
Chapter Eleven, p.235-36). When someone eise appears to be making foolish or even deadly 
choices, we may seek to persuade. We may implore. We may threaten to exclude that person 
from our Company, and to advise others to do likewise. But that is the limit of our rights to 
intervene. As John Stuart Mi l l so famously stated (quoted, Chapter One, p.58; Chapter Four, 
p.88)5 "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign". 
Now, this is not a formulaic guide to policy. There are others who stand in much the same 
tradition as I do and who believe that all questions of policy can be settled by deducing which 
rights follow from first principles. Should there be immigration control? they ask. No, they 
answer, because our right to do with ourselves as we please includes the right to buy or rent 
property where we please and then to live there. So far as we may be prevented from going 
where we will, we are coerced, and coercion is always wrong. There is no conception of the 
likely effects of throwing open the borders and allowing fifty million Bangladeshis to come and 
live in Bradford. If this matter is considered, it is either to be dismissed as unlikely to happen, 
or as a benefit to all concerned - both manifestly dubious claims. 
My own conception of liberalism is very différent. There are certain fixed principles, but no 
policy guidance can be directly deduced from them. Once these principals are stated, we need 
to ask the subsidiary question, of what should be considered to affect individuals alone, and of 
what to affect others. We can answer by saying that people should be left alone unless their 
actions involve the use of fraud or force against others, or unless they threaten the achievement 
of some legitimate common good. And this is clearly not a formula. It is not something into 
which a question of policy may be fed and from which an answer may be extracted. Any such 
question requires the dosest examination. It requires an understanding of law, économies, 
sociology, history, and every other branch ofmoral philosophy, before any answer can be given 
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to a question about what individual actions should or should not be controlled. Even among 
liberals who understand these disciplines equally well, there is room for disagreement. 
It is not a formula, but neither is it a cover for pragmatism of the sort that some Conservative 
politicians trunk the height of wisdom and mistakenly ascribe to Edmund Burke. Principles are 
neither to be applied rigidly even where catastrophe may be the result, nor to be scorned as 
"sterile dogma". Instead, they are to be seen as what the lawyers call "rebuttable presumptions". 
These are beliefs about matters of fact that a court will hold until they are disproved by 
submission of evidence to the contrary. Thus, if asked to investigate whether a state monopoly 
of the internal mails is justified, we begin with a presumption against such monopolies and see 
if there is any positive justification. If there is none, or it is not very strong, we simply confirm 
our starting presumption. 
Moreover, because arguments for privilege or control are often very sophisticated and hard or 
expensive to disprove (Chapter One, pp.48-57), the standard of proof employed must be the 
criminal one rather than the civil. Instead of settling arguments for intervention on the balance 
of probabilities, we need to insist on proof beyond reasonable doubt. To do otherwise is to give 
oneself, bound hand and foot, over to the special interest groups. 
Once this approach is understood, it is possible to accept that the application of liberal principle 
must always be contingent on circumstances. It may lead one occasionally astray, but is unlikely 
to result in a general drifting away from the actual principles. There are whole categories of 
interventions that should not normally be made by the authorities. Even so, on the showing of 
adequate proof, there is no presumption against state action that may not be overcome. 
Most obviously, there is taxation for national defence. A l l taxes involve the threat of violence. 
Money is taken from individuals in circumstances where they would almost certainly not give 
of their own accord, and it is spent on things that individuals would almost certainly not purchase 
in a free market. Frequently, the items of expenditure are the means of further limitations on 
freedom. But that is no argument in itself against taxation. There may come a time when all 
public goods will be bought and sold by voluntary exchange. But that is not possible at the 
moment. The only way for the country to be defended against foreign attack is for there to be a 
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State, which is to have the right to compel payment for the upkeep of its armed forces. 
This does not legitimise armed aggression, or the involvement of the State in other wars fought 
for any purpose beyond national defence as reasonably conceived (Chapter Eleven, p.233). I 
am, for example, opposed to the sending of British forces to Bosnia and Kuwait. Terrible things 
may be happening, or have happened, in these places. But there is no threat there to the survival 
or even to the well-being of this country; and so British tax money should not be spent, nor 
British lives be endangered, in these places. This being said, national defence is a proper reason 
for State coercion of individuals. 
Moving away from national survival, which is not really a controversial point within liberalism, 
we come to the whole issue of what is a "legitimate public good". This is controversial. It is 
very difficult to lay down précise rules here, as all dépends on circumstances. However, to lay 
down a gênerai rule, it is legitimate to provide by coercive action those things that a) are 
necessary for the achievement or maintenance of a more pleasant social life; and that b) cannot 
be obtained by voluntary actions; and that c) are not incompatible with the survival of other 
freedoms. In all cases, it must be repeated, the presumption is against State action. But assuming 
the évidence is beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption may be set aside. To see how this 
principle might be applied, let us look at the example of freedom of speech. 
Now, this is perhaps the most important specific right in liberal ideology. It is valuable in itself. 
It is vital for the maintenance of every other right. Following John Stuart M i l l , we have no 
means of knowing with complète certainty the truth or falsity of any proposition. Therefore, to 
prohibit its being advanced is to make a wholly unfounded assumption of infallibility. Moreover, 
if a prohibition is made, one of two conséquences will follow: 
First, i f the proposition is true, humanity will lose whatever benefit might follow from an 
addition to the stock of existing truths; 
Second, if it is false, we shall lose what little assurance we can have of the truth of the other 
proposition denied by it. As the late Karl Popper argued. propositions are to be accepted as valid 
so far as they have not so far been refuted. Establish even the plainest truth by law, and it will 
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dwindle from the status of a truth acknowledged by reason to the status of a préjudice that can 
be embarrassed by the feeblest opposing show of reason. 
This is an argument of immense power. Nevertheless, there are grounds on which freedom of 
speech may be restricted in the public interest. These are discussed in my pamphlet advocating 
a European Bi l l of Rights (Chapter Ten, pp.191-96). In this, I allow a number of grounds on 
which speech may legitimately be restricted. 
There are, for example, the basic rules of sub judice. While a criminal matter is before the 
courts, it may not be discussed in public with complète freedom. This is because the case is to 
be judged in all matters of fact by a Jury composed of ordinary people selected at random. It is 
necessary for the Jurors to reach their verdict solely on the basis of the évidence presented in 
court. Ordinary people cannot be presumed to possess the capacity that most lawyers have for 
putting certain évidence from their minds; and so certain évidence needs to be kept from entering 
their minds in the first place. Therefore, it is necessary to restrain the publication in the media 
of any other évidence. There must be no revealing, for example, that the Défendant has been 
already convicted of any other criminal offence; nor any discussion of alleged claims about the 
Défendant made by persons who are not to be called to give évidence. The Common Law rules 
of évidence are very technical, but have been evolved in order to ensure that a Défendant has the 
füllest chance of being fairly tried for the offences alleged. 
It is censorship to prevent a newspaper from revealing that an alleged sex murderer has three 
convictions for indécent assault; or from revealing that his mother allegedly said on her deathbed 
that he had confessed his guilt to her. It is an interférence with all manner of individual rights 
when an Editor is fined or sent to prison for printing these révélations. But it is an act of 
censorship necessary for the securing of other freedoms. Abolish Triai by Jury and replace it 
with the European system of criminal justice, in which questions of fact and law are decided by 
professional Judges, and there would be no grounds for censorship. A Judge sitting alone does 
not really need to be shielded from the wrong sorts of évidence. There would be no valid reason 
for limiting freedom of speech on matters before the courts. However, Trial by Jury is the most 
fundamental guarantee of our liberties in this country (Chapter One, p.25). There is at least very 
restricted scope for political intervention in the criminal process when all serious offences must 
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go before a Jury of the Defendant's peers, who have füll discrétion to reach any verdict that 
conscience directs. Throughout English history, Juries have moderated or even stopped political 
persécutions. They have also nullified bad laws by refusing to convict. To préserve this public 
blessing, some censorship of opinion is a regrettable necessity. 
We might also look at arguments about the protection of public order. There are circumstances 
in which the publication of certain views - or perhaps their publication in certain forms - might 
provoke a breach of the peace. It can be argued that, where this can be shown, there is a case for 
limiting freedom of speech. This is not to endorse "hate crime" laws - where people are not 
allowed to spread their views on the grounds that these are "offensive" to some minority group. 
Every new idea upsets someone, and Darwinism might have been banned in Victorian England 
if the feelings of Biblical fundamentalists had been regarded as solicitously as some feelings now 
appear to be. Nor is it to endorse controls in every case where a breach of the public order is 
threatened. After all, if the authorities accepted the likelihood that petrol bombs might be thrown 
as good reason for stopping a political march, there would be an obvious incentive for intolerant 
groups to get marches stopped by threatening to throw petrol bombs (Chapter Ten, p.194) 
A i l this being said, though, it does seem legitimate to prohibit speech in circumstances where 
there is a clear and présent danger of extreme disorder. So long as the presumption in favour of 
liberty is observed, the judgement of whether intervention is required does dépend on 
circumstances. Arguments for intervention must always receive hostile examination. As I argue 
in my work on the rise and fall of English liberalism (Chapter One, p.51 et seq), special 
pleading has too offen persuaded libérais into the acceptance of falsehood. There is also a duty 
to insist on no more than the minimum level of intervention needed to achieve its stated purpose -
to ensure that it is applied without limiting too many other freedoms; and to ensure that it lasts 
only so long as it is required and no longer. But there is no "one simple principle" to détermine 
the sphère of State action. 
There is equal uncertainty when we turn to actions which may harm only other individuals 
without endangering society in gênerai. Let us examine the prohibition of child pornography. 
This may appear an easy issue for any liberal. Arguments about the tendency of certain published 
items to "déprave and corrupt" those viewing them are to be rejected. Some conservatives might 
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argue that some things are evil in themselves, and that they ought to be prohibited regardless of 
demonstrated harm to others. A liberal would not agrée with this, however. Control is only to 
be allowed where clear and présent harm can be demonstrated to exist. There is no évidence that 
looking at any sexual display leads to the commission of sexual crimes. Even if there were such 
évidence, it would not justify censorship. A démagogue who stirs a mob to violence is one thing. 
He incites offences against life or property at a time when he knows that his listeners are already 
out of their right minds. He is then using those people as an instrument of his will, rather as if 
he were pulling the strings of a puppet. A pornographer is something eise. His wares are 
consumed mostly in prívate. Before anyone gives in to a temptation to go out and repeat the acts 
shown, there is always time for reflection; and there must always be préparation. In this case, 
responsibility for whatever crime might resuit is absolutely with the perpetrator. In legal terms, 
his own thought processes are a "new intervening cause" that prevents the ascription of 
responsibility to the pornographer. 
This is easy. It seems just as easy to make an exception to the rule of freedom of speech where 
children are concerned. The restriction is not to protect the viewer from depravity and 
corruption, but to protect the object of attention. In my analysis of the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 (Chapter Three, pp.83-86), I argue that controls on the distribution of 
such material are justified for the legitímate protection of individuáis. Children are a special 
category of individuáis. They do not have either the intellectual capacity or the expérience for 
there to be the normal presumption in favour of liberty. I do not accept the argument that sexual 
activity in itself is harmful to children. The British age of consent is a product of our own 
historical circumstances. It has been lower at other times, and it is presently lower in other 
places. Until the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 raised it to 16, the Common Law age of 
consent for girls was 12. In France at the moment, it is 15. Indeed, since I last wrote on the issue 
(1994), the age of consent for homosexual activity has been reduced from 21 to 18, and is about 
to be lowered again to 16. Far below these ages, there is no automatic reason to believe that 
sexual activity is harmful in the sense that coalmining or gambling is. 
Taking part in pornographie displays is harmful to children is because it is seen as a degrading 
act by others; and few adults are Willing to earn even quite large amounts of money from being 
portrayed in sexual acts because of the moral turpitude that they would also earn. Then there is 
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the separate matter of contagious diseases. These can be difficult or even impossible to cure; and 
in the case of aids, death can resuit. It is unlikely that most children will know this, or be able 
to appreciate the risk if told about it. And so the use of children in pornography should be 
prohibited in order to save them from unwittingly damaging their réputations, and to protect their 
health. There is no need to appeal to arguments about a tendency of such pornography to deprave 
or corrupt the consumers of it - arguments that that I have already said a liberal would reject. It 
is not the product itself that is objectionable, but the means of its production. 
The problem for liberáis emerges, however, when we turn from production to distribution of 
child pornography. I took it for granted in my article that distribution was part of the offence, 
and that the law could legitimately prohibit both. But in a letter published in the next issue of 
Free Life - the journal in which my article appeared - Dr T.J. Eckleburg found holes in my 
reasoning. 
I had assumed that the child pornography to be banned from distribution had been produced in 
this country. Dr Eckleburg pointed out that most of it is produced outside the United Kingdom -
mostly in Latin America and South East Asia. This being so, prohibition would not save child 
models from being pitied or despised. In their own countries, there might not be the same moral 
standards as in Britain. Even otherwise, the pity or contempt of the British public would mean 
nothing to objects living thousands of miles away. On this argument, prohibition was 
unnecessary. 
More important, though, it would advance a principie with much wider application than the one 
intended. If the sale within the United Kingdom of child pornography produced abroad was to 
be prohibited, so too ought the sale of Colombian coal, which is often dug by children who are 
harmed thereby. So too ought the vast range of things made in India with indentured child 
labour. After all, prohibition is not to follow from the nature of the product, but from the means 
of its production. And this principie being established, the manufacturing interests would begin 
an unanswerable clamour for protection against imports from the Third World. What a time they 
would have if they could advance their own interests under cover of a principie accepted for other 
purposes by the very libérais whose economic arguments stood in their way! 
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This would not be the first time that liberals had misled themselves into supporting arguments 
dangerous to their own central principles. It happened repeatedly in Victorian England with 
matters like state education and health and sanitary regulations (Chapter Ten, pp.51-56). That 
is on the assumption that Dr Eckleburg's criticisms are just. I have yet to decide. Nevertheless, 
we have here a valid example of a difference of opinion between liberals over the policy 
implications of liberalism. To repeat, the ideology is not one of rigid formulas that exclude the 
necessity for careful thought on practical issues. 
Two: The Rise and Fall of Liberal England 
In my pamphlet on the rise and fall of English liberty (Chapter One) I deal with a question that 
has occupied my thoughts since the late 1970s. How is it that a nation in which freedom had for 
so long existed, and where its fruits had been so long in evidence, could have turned into an 
increasingly despotic social democracy? 
My provisional answer is that the defence of English liberty between about 1640 and 1870 had 
almost nothing to do with English liberal ideology. It derived instead from an extreme 
conservatism. The leading "men of speculation", as Burke called them, were less interested in 
promoting an abstract set of "Lockean" rights than in preserving the inherited rights of 
Englishmen. The defenders of the Common Law in Stuart England had no regard for - and 
probably no understanding of - freedom as a coherent right to life, liberty and property. Instead, 
there were endlessly pedantic defences of the Statute of Winchester and Magna Carta. The most 
basic premise of the Common Law argument was even absurd, and became demonstrably so as 
the seventeenth century proceeded. It was believed that the English Constitution had always been 
as it was now, and that Edward the Confessor had ruled an England institutionally identical to 
the one that James I and Charles I ruled (Chapter One, pp.9-12). 
But absurd as the premise was, it was held with stubborn determination; and it was used to justify 
resistance to any attempt to mould England into an absolutist monarchy of the sort then emerging 
in Europe. It even justified rebellion and regicide when the King proved too unintelligent to 
realise the limits of his power under the ancient Constitution as this was conceived by his 
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subjects. 
Moreover, though Charles II was restored to the throne in 1660, the whole scheme of govemment 
over which his father and grandfather had presided remained destroyed. The Tudors and Stuarts 
had given England a crédible administration. It was never as powerful as in France or in the 
Habsburg Empire. But it was an instrument that allowed the central Government to impose its 
authority on the whole country. There was Star Chamber, to ensure that the administration of 
justice remained favourable to the authorities. There was the Ecclesiastical Commission, to 
ensure the obédience of the Church. There were various local Councils - in Wales and the North, 
for example - to transmit and enforce commands from the centre. In 1641, thèse bodies were 
abolished. They were unknown to the Common Law, and had been used to usurp its powers, and 
to reduce its autonomy. Thereafter, it was necessary to rule England by law alone (Chapter One, 
pp.20-27). 
This was the true cause of English liberty. The men who drew up the Revolution Settlement in 
the 1690s were not libérais in the Lockean sensé. But they did have an instinctive hatred of any 
administrative discrétion, or anything eise that challenged the supremacy of the Common Law. 
While this conservatism was hostile to what most of us would consider désirable reforms - ie, 
the simplification and humanising of the law, the establishment of fuli religious toleration, and 
so forth, it also resisted the growth of a strong centralised power that would have made reforms 
at the price of the liberties actually enjoyed by Englishmen. Ai l through the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, there was jealous regard for the Common Law that stopped any attempts 
at a purely administrative Jurisdiction. This ensured a paralysis of government, which in turn 
became too inefficient and corrupt to be trusted with any task beyond those specified by the 
existing law. 
This Revolution Settlement was challenged from the end of the eighteenth Century by writers like 
Jeremy Bentham, who insisted on the need for a remodelling of law and administration to make 
it both cheaper and more humane. With their devoted accumulation of facts and exposure of 
waste and corruption, they managed to undermine the conservative basis of English liberty. For 
the first time since perhaps the reign of Henry VIII, the whole State was looked at with an eye 
to reforming it. 
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The Whigs and Liberais understood the risks inhérent in trying to reform an imperfect but 
undeniably liberal order based on préjudice, and tried to minimise thèse risks by concealing 
novelty behind a façade of antiquity. But they did not understand the risks well enough to avoid 
them. They still managed to undermine the foundations of liberty. Their reforms needed an 
efficient civil service. Creating one set off a public choice explosion that the most influential 
liberal writers had not expected, did not recognise, and even did what they could to encourage 
(Chapter One, p.48 etseq). 
The Victorian libérais could have avoided this. Yes, they did reject the old Common Law 
arguments that had kept England free for centuries. Yes, they did create an efficient civil service 
with ail the public choice potential thereby entailed. Even so, they had a body of economic 
philosophy that clearly showed the advantages of leaving private effort alone. They could 
demonstrate with impressive logic the benefits of international and domestic free trade. Had they 
applied thèse insights consistently, they might have been able to contain the monster they had 
unwittingly created. As it was, they fatally compromised their ideology. To return to the earlier 
legal analogy, they allowed cases for state intervention to stand on proof made out on the balance 
of probabilities, rather than made beyond reasonable doubt. 
T.B. Macaulay, for example, accepted the case for state planning in the location of railway Unes 
because he thought the country would thereby have gained a more rational network. In this, he 
was probably right. What he failed to understand, however, was that the results of state planning 
would not stop with a better railway network. There would also be an argument laid down for 
the value of state planning that would be ruthlessly pressed by the bureaucrats and special interest 
groups to push voluntary effort aside in many other areas (Chapter One, p.54). 
Still worse, perhaps, was their fréquent ignorance of whether the facts alleged in favour of state 
action were true. Like historians ever since, they accepted the claims made in the Parliamentary 
Reports of their âge as incontestably true. In fact, thèse Reports were put together by 
administrators, like Edwin Chadwick, who had a vested interest in showing that only state action 
could achieve the ends that everyone desired. A great mass of évidence - about the effectiveness 
of private policing and private éducation for the working classes, and private sanitation, and so 
forth - was systematically concealed (Chapter One, p.57) 
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By failing to insist on laissez-faire in all matters, they allowed collectivism to grow up in a 
society that never had to repudiate liberalism in words. 
Harsh judgements are passed on T.B. Macaulay, J.S. M i l l and Walter Bagehot. They thought 
they were perfecting liberty. In fact, they were helping destroy it. If England is still a reasonably 
free country, it is because of the residual conservatism of the English people. 
A further matter that is not discussed in the essay is the rôle of Company law reform. The 
Limited Liability Acts permitted the growth after the 1850s of increasingly large and bureaucratie 
organisations. Other things being equal, mis should have assisted in the growth of government, 
as big business tends to benefit from régulations and taxes high enough to drive smaller 
competitors out of business. There is scope for more research on this aspect of the décline of 
liberal England. 
Indeed, some preliminary research that I have done indicates that the difïiculties that remained 
in the way to incorporation helped keep England freer in some areas than was the case in other 
countries. Why, for example, was alcohol prohibited in America but not in Britain? Part of the 
answer lies in a multitude of cultural and legal attitudes. Part lies, however, in the higher degree 
of corporatisation of American business. The breweries that were put out of business by the 
Volstead Act were mostly joint stock companies; and their owners and managers had a limited 
commitment to them. The breweries threatened by the tempérance campaigners in Britain were 
mostly family companies; and their owners were Willing to spend lavishly to keep tempérance 
at bay. 
Ai l this, however, is yet to be fully investigated. What I submit here is the basics of a 
explanation of the rise and fall of English liberty between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Three: The Continuing Décline of Liberalism 
The first essay in this section was written in May 1989, on the tenth anniversary of Margaret 
Thatcher's Coming to power (Chapter Two). It was based on a séries of articles written for 
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student publications, some going back into the early years of the decade. In turn, it was followed 
by a long Une of other analyses of the illiberal nature of "Thatcherism". 
My argument is that the Thatcher reforms cannot be seen as part of any liberal agenda. Much 
rather, they were a minimal response to the crises of the 1970s. In that decade, the relative 
decline of the British economy that had begun in the early 1950s threatened to become an 
absolute decline. Inflation, which had been relatively high for a long time, now spiraíled out of 
control. Unemployment, which had been creeping up since the late I950s, now rose to levéis last 
seen before 1940. Profits and investment levéis were collapsing. There were strikes and 
shortages. It seemed at times as if the country was on the verge of some great political upheaval. 
The Conservative Government that carne to power in 1979 stopped the economic decline. Some 
regulations were taken off Some taxes were lowered. Many state enterprises were sold into the 
private sector. The trade unions were no longer regarded as a tiresome partner in economic 
management, to be coaxed and nagged into cooperation. They were instead labelled as an enemy 
and smashed without mercy. By the middle 1980s, the reforms were helping the economy into 
an impressive recovery. By the late 1990s, they had plainly turned Britain from the "Sick Man 
of Europe" into one of the most open and dynamic economies in the world. 
Obviously, Thatcherism contained a lot of liberal economies. But these were always applied in 
carefully measured doses. Just enough was done to stop the relative decline. Since most other 
countries are still social democracies, or are misgoverned on other Unes, not very much needed 
to be done compared with what might have been done. The overall burden of taxes hardly 
changed during the years of Conservative rule. AI1 that changed were its incidence and mode of 
collection. As for regulation, this was reduced for big business, but greatly extended for small 
companies and solé traders. And outside the narrowly economic, there was a retreat from 
liberalism more pronounced than in any other time of peace in all of modern English history. 
The procedural safeguards of the Common Law have in many cases been brushed aside 
(Chapters Two and Three). Retrospective legislation has been made. Trial by Jury has been 
limited. The right to silence has been abolished. The burden of proof is being progressively 
reversed in criminal cases, so that innocence rather than guilt needs to be proved in court. Some 
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punishments can now be imposed without any due process whatever. 
Turning to substantive law, we find that there has been the first pre-publication censorship in 300 
years in the Video Recordings Act 1984. There has been a great mass of money laundering 
offences created, which have turned the banking system from a means of transferring payment 
to a means of surveillance and control (Chapter Eight). There has been a general intensifying 
of the "War on Drugs" - a war that can be seen on liberal grounds as serving no legitimate public 
interest. Though to a lesser degree, there has also been a general war against free choice. The 
right to smoke has been attacked with a combination of tax increases, advertising bans, and 
propaganda financed by the tax payers (Chapter Eleven). We have also been comprehensively 
disarmed, so that our ability to defend our own lives and property has been abolished in favour 
of our total reliance on the State for protection (Chapter Five). In its refusal to enact a 
clarification of the law regarding consent, the Major Government allowed at least the principle 
to be restored, that the State may control what adults do sexually with each other in absolute 
privacy. In 1990, a man was found guilty of "aiding and abetting others to cause injury to 
himself ' (Chapter Four, p.94). 
Turning from the content of legislation to its mode of enactment, we see that the Thatcher and 
Major years were illiberal here too. There was progressively less Parliamentary discussion of 
new laws. Instead, they were made by way of treaty obligations. Much of this tendency was 
driven by the requirements of European integration - a subject that I do not directly address in 
the present texts. During the past 25 years of European membership, our Constitution has been 
subtly amended. Some branches of government have been exalted as never before, others set on 
their way to extinction. The most obvious beneficiaries have been the administrators, the special 
interest groups, and the small number of politicians who learn to play the rules of the new 
system. These have become largely freed from democratic control. The old democratic 
institutions remain, but are of decreasing significance. They have little real control over the 
decisions that affect our lives. Either they merely ratify those decisions, or they are not even 
formally consulted. At every point, this transfer of power is justified by the need to comply with 
obligations accepted under the various European Treaties. 
Let me take what many will think a trivial example. In October 1995, it became a criminal 
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offence to use English measurements in a wide range of commercial transactions. There was an 
outcry in the média and to some extent in Parliament, as people were forced to stop using 
measurements the very names of which are part of our language. The outcry was silenced by the 
explanation that this had been forced on us by "Europe". A Directive from 1989 was produced 
which required standard units of measurement throughout the Union. 
The explanation was spurious. The Directive did require standardisation, but was silent about 
the outlawing of other units of measurement, or the use of criminal law to ensure compliance. 
Indeed, a Directive of the European Union is not a law. It is simply a wish list sent out by the 
Commission to the member governments, which can be treated very largely as they wish. I am 
told that in Spain and Italy and Holland, I can still legally buy a gallon of petrol and even a 
scruple of vitamin C - assuming I can find anyone there willing to deal with me in thèse units. 
The forced metrication of this country happened not because Jacques Santer decreed that it be 
done, but because the relevant officiais at the Board of Trade have tidy minds that are offended 
by the illogicality of the English system of weights and measures. Thèse people used the excuse 
of Europe to avoid the political reaction that might have frustrated their design had they relied 
on a law made entirely in this country. 
In the case of the money laundering laws - which I do extensively discuss (Chapters Eight and 
Nine) - the corruption of democracy is still more impressive. Thèse appear to have been forced 
on the British Government by a European Directive made in 1991. The truth is that various 
Home Office and Treasury officiais were looking for new things to regulate in the middle 1980s, 
at the same time as various City institutions were worrying about losing business as financial 
deregulation opened their markets to new entrants. There were other interested parties, but thèse 
were the important ones. They were powerful enough to lobby the British Government into 
joining with the Americans to call for a United Nations initiative against money laundering. This 
led to a Convention, that led to a Council of Europe Directive, that led in turn to a European 
Union Directive, that led finally to British laws for which no British politician can be blamed -
no matter how much harm they do to the City as a whole - and which no démocratie majority can 
overturn without first repudiating a mass of treaty obligations. 
In 1989,1 wrote that the Thatcher Government had set in place the full coercive apparatus of a 
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police State. It needed only the right circumstances for that apparatus to be put into use. In 1998, 
after another rüne years of legal changes, I see no reason whatever to amend this judgement. 
Back in the 1980s, I was regarded as eccentric by other liberal supporters of the Thatcher 
Government. One denounced me as a "right-wing Guardian reader" when I spoke out at a 
meeting in 1986 against what was then the Public Order Bill . The prevailing view of events was 
a kind of economic determinism that the most committed Marxist would have admired. The only 
thing that mattered, it was believed, was the economic "base". AU eise was merely 
"superstructure". Let the base be changed with enough privatisation and deregulation and tax 
cutting, and the matters that 1 was talking about would be of no importance to the outcome. In 
1986,1 was told at an Adam Smith Institute function to wait another ten years before passing 
judgement on the Thatcher project. Even in 1998,1 heard a leading member of the Libertarian 
Alliance déclare that the only matter of any importance was the share of national income taken 
by the State. 
As said, even in these matters, the judgement must be hostile. There has been no diminution in 
the economic power of the State, merely a rearrangement. But considering the claim regardless 
of the facts, it is as crude a mistake as can be imagined. Markets are a necessary condition for 
the existence of a free society - but they are not sufficient condition. Certainly, where our 
economic pursuits are sufficiently regulated or stifled, there can be no liberty in the sense 
recognised in this Context Statement. On the other hand, political despotism is perfectly 
compatible with the existence of a market economy. The latter can mitigate the worst effects of 
the former. Unlike under socialism, disobedience need not be accompanied by starvation. But, 
looking frora the Hellenistic monarchies to the Italian city states of the late Renaissance, to Chile 
under General Pinochet, or Syria under President Assad, the ability to buy and seil without 
restraint has never magically created due process in criminal trials, or allowed State actions to be 
criticised in public without risk. 
Moreover, when a government is freed from constitutional restraints, it may be enlightened in 
economic matters, but need not be. The fashion in économies for the past two or more décades 
has been to look to markets as the main system of coordination; and governments of virtually all 
descriptions have hurried to privatise their téléphone Systems. But let the fashion swing back to 
State control, and a government increasingly liberated from constitutional restraint will have no 
trouble in reversing its policy. Economic freedoms under political despotism are not freedoms 
at all, but revocable privilèges. 
Still worse, technological change combined with big and unlimited government may be about 
to propel us into a stränge and frightening new world of surveillance. Though I was nearly alone 
within the "new right" in making my complaints, there is nothing original in complaining about 
police powers and the Spanner case. This has kept the "liberal" press busy since 1979. The füll 
evil of what has been happening in the past two décades still lies in the future, fully explored only 
by a few dystopian science fiction writers. In my writings on identity cards and money 
laundering (Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine), I attempt to look into this future and see what 
the ultimate effect may be of the Thatcher reforms. 
The présent moves towards the complete surveillance of financial transactions and the 
establishment of an identity card System may together bring about the most total despotism that 
ever existed. We do not need to imagine the sort of abuses that have happened elsewhere in the 
world - of black people or Jews singled out for discrimination because of their identity cards. 
We do not need to imagine anything so melodramatic. A l l we need do is project présent trends 
into the future. 
As Computing power and priées continue to fall, the number of records held on us will naturally 
increase. Most of these will be opened for commercial purposes. The supermarket loyalty cards, 
for example, already give a füll picture of what their holders are buying. Credit card records have 
for years now constituted a pretty füll profile of where the holders are going and what they are 
buying. Libraries are beginning to store data of what books their members are borrowing; and 
bus companies are experimenting with personalised tickets that allow the holder's whereabouts 
to be tracked whenever he boards a bus. Otherwise, closed circuit televisión Systems are being 
predicted within five years that will be able to recognise faces from the unique vein patterns that 
show through ultra-violet filters on the camera lenses. 
Thèse developments have great potential for more effective marketing and customer service and 
safety. They are in our interests as consumers. The danger is that their development in a country 
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where the State is restrained by few considérations of privacy or due process will tend to make 
oui lives utterly transparent. It is easy to imagine the excuses that will be given for each of the 
records discussed above to be made available to the authorities - just imagine the convenience 
of knowing i f a suspect was in Central London at a certain time, and if he bought any paint of the 
variety that was found at the scène of the crime. Once the information is available, it will be 
demanded by our big and powerful State. 
And hère is the despotism. There will be no "boot stamping on a human face - for ever" It will 
in its outward appearance be gentle and reasonable. It will remain démocratie, in the sensé of 
allowing élections to office and the discussion of authorised topics. Its uses of power will be 
more or less in accord with public opinion. It will be wholly unlike the great despotic empires 
of our Century. 
In those empires, surveillance and control could never be total. Known dissidents could be 
followed round and watched. Informers and secret police could frighten everyone eise to some 
extent. But while whole populations could feel a certain pressure to conform to the wishes of 
those in authority, it was impossible to enforce conformity in ail cases. It would have generated 
a mountain of paper. Economies, already weakened by socialism, would have been made still 
weaker by the diversion of labour to accumulating and using this mountain. 
But this future despotism will not face such problems. The System that I can dimly see will not 
collapse under the weight of its own folly. The surveillance State, to which we are fast 
advancing, will make it easier than ever before to know what people are thinking and doing. And 
it will be able to impose a moderate but firm pressure on everyone to conform to whatever code 
of behaviour is thought appropriate. Imposed over several générations, not impeded by the 
existence of other free countries, and not compromised by the sort of overt tyranny that provokes 
spiritual where not other résistance, this new despotism will at last produce a new humanity. The 
différence between people in this and in earlier despotisms will be as the différence between an 
animal chained and an animal tamed. 
Most of us, after all, are quite timid. We do not pick our noses in public, or Scratch our bottoms, 
for fear of how we shall be regarded by the world. To be ashamed, even of nothing very serious, 
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is a naturel, indeed a necessary feeling. But we are now facing a return to the conformity of 
village life from which our ancestors so gladly escaped. We are looking at a future world in 
which there will be no privacy, no anonymity, no harmless déception, in which we shall ail live 
as if in a fish tank. 
The effect will an invisible but effective control. The Knowledge or prospect of being watched 
will for most of us be a greater déterrent from whatever may then be classed as sin than a whole 
mass of légal prohibitions. People will corne to realise that safety lies in trying to behave and 
to think exactly alike. The exposure conséquent on doing otherwise will be too awful if vague 
to contemplate. There will be some exhibitionists, willing - and perhaps happy - to expose their 
lives to the interested scrutiny of others. But not much is to be thought of a world in which such 
people have become the only individuals. 
Nor is there much to be thought about that world's chances of further progress. During the past 
300 years, we have fallen into the habit of believing progress to happen automatically. But it has 
always depended on individuality. Destroy individuality, and there is an end of progress. 
In short, I am saying that the intellectual revival of liberalism - which cannot be denied - has led 
not to a revival of liberalism in the public domain, but to its further décline. Some of its 
économie éléments have been detached and used to pay for the technology that is taking us still 
further away from liberalism. I am one of the very few modem libérais making this point. I am 
perhaps the only one in this country who has made the point at any length. And even now, I am 
still regarded for the most part as a pessimistic Tory obsessed with the trivia of légal procédure 
and violations of privacy. Even now, most other libérais seem complacently to assume that 
things like video caméras on every street comer and identity cards are somehow part of the libéral 
revival, so long as they are provided under a joint venture that involves the use of private finance. 
Four: The Prospects of a Return to Liberty 
And so, as the past two décades of libéral revival have been a failure at the level of polîcy, I will 
in this section outline another strategy by which our freedom might be recovered. This falls 
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under the heading of "justifications of liberty", "methods of arguing for liberty", and the 
"medium by which all may be expressed". 
Justifications of Liberty 
In order to survive, liberty needs a convincing intellectual justification. It has not been enough 
to assert, as I do above, that free people do better than unfree. The arguments from utility are ail 
valid, but do not seem to work very well as a restraint on power. The reason probably is that they 
are often too abstract to be generally and clearly understood. It is too easy to slide exceptions 
into the gênerai rule, until the rule itself is forgotten. 
Far better is a more emotional commitment. Belief in the Common Law and ancient Constitution 
served this purpose excellently. If somebody suggested changing the way Juries were selected, 
it was no good to argue that it would lead to gains in efficiency or justice - even if this were a 
valid argument. The answer would always corne back: "Such was never done in the past, and 
such therefore may not be done now". It was a simple answer. Anyone could understand appeals 
to antiquity. No degree of sophistical reasoning could shake it. It meant that accused félons were 
not allowed legal représentation until the 1830s, and that the horrid peine forte et dure continued 
until 1771 (Chapter One, p.36). But it was enough to see the Stuarts off and all their despotic 
innovations. 
If liberty is to be reestablished in this country, and maintained thereafter, equally simple and 
definite arguments are needed now, We can, as do the followers of Ayn Rand and other liberal 
philosophers, make claims about our natural rights to life, liberty and property. The problem is 
that thèse have no satisfactory underpinning. They are too open to sceptical attack (Chapter 
Eleven, pp.208-13). And so I turn to two other possible supports. 
The first is to get a Bil l of Rights passed that cannot be ignored by the politicians. This has to 
some extent worked in the United States. The first ten Amendments, made in 1791, compel the 
authorities to abstain from whole classes of intervention - in the case of the Second Amendment, 
the politicians have so far even been held from bringing in the gun prohibition that would almost 
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certainly have otherwise been imposed. The Bill of Rights works by reducing a mass of 
arguments about the value of freedom to a form of words that over time had acquired almost 
religious significance. For every one person who thinks freedom of speech and the right to keep 
and bear arms to be good things, there may be hundreds who passively accept them because they 
are part of the Constitution. The Americans still have the ancient Constitution that we lost in the 
nineteenth Century. 
In 1990, I was engaged to draft one such by the Adam Smith Institute. It was at the time 
preparing a séries called "The Omega Project", in which all the institutions of what was then the 
European Community would be recast on liberal Unes. There would be reforms to the 
Commission and the Parliament and to things like the Common Agricultural Policy. The whole 
would be capped with a Bi l l of Rights, which would entrench freedom throughout Europe. My 
resulting Bil l of Rights, with Introduction and Commentary, was published in November 1990, 
and was extensively discussed in the media (Chapter Ten). 
Though even then, I was deeply hostile to the idea of British membership of the actual European 
Community, I wrote and argued for the Bi l l of Rights on the grounds that its adoption at the 
European level would solve a problem at the British level. This problem is Parliamentary 
sovereignty. Under English law - Scottish may be différent - there can be no entrenchment of any 
législation. Parliament can do anything it pleases, except bind itself for the future. There could 
be no hope of getting and keeping a bill of rights under English law. 
My draft was much praised at the time for its clarity and completeness. It has a number of faults 
that now strike me as obvious. The second most important is that it lacks explicit prohibitions 
of the civil asset forfeiture that has been used in America to nullify the due process clauses of the 
Constitution. By relying on an Admiralty Jurisdiction taken from English law, the American 
authorities have found the means to take property without even the semblance of a triai. It is 
simply enough for the owner to be suspected of a drug offence. My Bi l l of Rights would 
probably stop such acts under Article I (Chapter Ten, p.182). But an explicit prohibition would 
close a possible loophole. 
The most important fault, however, is that no politician in Europe would ever consent to 
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something that so utterly constrained their right to act as they pleased. What I drafted would 
serve rather well as the Bill of Rights of a country in which liberalism was already the dominant 
ideology. It could not by itself establish the domination ofthat ideology. And so I turn to the 
second possible support for liberty, which is the religious. 
My pamphlet on the Christian case against the anti-smoking movement (Chapter Eleven) does 
far more than make a case for FOREST. It is also an extended méditation on the relationship 
between theology and politics. Its conclusion is that liberalism is the ideology most pleasing to 
God. I argue this as foliows: 
First, true virtue must be freely chosen. This is both deductively and Scripturally true. For 
example, when asked by the rieh young man how salvation might be gained, Christ replied: 
If thou wilt be perfect, go and seil that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou 
shalt have treasure in heaven: and corne and follow me. [Matt. 19:21] 
That is not the same as having the Disciples jump on him and rob him and give ail his goods to 
the poor. It means a voluntary renunciation of wealth. For the virtue of the act lies not in the 
mere Transfer of assets, but in the willingness to make that transfer. When God made us, he made 
us free to choose. The notion of Divine punishment and reward is otherwise meaningless. Our 
actions can be good or evil - and therefore capable of punishment or reward - only so far as they 
are freely chosen. 
Second, we can therefore say that the form of society most pleasing to God is one in which its 
various members are to the füllest extent possible free to choose their own actions. Such 
freedom, of course, must be consistent with the survival of the society in which we live and act; 
for virtue and vice have meaning for the most part only so far as we deal with other human 
beings. 
Now, this is in itself an empty formula. To take it up and rush straight into arguments about 
social and economic policy is to fall into the same error as the preachers of the "Social Gospel". 
Neither The Bible nor deductive theology says anything about the précise shape of God's 
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preferred social order. There is no guidance to be found in the practice of the Old Testament, as 
whatever order was established there was under God's direct Orders, and applied to a number of 
Jewish tribes in circumstances utterly différent from our own. In any case, the Old Testament 
has no binding effect on Christians, having been superseded by Word of Jesus Christ. It is worth 
studying only so far as it prophesies and illuminâtes that Word. Nor is there anything in the New 
Testament that directly answers questions of social and economic policy, as the various books 
were written under the impression - an impression so far shown by expérience to have been a 
misunderstanding - that the world was about to corne to an end; and that the questions that we 
most wish to ask had no need of an answer. 
To provide answers of any value, the formula must be used in the light of secular knowledge. 
This is an entirely legitimate approach. For, while The Bible contains the Word of God, it does 
not contain the whole Word. It does not, for example, tell a carpenter how to make a chair, or 
contain guidance on the best operating system for a computer. More importantly, even what 
seems the piain Word can be contradicted by natural évidence. We know now that many 
passages in the Old Testament regarding the natural sciences are false if taken literally. We 
know, for example, that the Earth orbits the Sun, and care nothing for the verse in Joshua 
describing how the Sun was stopped in its path around the Earth to let the Israélites win a battle 
before the evening. [Josh. 10:13] We do not reject the verse as false, but we do reject the 
interprétation placed on it before Copernicus and Galileo. When therefore we désire to exercise 
the dominión that God has given us over the Earth and its resources, we look to the natural 
sciences. This is not blasphemy. For centuries now, it has been held that the laws of science are 
the laws of God. 
The same is true of the social sciences. The laws of thèse also are the laws of God. They are 
regularities of conduct allowed by God for the better survival of human society. And, on a 
candid examination, it will be found that the liberal view of the social sciences is the correct one. 
And this makes liberalism part of the Divine Plan for mankind. God desires us to be as free as 
is compatible with the survival of society. Liberalism is the ideology of freedom, and can be 
shown to be compatible with such survival; and so is the social and economic extension of 
Christianity, just as physics and biology and so forth are the scientific extensions. 
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This allows us to défend Trial by Jury and free trade and freedom of speech not just as 
contingently good for social well-being, but also as being divinely ordained. Whoever wishes 
to destroy or limit freedom without legitimate cause is the enemy not just of mankind, but also 
of God, and shall receive for his efforts damnation. 
This is not the only - and may not be the best - emotional support for a free society. But it is a 
set of arguments that follows properly from its premises, and is offered to the religious as their 
guide in matters of législation. 
Methods of Arguing for Liberty 
This being said, we need a strategy for arguing for liberalism. My second pamphlet on gun 
control (Chapter Six) proposes a strategy of deliberate extremism. Just after the Dunblane 
Massacre in 1996,1 was invited into a Scottish télévision studio to argue for the right to keep and 
bear arms for self-defence. I did so very forcefully, and was absolutely shunned by the audience 
for my pains. No one agreed with me. Even the représentative from the Shooters Rights 
Association, who agreed with me in private, kept his distance from me in the réception 
afterwards. 
I might have concluded from all this that I had failed. Instead, I decided that I had succeeded 
very well. For the secret of marketing unpopulär arguments is to state them as clearly and 
memorably as possible. This has three advantages: 
First, by moving the extremes of debate, we also move the centre of debatę. If I argue that 
income tax is about right at the current level, the middle position will be between me and 
someone who wants to increase it - thus the middle position will be for a small increase. If, on 
the other hand, I argue for the abolition if income tax, I might so shift the middle position that 
most people will décide that a small eut is the best policy to agrée. The trick works because most 
people instinctively believe that middle positions are the safest place in any debate. Extremes, 
by contrast, have a bad réputation. It is not generally understood that the centre is a function of 
the extremes; and this is a valuable weapon. 
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Second, extremism wins converts who are in turn good at spreading ideas. Many religions and 
political movements have gone far on the commitment of extremists who will tolerate no 
exception to their gênerai rule, but carry every principle to its logical conclusion. Moreover, even 
if converts are not directly gained. a clear statement of an outrageous view is easily remembered 
for others to describe later on. And it is often the case that a scandalised account of an opinion 
will be passed on to possible converts. Something like this actually happened to me in 1978. 
Reading The New Statesman one day, I came across a sneering référence to "the Austrian fanatic 
von Hayek". I at once went off and got his Constitution of Liberty. It would have been still 
better had Mr Foot told me the contents! 
Third, extremism establishes a position in the gênerai debate. Regardless of their truth or 
falsehood, successful doctrines go through a fairly common évolution. First, they are ignored. 
Then they are ridiculed. Then they are misrepresented and seemingly refuted. Then they are 
seriously contested. Then they become the consensus. If an idea is to get beyond the first stage, 
it must be propagated as forcefully as possible. If one person is trying to be heard in a room füll 
of people ail talking about something eise, he must shout very loud. So it is with extremism. 
The need, therefore, is for libérais to be as extreme as they can be every time they have the 
opportunity to be heard. This is not to advocate the rigid purity that I have already criticised, but 
is simply stating what is believed as clearly as possible. There is little value in arguing for a 
capping of welfare expenditure, when the real désire is to abolish it. There is no value in 
modération. It is rather like heartng an estate agent say "If you ask £80,000 for this house, you 
may not find a buyer. Better far to ask £40,000 and try to gazump any buyer upwards sometime 
before exchange of contracts." Not only is this dishonest, it is also fanciful. In politics, as in 
gênerai, the best way to get what you want is to ask for it - or to ask for rather more and then be 
Willing to compromise. 
Look at the British socialists who spent half a Century of arguing and Publishing before 1945. 
Did they spend that time talking about the need for a National Coal Board and a National Health 
Service that would leave the consultants free to keep on their private patients? If they had, it is 
unlikely that the Labour Party would have got anyone into Parliament, let alone won the battle 
of ideas in the 1930s and 40s. Instead, they spoke about what they really wanted - their "New 
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Jerusalem" of universal brotherhood and plenty. This is what attracted people of intellectual and 
organising ability into their movement, and helped beat down an opposition that was right but 
had almost no one able or Willing to say so. The actual institutions set up by the Attlee 
Government were compromises, and were never intended to last much beyond the next big 
ratchet to the left in British politics. That thèse institutions lasted so long is testimony not to their 
durability, but to the weight of the intellectual pressure behind them even after the 1940s high 
point of British socialism. 
This is not to reject compromise. There will be no fuli return to liberalism for many years. There 
must be compromise in the short term, accepting whatever can be had. There is no value in 
sabotaging a fine compromise for the sake of something that cannot yet be achieved, but may be 
achievable after a few years of the compromise - see, for example, the opposition of some 
homosexual groups to lowering the age of consent to 18 rather than 16. But compromise must 
not be something that is reached as the advocates of modération wish it to be. To be successful, 
libérais must get into the habit of saying what we really want, and then settling until the next 
convenient moment for what we can get. 
Medium by Which All May be Expressed 
In this final section, I tum to the question of how the liberal message may be propagated. It will 
not be via the established media. This is worthless from the liberal point of view. Liberty of 
conscience and of unlicensed printing once embodied two principies - that individuáis have the 
right to believe whatever they will, and to communicate this without hindrance. The institutions 
remain, their principies repudiated. Today, we can read about religion things that might have 
shocked Voltaire. But the important debates are no longer religious. Where they are important, 
there are new catechisms and new forms of blasphemy - and a policing of them that, increasingly, 
any inquisitor might have recognised. 
In this country since about 1910, the media has at least distorted the news. Instead of reflecting 
what people are really thinking, and reporting what the politicians are really doing, it has created 
a world close enough in appearances to the real one not to cause scandai, but in which nearly ail 
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the substance has been replaced. It may no longer be able to conceal things like the Abdication 
Crisis, or Churchill's drunken incompetence. But it can still set a false agenda for public debate. 
It does this by a subtle yet effective framing of arguments, by turns of phrase, by terminology. 
We have, for example, the continued use of "right" and "left" - a dichotomy that never meant 
much at its most relevant, and which now describes political debate about as well as the 
Ptolemaic system described the universe. It is a dichotomy that, so far as the public is concerned, 
serves to break liberalism into disconnected fragments and to scatter these across the whole 
conventional spectrum of thought, and so to reduce its effectiveness as the main opposition 
ideology of our age. Or we have the repeated conflation of greenery with niceness, of coercive 
altruism with caring, of markets with throat-cutting greed, of anti-nationalism with a love of 
supra-national institutions like the United Nations and the European Union. 
It may seem an absurd exaggeration to say this in a country where no laws exist against 
propagating any point of view, but the issues are presented by the British media in ways that 
often prevent their being intelligently discussed. Part of this, no doubt, is due to the idleness and 
stupidity of most people who get jobs in the media. Part of it, though, is the effect of a 
centralised media the owners of which have been co-opted into the Establishment. 
But the Internet changes all this (Chapter One, p.62). The West is moving perceptibly into an 
age of zero censorship. We are not there yet - not even in America, where the revolution is most 
advanced. But it is plain where we are heading. The intricate web of laws and informal 
pressures that governs expression in even the freest countries is being broken through. If we 
want to publish unorthodox opinions, we no longer need to negotiate with editors, hoping at best 
for a letter to be published or to be laughed at even while allowed on to a current affairs 
programme. If we want to read such opinions, we no longer need to hunt down obscure little 
pamphlets and newsletters. It is increasingly irrelevant whether the media barons are offered 
bribes or threatened with prison: their ability to manipulate what we read or see or hear is 
withering almost by the day. If still only in small amounts, everything is now available on the 
Internet, and can be accessed as easily as looking for a Chinese takeaway in the Yellow Pages. 
And every day, more pages are created on the World Wide Web, and more data flows through 
the news groups. We are increasingly in a position to know what is happening, and to make our 
opinions about this directly available to millions of other people. 
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It is the Internet that imbues the whole liberal project with fresh hope. A l l eise has failed, but the 
Internet remains. It is the équivalent of the hand printing presses that helped bring down the 
Stuarts in the 1640s. As with the defenders of liberty then, libérais now may have only to ensure 
that the message sent via the medium is clear and attractive and recognisably true. 
Conclusion 
Al l being said, one must avoid excessive optimism. The overriding thème of this thesis is that 
liberalism is not inévitable. It emerged in England largely by accident. It was maintained for 
several centuries by a set of forces that has no précise équivalent in any other nation at any other 
time. Only its décline can be seen as inévitable - as the temporary supports on which it rested 
were knocked away, and the course of English history merged again with that of the rest of 
humanity. In other words, the liberal ascendency in England before about 1914 may not have 
been part of any "progress" from status to contract - but rather an aberration that could not and 
did not last. 
After the first text, showing this history, the others variously describe the continuing décline of 
liberalism and speculate on how it may be revived. The overall conclusion is deeply pessimistic. 
Perhaps the internet will almost magically roll back the great counter-Enlightenment of the 20th 
Century. Perhaps it will not. 
Though his influence hovers over most of the texts here reproduced, Hayek is not often 
mentioned. It may be well, therefore to quote him at the end of this context Statement: 
[W]hen we décide each issue solely on what appear to be its individual merits, we 
always over-estimate the advantages of central direction. Our choice will 
regularly appear to be one between a certain known and tangible gain and the 
mere probability of the prévention of some unknown bénéficiai action by 
unknown persons. If the choice between freedom and coercion is thus treated as 
a matter of expediency, freedom is bound to be sacrificed in almost every 
instance. As in the particular instance we shall hardly ever know what would be 
the conséquence of allowing people to make their own choice, to make this 
décision in each instance dépend only on the foreseeable particular results must 
lead to the progressive destruction of freedom. There are probably few 
restrictions on freedom which could not be justified on the grounds that we do not 
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know the particular loss they well cause.1 
The 20th Century has seen the triumph of expediency. This thesis looks at the means by which 
it was avoided in the past, and by which it may again be avoided in the 21 st Century. 
Note on Authorship 
All the writings mentioned below are my own unassisted work. Those written under a différent 
name are given with the pseudonym in quotation marks. 
* F.A. von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement ofihe Liberal Principles of Justice and 
Political Economy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973-79, Volume One, p.57. 
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Chapter One 
How English Liberty was Created 
by Custom and Accident 
and Then Destroyed by Libérais2 
by Sean Gabb 
24,816 words 
First Published as Historical Notes No.31, 
by the Libertarian Alliance, 
London, 1998, 
ISBN 1 85637 410 6 
One: The Question Stated 
According to William Winwood Reade, writing in the early 1870s, 
placing aside hereditary evils which, on account of vested interests, it is 
impossible at once to remove, it may fairty be asserted that the government of this 
country is as nearly perfect as any government can be.3 
Now, this is not one of those vague boasts that turn up in the literature of every powerful nation. 
2 Throughout this work, I will refer sometimes to Britain, but mostly to England. The reason is that I shall be reterring 
mostly to English history, not to Scottish, Welsh or Irish, and to English modes of thought. Before 1707, there was no 
constitutional entity known as Britain; and though during the end of the eighteenth Century, the modes of thought I am discussing 
wcre oftcn most fiiUy and memorably expressed by Scottisli and Irish philosophers, thèse were for the must part joining in an 
English debate. 
Now - April 1998 - when the United Kingdom is plainly on the verge of disintegrating, therc seems no point in maintaining the 
polite fiction that has grown up in the présent Century of referring to specifically English things as British. For this reason, 1 only 
refer to Britain when discussing issues affecting the whole United Kingdom. 
3 William Winwood Reade, The Martyrdom ofMan (1872), Watts & Co., London, 1924, Chapter VI, "Intellect", p.418 
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Reade was what may loosely be called a classical liberal - that is, he believed in free markets, in 
personal freedom, and in the rule of law. He denied that it was either the duty or the ability of 
government to make people happy, but only to enable the conditions in which they themselves 
could pursue happiness as they conceived it.4 
It seems hard on his own grounds to disagree with him. The previous 40 years have been seen 
as a time of nearly continuous progress towards his state of perfection. The criminal law had 
been humanised, and the civil law made cheaper and more rational. Central and local 
government had been cleared of waste and sinecures. The armed forces had been likewise 
reformed. Religious disabilities had been lifted. Trade protection had been all but abandoned, 
and other taxes were low and falling: the standard rate of income tax was 3d in the pound in 
1872, and was to fall to 2d in 1873 - or from 1.25 per cent to 0.833 per cent.5 And the old taxes 
on publication had been entirely abolished. At the same time, the National Debt was being repaid 
-down from £846. lm in 1836 to £784.2m in 1872; or, as a share of the growing national income, 
from 228.67 per cent to just 73.15 per cent.6 The Poor Law no longer pauperised the working 
classes; and these, by the steady rise of incomes and by downward extensions of the franchise, 
were now being brought within the pale of the Constitution. As Reade said, there was much still 
to be done. But much had been done. More than any other in the world, the mid-Victorian State 
could be described, in Carlyle's words as "anarchy plus the constable". 
Yet even as it was celebrated, this state of affairs was passing away. Year by year, the authorities 
were becoming more active - taking an increasing interest in the contractual and other 
relationships between individuals. By 1884, Herbert Spencer could take it for granted that 
4 For explicit statements of Reade's liberalism, see: 
Human nature cannot be transformed by a coup d'état, as the Comtists and Communists imagine. It is a 
complete delusion to suppose that wealth can be equalised and happiness impartially distributed by any 
process oflaw, Act of Parliament, or revolutionary measure.... [A] government can confer few benefits upon 
a people except by destroying its own laws (ibid., pp.417-18). 
s Source: B.R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971. 
pp.427-29. 
6 /eu/, pp.336-67. 402. 
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[Régulations have been made in yearly-growing numbers, restraining the citizen 
in directions where his actions were previously unchecked, and compelling 
actions where previously he might perform or not as he liked; and at the same 
time heavier public burdens, chiefly local, have further restricted his freedom, by 
lessening that portion of his earnings which he can spend as he pleases, and 
augmenting the portion taken from him to be spent as public agents please.7 
Perhaps worse from his point of view, much of this was being done by Liberal Governments, and 
in the name of liberalism. Joseph Chamberlain, for instance, not only called himself a liberal, 
but was President of the Board of Trade in the second Gladstone Ministry; and he was there 
making the sort of laws that Spencer abominated - Acts to allow local authorities to supply 
electric lighting, and to interfère with the running of the merchant marine. He justified this 
"new" liberalism on clever grounds: 
When government was represented only by the authority of the Crown and the 
views of a particular class, I can understand that is was the first duty of men who 
valued their freedom to restrict its authority and to limit its expenditure. But ail 
that is changed. Now government is the organized expression of the wishes and 
the wants of the people and under thèse circumstances let us cease to regard it 
with suspicion. Suspicion is the product of an older time, of circumstances which 
have long since disappeared. Now it is our business to extend its functions and 
to see in what ways its opérations can be usefully enlarged.8 
As Spencer saw it, however, all this was just an excuse for turning liberalism into a "new form 
of Toryism", in which the old protective spirit could take on forms more suited to a démocratie 
âge. 9 He was not alone. In 1882, the Liberty and Property Defence League was founded - a 
coalition of individualist libérais and conservatives and business interests, drawn together to fight 
under the motto "Individualism versus Socialism". The contribution of this body to the 
préservation of English liberty cannot be overestimated. Düring more than 30 years, it spent 
7 Herben Spencer The Man versus the State (1884), The Thinker's Library. No. 78, Watts & Co., London, 1940, 
"Préface", p.xi. He was accounted one of the greatest sociologists of his ager and his unmaintained grave in Highgatc Cemetery 
lies about six feet from that of Karl Marx. 
8 Joseph Chamberlain, speech to the "Eighty" Club [a grouping of Liberal MPs first elected in the 1880 Genera] 
Election], 28th April 1885; reported in The Times, London, 29th April 1885. 
9 Spencer, op. cit., p. 19. 
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lavishly on its own campaigns, and coordinated action for others. Though for the next generation 
it would fight often very successfully, there could be no doubt that it was resisting an immensely 
more powerful impulse, which it was able at best to hinder.10 
Taking a longer view, E.S.P Haynes felt certain enough in 1916, the middle year of the Great 
War, to say that 
[t]here is no doubt that for the last forty years the whole tendency of British 
politics has been hostile to individual liberty.... We are no doubt fighting 
Prussian aggression, but not necessarily Prussian ideals of internal government. 
Indeed the only effect of the war up to now has been to strengthen the hands of 
Prussian-minded Britons." 
Turning from opinions to facts, there is no doubt that, starting around 1870, the British State 
began a remarkable and largely continuous expansion. Since the end of the French Wars, 
Government spending as a percentage of national income had been drifting downwards - from 
about a third in 1815 to just over 7 per cent in 1870. Thereafter, the fall stopped. There was no 
significant increase in time of peace until after the naval race with Germany began after 1905, 
1 0 For a history of the League, see Norbert C. Soldon, Laissez-Faire on the Defensive: The Story of the Liberty and 
Property Defence League, 1882-1914, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Delaware, 1969 - copy in the possession of Chris 
R. Tame. See also Thomas Mackay (ed.), A Plea for Liberty: An Argument Against Socialism and Socialistic Legislation 
(1891), republished by Liberty Classics, Indianapolis, 1981; and Auberon Herbert, The Rights and Wrongs of Compulsion by 
the State and Other Essays, Liberty Classics, Indianapolis, 1978. 
1 1 E.S.P Haynes, The Decline of Liberty in England, Grant Richards Ltd, London, 1916, "Introductory", pp. 14-15, 
19-20. 
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when it rose to 8.49 per cent in 1913.12 But in an âge devoid of large wars, when the national 
income was briskly increasing, a stable share for public spending allows a considérable 
expansion of State activity. After the Great War, of course, Government spending went back to 
the levelsof 1815, and eventually far beyond, reaching a peak of 52 percent in 1972. Since then, 
it has drifted back down to about 40 per cent, rising and falling in line with conditions in the 
economy at large. 
These figures indicate but do not precisely show the extent of modem control over our lives. It 
is fair to say that almost nothing we do is beyond state supervision where not control. Our 
working lives are regulated in ways so various and offen overlooked as almost to challenge 
description. Whether we offer our labour to an employer or our services directly to the public, 
the terms on which we do so are in perhaps a minority of cases negotiated solely between the 
contracting parties. Our food is regulated at every point between its création and arrivai on our 
plates. Our health and fitness have become things managed by the State, with a growing System 
of punishments for disobeying the experts' advice.13 The raising of our children is closely 
1 2 Public Finance Statistics, United Kingdom, 1855-1938 
Year Gross Govt Net National per ce 
Spending Income at Current 
(£m) Priées (£m) 
1855 69.1 636 10.86 
1860 69.6 694 10.03 
1865 67.1 822 7.16 
1870 67.1 936 7,17 
1875 73.0 1113 6.56 
1880 81.5 1076 7.57 
1885 88.5 1115 7.93 
1890 93.4 1385 6.74 
1895 105.1 1447 7.26 
1900 193.3 1755 11.01 
1905 147.0 1776 8.27 
1910 167.9 1984 8.46 
1913 192.3 2265 8.49 
1938 909.3 4671 19.47 
Source: Ibid., pp.367-69, 397-99. 
1 3 For an authoritative Statement of the lifestyle regulators' creed, see Alweyn Smith and Bobbie Jacobson (eds), The 
Nation s Health: A Strategy for the 1990s: a Report from an independent Multidisciplinary Commutée Chaired by Professor 
Alweyn Smith, King Edward's Hospital Fund for London, London, 1988. 
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watched; and there are even calls for procréation to be licensed by the State.M Our 
entertainments are explîcitly regulated, and sometimes forbidden, in the interests of our physical 
and moral well-being. We have a "War on Drugs" - something that, waged by the Chinese State, 
Struck the Victorians as absurd.15 In fighting that "war", the British State is fast abolishing 
privacy in fînancial matters and reversing the bürden of proof in criminal cases.16 
By the standards of a classical liberal, most of us now alive were born into a welfare state. AU 
of us now live in a police state. It may not be the sort in which the press is censored and people 
disappear. But it is the sort in which we stand beneath an absolute and arbitrary power. If that 
power is often used for benevolent ends - if the more plainly despotic laws are never fully 
enforced - that is because our masters please to rule us in this way. Give us new masters, or let 
the présent ones please otherwise, and we shall soon discover the basics of how England is now 
governed. 
The question here to be examined is - Why did this happen? How did the England of Reade's 
day become the England of our day? Is it - as the socialists and social democrats insist - that 
1 4 See, for example, Judy Jones, "Top doctor urges legal controls on parcnthood'', The Observer, London, 7th August 
1994 - report of how Professor Sir Roy Calne argues "that people in Western nations should havc to pass a parenting test and 
gain a reproduction 'licence' bcfore being allowed to have childrcn". 
1 5 See, for example, T.B. Macaulay (then Secretary of State at War), Speech on the War with China, delivered in the 
House of Commons on the 7th Apri l 1840 : 
We may doubt whether it be a wise policy to excludc altogether from any country a drug which is often 
fatally abused, but which to those who use it rightly is onc of the most precious boons vouchsafcd by 
Providence to man, powerful to assuage pain, to soothe irritation, and to rcstorc health.... We have leamed 
from ail history, and from our own expérience, that revenue cutters, custom-house officers, informers, will 
never keep out of any country foreign luxuries of small bulk for which consumers are Willing to pay high 
priées... 
(The Misceiianeous Wriiings and Speeches of Lord Macaulay, Longmans, Green, and Co., 
London, 1889, pp.607-08). 
1 6 For the abolition of fînancial privacy, see Sean Gabb, The New Tyranny of Global, European and British State 
Control of Financial Transactions, "Legal Notes No.23", The Libertarian Alliance, London, 1995. See also Sean Gabb, review 
of William C. Gilmore (ed.) International Efforts to Control Money Laundering {Cambridge, 1992), and Rowan Bosworth-
Davies and Graham Saltmarsh. Money Laundering: A Practical Guide to the New Legislation (London, 1994), publ ished in Free 
Life, London, No.23, August 1995. 
For the reversai of the bürden of proof, see J. Enoch Powell, The Drug Trafficking Act versus Natural Justice. "Legal Notes 
No.2?:, the Libertarian Alliance, London, 1987. See also Anthony Furlongand Edward Hume, review of the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 1995, published in Free Life, London, No.24, December 1995. 
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liberalism was found at last to be a defective ideology, and that the departures of the présent 
Century have been on the whole for the best? Or, to take a slightly différent point of view, is it 
that liberalism was only suited to one particular stage of social évolution, now long past? Or was 
it overcome by bad luck - the drift into power politics that began in 1870 and culminated in the 
Great War? Or was it overcome by a coalition of special interests? If this last, why did it prove 
so feeble in the contest? 
The question of why liberalism collapsed has been asked endlessly - and it was even being asked 
before it had collapsed.17 I have been asking it ever since I became a liberal in my early youth. 
I cannot claim any complète answer. But the longer I have thought about the question, and read 
the answers supplied by other people, the more I suspect that there never was any strictly liberal 
ascendency in England. Undeniably, there was a Liberal England. But its rise and existence 
until 1914 owed comparatively little to liberal ideology. It owed far more to separate, i f related 
circumstances. 1 suspect also that the great diminution of liberty that has occurred since Reade's 
day was set in motion by people like him. 
Two: The Seventeenth Century Origins of Liberal England 
To see this, let us begin by looking at the ideas that shaped and maintained English liberty 
between the seventeenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. Because it is one of the 
very few political texts continuously published and read since the seventeenth Century, we could 
go to John Locke's Second Treatise, published in 1690. According to paragraph 4, 
[t]o understand Political Power right, and dérive it from its Original, we must 
consider what State ail Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of perfect 
Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as 
they think fît, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or 
1 7 See, for example, Albert Venn Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England Düring 
the Nineteenth Century (1905). second édition, Macmillan and Co. Limited, London, 1914, Lecture VII, "The Growth of 
Collectivism"'. 
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depending upon the Will of any other Man. 1 8 
Now, this may be the most extreme liberal Statements ever published by a great philosopher. 
Translated from his own rather abstract terminology, Locke is saying: How we make and dispose 
of our money, and under what conditions; where we settle and live; what clothes we wear; what 
information we receive or impart, how and with whom we associate, what things we eat, or drink, 
or inhale, or otherwise ingest - thèse, within the limits set by the equal rights of others, are 
matters solely for us to décide. 1 9 
While his own model of the best government bears a strong and perhaps unnecessary 
resemblance to an idealised English Constitution of the seventeenth Century, Locke is clear that 
the main, if not the sole, function of government is the protection of life and property. If it goes 
substantially beyond that function, only on the grounds of convenience can an objection be raised 
" An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End qf Government (1690), Chapter H, paragraph 4 - in Peter 
Laslett's édition (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1960), p. 287. The italics are original. 
1 9 As might be expected, there is some controversy regarding just what Locke meant by this "State of perfect 
Freedom". I will not give a lengthy analysis of the Second Treatise. 1 will instead refer the reader to the following: 
He that will carefiilly peruse the history of mankind, and look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with 
indifferency survey their actions, will be able to satisfy himsclfthat there is scarce that principle of morality 
to be named, or rule of virtue to be thought on (those only excepted that are absolutely necessary to hold 
society together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct societies), which is not, somewhere or 
other, slighted and condemned by the gênerai fashion of whole societies of men, govemed by practical 
opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others. 
(John Locke. Essay Concerning Human Understanding (also published in 1690), Book 1, Chapter 
11) 
There is no absolute morality. There are those rules "that are absolutely necessary to hold society together". Any that cannot 
be shown to be necessary may be abolished as restraints on freedom. 
Locke is an inconsistent philosopher. The empiricism of his Essay not merely conflicts with, but wholly undermines the natural 
law position adopted in his Second Treatise. But tolérance is more a state of mind than an opinion; and it is, 1 think, legitimate 
in this case, to quote from the Essay to expand on a Statement made in the Second Treatise. 
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to its remodelling or overthrow. 
Yet, for all he may appeal to us, Locke neither conquered the English mind of his day, nor can 
be taken as spokesman for its liberalism. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "the 
rights of Englishmen" was a phrase as much on the lips of politicians as "democracy" is in the 
twentieth. It pleased the public. But, then as now, there was a difference between lip-service and 
genuine belief. Nor among those who did believe was there much reason or desire to expand the 
phrase until it was co-extensive with Locke's "State ofperfect Freedom". 
For the most part, the political thinkers of the seventeenth century defined liberty in a far more 
3 0 See, for example: 
...Tyranny is the exercise of Power beyond Right, which no Body can have a Right to. And this is making 
use of the Power any one has in his hands; not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private 
separate Advantage. When the Governour, however intituled, makes not the Law, but his Will, the Rule; 
and his Commands and Actions are not directed to the preservations of the Properties of his People, but the 
satisfaction of his own Ambition, Revenge, Covctousness, or any other irregular Passion. 
(Second Treatise, Chap. XVIII, 199 (pp. 416-17)) 
...Revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in publick affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling 
part, many wrong and inconvenient Laws, and all the slips of humane frailty will be born by the People, 
without mutiny or murmer. But if a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all lending the same 
way, make the design visible to the People, and they cannot but feel, what they lie under, and see, whither 
they are going; 'tis not to be wondered, that they should then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put the 
rule into such hands, which may secure to them the ends for which Government was first erected... 
(ibid, Chap. XIX, 225 (p. 433)) 
Compare this, by the way, with the following: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to 
secure these rights. Governments are instituted among Men. deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of 
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles 
and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and 
Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light 
and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, 
while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. 
But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to 
reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and 
to provide new Guards for their future security. 
(From Thomas Jefferson, The Declaration of Independence of The United States of America, 
1776) 
It is hard not to accept that Jefferson had the text of Locke open before him as he drafted this most powerful of manifestos, or 
at least had a clear recollection of it in his mind. 
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restricted sense than it can be found in the pages of John Locke. We see this in the writings of 
men like Coke, Davies, Seiden, Cotton, Prynne, Pym, Eliot, Hampden, Whitelocke, and Glanvil -
all of them lawyers or students of the English Common Law. To them, freedom meant the 
enjoyment of certain rights inherited from the past. They believed, or maintained, that the 
English Constitution had continued exactly the same in every age since "time immemorial". 
Except for a cycle of decay and restoration, nothing was claimed ever to have changed. Immense 
industry went into the job of proving that every technicality of pleading or of the law of real 
property known to the courts of James I had descended unchanged from the very beginning of 
English history - a beginning that the lawyers were unwilling to date.21 Torture and Ship Money 
had been illegal in the reign of Henry II. Edward the Confessor had governed with the advice 
of a Parliament summoned in the usual way. In the legal submissions made during the Case of 
Ship Money - R v Hampden (1637) - precedents were advanced, and seriously examined, from 
the reign of King Egbert (827-39). 
Some appeal was made to natural or Divine law. But the main grounds of defence were 
historical. Indeed, they were considered its best grounds; and the lawyers defended them with 
fanatical zeal. For there was no understanding of prescription as we find it in the writings of 
Hume and Burke - that long possession should be seen as conferring title, regardless of origins. 
There are flashes of the later doctrine in the writings of Coke and Davies22; and a line of descent 
2 1 See, for example, The Country Justice, a manual of law published in 1661 : 
The common laws of this realm of England, receiving principally their grounds from the laws of God and 
nature (which law of nature, as it pertaineth to man, is also called the law of reason), and being for their 
antiquity those whereby this realm was governed many hundred years before the Conquest. 
(quoted, J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1958, pp. 140-1). 
1 2 See, for example: 
For a Custome taketh a beginning and groweth to perfection in this manner: When a reasonable act once 
done is found to be good and beneficiall to the people, and agreeable to their nature and disposition, then 
do they use it and practise it again and again, and so by often iteration and multiplication of the act it 
becometh a Custome; and being continued without interruption time out of mind, it obtaineth the force of 
a Law. 
(Sir John Davies, Irish Reports (Les Reports des Cases & Matters en Ley, Resolves & adjudges 
en les Courts del Roy en Ireland. Collect & digest per Sir John Davies, Chivaler, Attorney del 
Roy en cest Realm, written 1612, published 1674, quoted, J.G.A Pocock, 77ie Ancient Constitution 
and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1957, p. 33). 
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between ail thèse writers can be drawn through Sir Matthew Haie in the late seventeenth 
century.23 But in the early Stuart period, the Constitution was defended on the grounds that it was 
both immémorial and unchanging. And that is how it had to be. For without a full concept of 
prescription, the common lawyers accepted that if the Constitution could be shown not to be both 
immémorial and unchanging, it would be stripped of its legitimacy. They took it as self-evident 
that a right granted, however anciently, was revokable by its grantor or by his représentative. 
In particular, they allowed that if William I had governed by right of conquest, then Parliament 
and the Common Law must have derived from some later royal gift or consent; and that, this 
being so, neither could have any security in the présent. It would be open to Charles I to change 
or even abolish them at his pleasure. Men grew very frightened when they contemplated the 
Norman Conquest; and a continuîng thread in English thought right into the eighteenth century 
was the attempt to show that William had ruled not a conqueror, but as the lawful successor of 
Edmund the Confessor who had just happened to find it necessary to assert his right of 
succession by force of arms.24 
This is a bizarre doctrine, and it is hard now to see how any intelligent person could have 
accepted it. It was also a doctrine that had only emerged to dominate légal thought in the récent 
2 3 ...[W]hen by long Succession of Timcf the Conqucred had either been incorporated with the 
conquering Peoplc, whereby they had worn out the very Marks and Discriminations between the 
Conquerors and Conquered; and if they continued distinct, yet by a long Prescription, Usage and 
Custom, the Laws and Rights of the conquered Peoplc were in a manner settlcd, and the long 
Permission of the Conquerors amounted to a tacite Concession or Capitulation, for the Enjoyment 
of their Laws and Liberties. 
(Sir Matthew Haie, The History of the Common Laws of England, written 1676, second édition 
published 1716, quoted, Pocock, op. cit, p. 179). 
2 4 According to Pocock, 
[t]he typical educated Englishman of this age, it seems certain, a vitally important charactcristic 
of the constitution was its antiquity, and to place it to a very remóte past was essential in order to 
secure it in the présent. 
(op. cit., p. 47) 
See also: 
Should we allow our laws to have an uncertain Original, 1 fear that some people would of 
themselves fix their original from William 1, and if that should be taken for granted, 1 don't know 
what ill use the Champions of Absolute Monarchy may be inclined to makc of such a concession. 
(op. cit., pp. 119-20) 
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past. Not only was the early Tudor period one of quite radical legislative activism - the Crown 
and Parliament both exercising their right to make changes in the law - but there had then also 
been a pronounced sensé of the Common Law as just a local manifestation of a universal law. 
Men who had lived through the growth of Royal Councils such as the Court of Star Chamber, 
staffed by men schooled in the Roman Law, or had seen the Succession repeatedly changed by 
Act of Parliament and whole churches established and disestablished, could have little sensé of 
immémorial custom. It was only with the political stability and the isolation of English thought 
that followed the Elizabethan Seulement, that the Common Law began to regain the primacy it 
had enjoyed in the middle âges. The common lawyers of the early Stuart period were able to 
advance their claims of rights inherited from the distant past only by forgetting a quite différent 
State of affairs that had existed before the later years of Elizabeth. 
Nevertheless, though bizarre and novel, the doctrine was undeniably useful. More by luck than 
intention, the English people had emerged into the modem period with a Constitution relatively 
untainted by despotism. Throughout Western Europe in the sixteenth Century, the requirements 
of national defence or aggrandisèment had raised up large standing armies under royal control. 
These had allowed kings to beat down the constitutional checks and balances that had previously 
been common across the whole région. The Kings of France and Spain had become absolute 
monarchs, able to tax and order their realms more or less as they pleased. 
Only in England had this pressure been absent. Because of its island status, there had been no 
need of a standing army, and thus no occasion for a fundamental unbalancing of the Constitution. 
Indeed, the inflation of priées that had accompanied the flood of silver into Europe from the 
Spanish Settlements in South America had even weakened the traditional powers of the Crown. 
A King was expected to "live on his own" - that is, to pay the normal expenses of government 
from the customary rents of his estâtes plus the proceeds of a few ad valorem duties granted at 
the beginning of each reign. With the real proceeds of thèse revenues in décline, Elizabeth was 
forced throughout her long reign to an extreme economy that allowed no army whatever in peace, 
and that was eased in times of emergency only by approaches to Parliament, which had the 
exclusive right to grant taxes. She might have used her popularity to coax more money out of 
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Parliament, but this would have meant allowing it a share of govemment that no Monarch until 
William III could be brought to accept. 
Yet, by the time James I succeeded to the throne in 1603, various doctrines of divine right and 
unfettered sovereignty had made their way into English thought. They can be found in the 
writings of the âge. 2 5 AU ideas have conséquences, and those that promote small and already 
powerful groups have a tendency to produce the largest conséquences. We only need look at the 
présent campaign against the motor car to see this. Most British people have either a car or 
access to one. They enjoy the pleasure and convenience of motoring, Yet they do no more than 
grumble at the rising bürden of taxes and other restrictions on motoring. They do this because 
the debate over the motor car has been won by its enemies. So it might have been with the 
argument over English liberty in the seventeenth Century. A clear vision on one side of a 
Monarchy, exalted and served by a bureaucracy and able to try ail the approaches to national 
greatness then fashionable; and on the other an unfocussed sensé of unease as the loss of an 
ancient but derided Constitution - there would have been no contest. The doctrines then coming 
in from Europe would have been used to justify the introduction into England of a royal 
despotism that in Europe they had been devised to justify after the event. To keep thèse doctrines 
from having any mark on the Constitution, it was necessary to raise up some countervailing 
doctrine of limitation. 
The rediscovery of the Common Law served this purpose. It allowed a defence of the declared 
rights of individuals and corporations and the powers of the House of Commons against royal 
encroachments. It stressed that govemment should act only by due process. It was even quietly 
expansive, since many of the rights claimed as ancient were actually modem or not yet existent. 
See, for example, the arguments during the reigns of James I and Charles I over the rights of the 
House of Commons: for ail the antiquarian zeal of the Parliamentary leaders, much of what they 
u See, for example, Francis Bacon, who served under James I as Lord Chancellor: 
Let judges also remember that Salomon's throne was supported by lions on both sides: let them be lions, 
but yet lions under the throne; being circumspect that they do not check or oppose any points of sovereignty. 
(Essays (second édition, 1612), No. LVI, "Of Judicature" - édition quoted published by Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1911, p. 164) 
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were claiming had never been admitted in earlier times, let alone granted and enjoyed. 
Yet the conventional test of whether a law was good or bad was not in itself liberal. A modem 
law could be judged on how well it harmonised with the others; and mis in practice applied a 
liberal test to many Stuart measures. But an old law could be at best only reinterpreted. 
Otherwise, no matter how illiberal, it was regarded by the defenders of freedom as no less valid 
than Magna Carta. 
A i l this suited the more radical dissenters, who joined their zeal for godliness to the defence of 
the Ancient Constitution. It allowed quite as much freedom as most of them wanted. Their 
complaint against the House of Stuart was that it maintained the supremacy of a Church that they 
abhorred, and that it persecuted them. With very few exceptions, this did not make them into 
secular libertarians.26 Their own Settlements in North America were in many respects as 
intolerant and conformist as Stuart England. Religious freedom meant for them the right to 
belong to an approved Dissenting church and to no other. The freedom of thèse churches from 
State control meant their right to enter politics and have their own views enacted into law. They 
hated Roman Catholics, and Anglicans, and pleasure. Their hatred of this last can hardly be 
conceived. Every pleasure, no matter how modest, that was not immediately joined with the 
contemplation of God and His Awful Day of Judgment, was to them abominable. They "hated 
bearbaiting" says Macaulay, 
not because it gave pain to the bear, but because it gave pleasure to the spectators.27 
For the truth of this epigram, they stand condemned by their own Statements. "The more you 
please yourselves and the world" said one preacher to his flock, "the further you are from 
pleasing God.... Amity to ourselves is enmity to God." "Pleasures are most carefully to be 
2 6 For an exception to, and an élaboration on. this statement, see Sean Gabb Henry Vane, ¡613*1662: America s First 
Revolutionary, "Libertarian Héritage No.8", the Libertarian Alliance, London, 1992. 
" Thomas Babbington Macaulay, History of England from the Accession ofJames //. ( 1848-60) "Everyman" Edition, 
J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd. London. 1910, volume one, p. 129 - or. in any othcr édition, the eleventh paragraph of Chapter 11. 
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auoided" wrote another: "because they both harme and deceiue." "Christ did never laugh on 
earth that we read o f wrote yet another, "but he wept."28 
Düring their brief triumph, after 1649, they set about enacting their préjudices into law. They 
harried the Catholics and Anglicans. They closed the théâtres. They eut down the Maypoles and 
abolished Christmas. They made all sex outside marriage a misdemeanour on first offence: on 
second offence, it was made a felony, punishable by death. To be sure, many dissenters became 
Lockeans; but the main dissenting creeds were anything but Lockean. 
This being said, the Dissenters did a service to the Constitution by attaching their own cause to 
it. They added a religious sanction to the defence of Common Law and Constitution in an âge 
when religion was an immensely powerful force in politics, and when Common Law and 
Constitution needed ail the strengthening available. For them, royal despotism and the Catholic 
faith were one and the same. And in spite of all they did when they had the power to brush 
Parliament aside, it was their enthusiasm against the Stuarts that ensured the victory of 
Parliament in the Civil War. 
But regardless of how badly damaged the Royalist cause emerged from the Civil War, the 
theoretical underpinnings of the Common Law argument were also damaged. Its defects had 
been sharply revealed. The central décades of the 17th Century had seen all the threads of legal 
continuity snapped. The men who saw the Monarchy restored in 1660, had lived through two 
civil wars, a régicide, two military coups and any number of written constitutions, some adopted, 
others drafted and argued Over. To them, inherited custom in itself no longer seemed to bind. 
In spite of its logical absurdity, the Common Law doctrine had been psychologically sufficient 
in an âge when the institutions of State really did seem to have descended from time immémorial. 
It could not satisfy so well in an âge when thèse institutions had been swept away and replaced 
by others, only eventually - and largely by surprise - to be restored. 
2 8 All quoted by Buckle, op. cit., Volume III, Chapter. IV, "An Examination of the Scotch Intellect Düring the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" - in my édition Volume III, pp. 254-5. Admittedly, thèse are Scottish examples. But 
they can stand for the more extreme of the English sectaries. 
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Of course, lime can smooth away any number of shocks; and a génération of stability after 1660 
might have allowed the psychological threads to reconnect to time out of mind, just as they had 
a Century earlier. But there was the further unsettling influence of the royalist antiquarians and 
the absolutist philosophers. The first were showing how the Constitution had not remained fixed, 
but had evolved over hundreds of years. The second were actually stepping outside the debate 
over the Constitution to pour scom on ail sides. 
It was Sir Henry Spellman, writing under Charles I, who knocked the first real holes in the 
Common Law argument. Looking through the same records as the lawyers, but reading the Latin 
in its piain meaning rather than those attached by the lawyers, he discovered the feudal 
innovations of William the Conqueror, and was able to trace in outline the graduai softening of 
thèse over the centuries into the freeholding Constitution of the seventeenth Century. Spellman 
remained to some extent fixed within the Common Law tradition - even repeating the insistence 
that William had not been a conqueror.29 But he was followed by other antiquarians, culminating 
in Robert Brady, whose writings of the 1680s were a deadly response to the Whigs in their use 
of the Common Law against the despotic ambitions of Charles II and his brother James. 
Supported by masses of évidence, most of it true, thèse accounts undermined the notion of 
immémorial custom, and therefore cleared the way for an assertion of royal power. For if 
Parliament was younger than the Monarchy, everyone agreed, it was plainly subordinate to it in 
every respect. 
About the only effective reply to this line of reasoning came from men like Thomas Hobbes. But 
they posed an even more deadly threat to the Common Law doctrine. What relevance, asked 
Hobbes, could the past have to the présent, except as explanation? In every State, he argued, 
there must necessarily be a sovereign power, and this must have the füll power to order things 
as it found convenient. It may be convenient to order a state in line with its historical expérience. 
But this is not to posit any limitations on the power of the sovereign, whose will cannot be 
resisted. "The sovereign of a Commonwealth" he argues, 
2 9 Pocock, op. cil., p. 149. 
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be it an assembly or one man, is not subject to the civil laws. For having power 
to make and repeal laws, he may when he pleaseth free himself from that 
subjection, by repealing those laws that trouble him and making new; and 
consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free when he will: 
nor is it possible for any person to be bound by himself; because he that can bind, 
can reléase; and therefore he that is bound to himself only, is not bound.30 
Law, according to this way of thinking, is nothing but the expressed will of a sovereign 
law-giver. It overturns the Common Law argument - not by contesting it from within, as the 
Royalist antiquarians sought to do, but simply by denying it any logical force. For "[t]he opinion 
that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant, that is to say, on condition, 
proceedeth from want of understanding this easy truth, that covenants being but 
words and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain or protect any man, 
but what it has from the public sword.31 
In the génération after 1660, the force of Hobbes' thought was blunted by its novelty. Very few 
Englishmen could understand what he was saying. Moreover, his argument took people in 
directions that hardly anyone wished to go. The debate of the age was not the Common Law 
against divine right monarchy, but an argument within the Common Law tradition. Even the 
Royalists who had followed Charles II into exile accepted the immemorial nature of the English 
Constitution, and disagreed with the Parliamentarians only over its interprétation.32 They were 
not inclined to take up a line of reasoning that eut their opponents to pièces, but also meant 
aeeepting views no less deadly to their own, and that sanetioned a government vastly more 
absolute than anything they themselves wanted. 
Far more dangerous were the works of Sir Robert Filmer. He also believed in absolute 
1 0 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan: or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, EcclesiasUcal and Civil ( ] 651 ), 
Chapter XXXVI. "Of Civil Laws" - in my édition (George Routledge and Sons, London, 1885), p. 124. 
31 Ibid., Chapter XVIII, "Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution" - p. 85. 
" Royalists of the school of Hyde. for instance, remained common lawyers in their prédilections and 
consequently believers in the ancien! constitution; the limit of their political beliefs was the 
assertion that a freely fiinctioning royal prérogative formed an cssential part of the constitution, 
and the limit of their use of history was the attempt to find précédents proving its existence. 
(Pocock, op. cit.. p.148). 
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sovereignty but hedged it - often in ways that disguised it - with arguments about the origins of 
Parliament and a mass of Scriptural quotation.33 Read today, his writings cannot but strike as 
some of the most foolish things ever written in English. Published during the Exclusion Crisis 
of 1679-83, they had a tremendous effect. They gave heart to the radical Tory fringe who stood 
against every attempt to prevent James Duke of York from succeeding his brother Charles [I, or 
even to limit his powers if he was to succeed. They caused explosions of outrage among the 
Whigs, cutting as they did through nearly a Century of consensus over the Common Law. 
The opponents of Charles II and James II faced ideological problems that the opponents of James 
I and Charles I had never had to consider. They were forced to choose. They could continue 
insisting, against all the évidence, that there had been no Norman Conquest; or they could find 
another support. Those who looked for another drew on various traditions - on the Greek and 
Roman stoics, on the mediaeval schoolmen, on the Jesuit controversialists. The classic 
expression of the resulting synthesis can be found in Locke's Second Treaiise. 
But, as said, this was not a typical expression. It may be one of the few works of political 
philosophy to have been continuously read since the seventeenth century, but it was surely among 
the least understood and appreciated in its own day. Then, it was the First Treatise 
accompanying it that made Locke's réputation as a writer on politics. Hardly read at ail now, this 
is a long and elaborate réfutation of Filmer's Patriarcha, and is argued on Filmer's own grounds. 
The oddly abstract spéculations that followed it were out of sympathy with the âge - even after 
the arguments from the immémorial and unchanging nature of the Constitution had been 
thoroughly unsettled. The pure theory of natural liberty was just as unsuited to the âge as was 
the pure theory of sovereignty. It was too geometrical. It went too far with its uncompromising 
Statement of rights that were not always recognised by the existing Constitution. It made scarcely 
more sensé to the génération of Somers and Newton as would an explanation of quantum 
mechanics. 
" The modern edition of Filmer's works is Peter Laslett (ed.). Patriarcha andOther Political Works of Sir Robert 
Fitmer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1949. 
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More congenial were the Discourses Concerning Government of Algernon Sidney, published in 
1698. Another attack on Filmer, these cover roughly the same gronnd as Locke, but every point 
is supported at least in part by the usual appeals to history and Scripture. There are long 
discussions of the Norman Conquest - denying it happened, denying that William made himself 
master of the soil, denying that the Stuart Kings had inherited any powers beyond those 
consistent with a limited parliamentary constitution.34 
Sidney differs also from Locke in his more restrictive view of freedom. Locke is a radical 
individualist. His argument begins with an assertion of the individuaos inborn, inalienable rights 
to life, liberty and property. Al l social arrangements are merely contrivances for maintaining 
these rights and for making their possession more enjoyable. For Sidney, the community is at 
least as important. He follows the ancients into the trap of confusing liberty with national 
independence. Thus, he heaps the most lavish praise on Sparta and Republican Rome, neither 
of which could be considered free countries in the Lockean sense.35 This was certain to please 
anyone who wanted another Puritan Commonwealth. 
More importantly, he fails to conceive how freedom limited only by the equal rights of others can 
be combined with order and political stability. He is like those modem conservatives, who stand 
so nearly on the border with liberalism, and make such nearly liberal statements, that to a casual 
glance they can pass as other than they really are. Freedom is glorious, he proclaims - but 
requires moral supervisión. For, without this, people will fall into vice; and private actions have 
3 4 Sec, for exarnple, Chapter Three, section 29, "The King was never Master of the Soil" (Algernon Sidney, Discourses 
Concerning Government (1698), (pp.493-97 of the édition published by Liberty Classics, Indianapolis, 1990)) 
3 5 Forcxample, 
...the Spartans desiring only to continue free, virtuous, and safe in the enjoyment of their own territory. and 
thinking thcmselves strong enough to défend it. framed a most severe discipline, to which few strangers 
would submit. They banished all those curious arts, thaï are useful to trade; prohibited the importation of 
gold and silver; appointed the Helots to cultivate their lands. and to exercise such trades as are necessary 
to life; admitted few strangers to live amongst them; made none of them free of their city, and educated their 
youth in such exercises only as prepared them for war. I will not take upon me to judge whether this 
proceeded from such a modération of spirit, as placed felicity rather in the fullness and stability of liberty, 
integrity, virtue, and the enjoyment of their own, than in riches, power, and dominion over others.,, 
(ibid... Chapter Two, section 22, "Commonwealths Seek Peace or War according to the Variety 
of their Constitutions" (pp. 203-4)) 
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public conséquences. Therefore, 
those who uphold populär governments, look upon vice and indigence as 
mischiefs that naturally increase each other, and equally tend to the ruin of the 
state. When men are by vice brought into want, they are ready for mischief: there 
is no villainy that men of profligate lives, lost réputation, and desperate fortunes 
will not undertake. Populär equality is an enemy to thèse; and they who would 
préserve it must préserve integrity of manners, sobriety, and an honest 
contentedness with what the law allows.36 
Not surprisingly, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 produced few radical changes on the surface. 
Alone of ail the great révolutions, indeed, it was carried through by men who desired at ail costs 
to deny that it was a révolution. Mindful of how their fathers had acted in 1641, they avoided 
both violence and grand gestures. Hardly anyone in the Convention called by William was 
anything but a firm believer in the Comnion Law and ancient Constitution. The only question 
debated was in what sensé that Constitution was to be understood after four years of James II. 
It is almost surprising that the Resolution emërging from the debate contains even one clause that 
might be regarded as Lockean. It was resolved that James, 
having endeavoured to subvert the constitution of this kingdom by breaking the 
original contract between King and People, and by the advice of Jesuits and other 
wicked persons having violated the fundamental laws, and having withdrawn 
himself out of the kingdom, has abdicated the government, and that the throne is 
thereby vacant. 
This was a deliberately inclusive formula, uniting every élément in the coalition that had 
assembled round William at Hungerford. But the main emphasis is on subverting the 
Constitution and violating the fundamental laws. These concepts went unquestioned in the 
debate. It was the words "original contract" that caused the most trouble. Gilbert Burnet tells 
36 Ibid., Chapter Two, sec. 24, "Populär Governments arc less subject to Civil Disorders than Monarchies; manage 
them more abiy, and more easily recover out of them" (p.229). See also "Foreword" by Thomas G. West; 
[A]lthough Locke was more often quoted, the core of Sidney's thought probably represents better than 
Lockc's the spirit of American republicanism (p.XXVIl). 
Certainly, no édition of Locke's Second Treatise appeared in America between 1773 and 1937 - Locke, op. cit., Laslett's 
Introduction, p. 125. 
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how some of the Lords in the upper house of the Convention asked where this contract was kept, 
or how it might be come at. They were given a vague answer about how every legal government 
implied a contract of some kind; and it seems to have been understood that the words were not 
intended to have any meaning beyond being a synonym for ancient Constitution.37 
Somewhere in his writings, Marx calls the Glorious Revolution a "palace coup". Somewhere 
else, Disraeli dismisses it as having done no more than introduce England to "French wars, 
Venetian politics and Dutch finance". Recent historians have dropped the adjective, and have 
taken to surrounding the noun with quotation marks. Undeniably, it was carried through not to 
establish the inalienable rights of man to life, liberty and property, but to preserve the inherited 
rights of Englishmen. Yet, looking past the intellectual timidity of the anti-Stuart coalition that 
finally triumphed in 1688, what they achieved was both revolutionary and, in liberal terms, 
glorious. They may have intended to achieve less than they did. But what they did achieve has 
justly earned them the veneration of all real friends of humanity. 
Three: The Administrative Vacuum of the Eighteenth Century 
Though never on the Continental scale, the Tudor and early Stuart monarchs had developed a 
centralised and fairly efficient administration. The counties might be ruled by the Justices of the 
Peace, and the towns by the municipal corporations - and both therefore by the leading local 
families. But these were in turn closely supervised by the Privy Council and the Councils of 
Wales and of the North. The Church was supervised by the High Commission, and the legal 
system by the Court of Star Chamber. Through these bodies, a mass of moral and economic 
regulation was imposed. Religious dissent was punished. Juries were intimidated. Monopolies 
and wage and price controls were enforced. 
Then, in 1641, excepting the Privy Council, which was greatly weakened, the whole central 
administration was either abolished outright or made impotent. It had been alien to the 
3 7 Gilbert Burnett, History of His Own Time (1723-34), Book IV. 
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Constitution. It had been used too extensively to usurp the authority of Parliament and the 
Common Law. It was not reconstituted after 1660, and the devolution of most government into 
local hands was quietly accepted. From then on, the only means of government were according 
to the Common Law or by Acts of Parliament made under the influence of the Common Law and 
interpreted and enforced by the courts of Common Law. 
The result of this was a severe limitation of governmental power. It is worth emphasising that 
this was not brought about by explicit limitations on the power of government to seek specific 
ends, as happened in America. A l l through the eighteenth century, minority groups were 
persecuted by the authorities. Catholics and Dissenters were denied a range of civil and political 
rights. Men who engaged in homosexual acts were hunted down more ferociously than in any 
of the absolutist monarchies of Europe - even if with less venomous persistence and fewer 
prohibitory laws than was later the case in England.38 The Common Law has never sought to 
prevent any stated end of government. It is the procedure of Common Law, with its requirement 
of due process and consistency between cases, that makes the ends to certain means impossible. 
There is no rule of Common Law that prevents a government from trying to regúlate prices. It 
simply prevents the sort of administrative supervisión and discretion without which they cannot 
be regulated. It was because of these limitations that the Tudor Monarchs had bypassed the 
Common Law and relied instead on their Councils and Commissions. Without these, 
administration in the European sense was abolished. 
3 S Therc were three main persécutions during the half century following the Glorious Révolution ofl688 - in 1699, 
in 1707, and in 1726. In this last, more than 20 molly houses were watched and raided. The likelier open places were patrolled. 
There was a spate of prosecutions for buggery and various less scrious Common Law offences. 
In 1726, one William Brown was entrapped while cruising in Moorfields. Asked at his trial what could have led him to make 
advances to the agent provocateur, he replied: 
"I did it because I thought I knew him. and I think there is no crime in making what use 1 please of my own 
body" 
(Select Trials for Murders, Robberies, Râpes. Coining, Frauds and Oiher Offences at the Sessions 
Hoiise in the Old Bailey. London, 1742, Volume 3. p.39-40; quoted, Alan Bray, Homosexuality 
in Renaissance England, Gay Men's Press. London, 1982, p.l 14). 
Had the Jury been composed of Lockeans, he ought surely to have been acquitted, if not carried shoulder high into the street. 
The City Jurymen were unimpressed; and Brown was sentenced to stand in the pillory. 
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There was, for example, no concept of administrative law. In France, the object of royal policy 
ail through this period had been to release administration from the control of law. The ordinary 
courts had been corrupted by the fiscal needs of the State. Judicial offices were created and sold 
to the highest bidder. The buyers joined a large class of irremovable office holders. Ignorant 
sometimes of the law, but never of their right to the fees from which their income derived, they 
made justice both expensive and uncertain. Yet, despite their corruption, thèse courts were still 
feared by the Government. They might apply the fixed rules of law, and might punish officiais 
judged in breach of the law. So, from the Controller General down to the lowest contractor on 
the roads, public servants were granted immunity from prosecution in the normal courts. Cases 
were heard instead by special administrative tribunals. The reason why was put very plainly by 
a Minister: "a state officiai indicted before an ordinary court would certainly find the judges 
prejudiced against him; and this would be to undermine the royal authority".39 The rules of 
justice were partially or altogether suspended whenever "the public good" was invoked. 
Administrative law was the instrument by which France was made into an absolute centralised 
despotism - a despotism tempered only by inefficiency and corruption. The Government took 
property for public use without compensation. It censored the press. It imposed punishments 
without the shadow of due process. A lettre de cachet - that is, a signed letter from the Royal 
Council - was enough to have someone imprisoned or exiled for as long as directed, and without 
any legal redress. These were obviously used to put down dissidence - as when, in 1749, a mild 
criticism of state policy earned the poet Désforges three years in an iron cage. They were also 
the private weapon of anyone able to persuade or bribe a Minister into issuing one. 
In England, punishments conld only be imposed by the Common Law courts. This ensured that 
the administrative authority of government was continually checked in ways that Europeans 
found astonishing. 
Take revenue collection. Even the imposition of Ship Money in the time of Charles I had been 
3 9 Translated from Alexis de Toqueville, L'Ancien Régime (1859), Livre II, Chapitre IV (Oxford University Press 
édition of 1969, p. 64) - translated, Sean Gabb. 
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subject to challenge before the courts; and it was only by a majority of a packed Bench that this 
tax had been judged legal. The more regular taxes allowed by Parliament after 1660 were 
continually avoided by legal challenges and creative uses of existing law. In the 1660s, a 
Derbyshire innkeeper named Michael Heathcot found a way round the beer excise by serving 
beer free to his guests who paid for the untaxed food, lodging and fodder that he provided. The 
only response available to the authorities was to procure a change in the relevant Act of 
Parliament. In Monmouthshire, innkeepers simply shut their doors in the faces of the excisemen, 
who had no legal power to break doors open.40 In France, tax gatherers were little more 
restrained than a gang of thieves. In England, taxes were effectively limited to things like land 
and windows and foreign trade. The first two had the advantage of being assessable with 
minimum intrusion; and the few disputes that arose over assessment and collection could be 
reliably left to the courts. The third were paid either by foreigners or a small minority of the 
population. 
The one serious attempt to expand the tax base before the end of the eighteenth century was 
Walpole's Excise Bil l of 1733. This would have achieved a number of desirable ends. It would 
have checked smuggling, and increased the carrying trade of England, and made London into a 
free port, and have allowed a reduction or repeal of the land tax. These were desirable except 
for the means. As proposed, the measure would have raised up a small army of officials with 
powers of inspection over shops and warehouses, and even private dwellings - powers that would 
have necessarily have been couched in terms alien to the Common Law. The proposal was 
shouted down by virtually the whole country, and was quickly abandoned.41 
Or take the suppression of political dissent. The only means allowed for this were the laws 
against high treason and seditious libel. On paper, these were ferocious laws; and they could be 
made into instruments of great cruelty and injustice in times of panic - as happened between 1670 
4 0 Michael J. Braddick, The Nerves of State: Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558-1714. Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1996, p.163. 
4 1 For a good account of the Excise Crisis, see John Morley, Walpole. "Twelve English Statesmen", Macmillan. 
London, 1890, 166-82. 
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and 1688, and again in the 1790s. For the most part, however, they were very limited 
instruments. Torture had always been illegal under the Common Law, and no forced confession 
could be received by the courts. The Habeas Corpus Act 1679 strengthened the old guarantees 
against arbitrary arrest and detention. 
Above all, the political laws could be enforced only in courts where a Jury was the final judge 
of all matters of fact. After Bushell's Case (1679), the right was unquestioned of Jurymen to find 
whatever verdict their conscience directed, even if against all the prosecution evidence. This was 
an effective check on at least unpopular oppressions. It saved Lord George Gordon in 1780, and 
has continued to save large numbers of lesser victims to the present day. Added to this, Judges 
were given security of tenure during good behaviour after the Revolution; and the purges for 
political unsoundness that disgraced the reigns of Charles I and James II were not repeated. 
Thereafter, a Judge might be friendly to the authorities, and might try leading Juries into 
favourable verdicts - but there was no punishment available if he chose to enforce the law as he 
conceived it. 
And as the eighteenth century advanced, such administrative discretion as had survived after 
1641 was limited still further. The whole concept of administration was narrowed to the 
fulfilment of duties imposed by the Common Law or Act of Parliament. Any Minister or official 
who exceeded his legal authority could - and sometimes did - have to stand in court like any other 
trespasser. In the most famous case arising between an individual and the authorities, Entick, a 
printer, sued two officials in 1764 for having broken into his house and seized his papers. 
Nothing had been found in the raid on which a prosecution could be founded, and the suit was 
for the trespass that had thereby been committed under Common Law. The officials pleaded a 
warrant signed by one of the Secretaries of State. This was based on a loose custom that had 
survived the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1695 - that is, the press censorship law with which the 
later Stuarts had tried to control public opinion. The Act had created wide powers of search and 
seizure of documents. The warrant used against Entick was a vague document that specified 
neither the place to be searched nor the things expected to be found there. It was a "general 
warrant" - or, in modern terms, it sanctioned a "fishing expedition". It was hoped that a search 
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of Entick's papers would reveal evidence of on which could be based a prosecution for seditious 
libel. 
These powers of search and seizure had survived their enabling Act largely because they were 
hardly ever used after 1715, and so no one saw fit to question their survival. The early years of 
George III, however, saw a revival of political dissent; and the authorities looked round for 
means of suppression. The attempted prosecution of Entick was part of a general scheme that 
had been inspired by the reaction to the pamphleteering of John Wilkes. The problem for the 
Government was that it had to face absolutely independent courts to justify not merely its use of 
general warrants, but their very existence. 
Entick v Carrington turned on a simple point. In pleading the Secretary's warrant, the officials 
were relying on the Protection of Constables Act 1750, which barred prosecutions for search and 
entry under warrant when no evidence of illegalities was found. Entick's lawyers claimed that 
the Act did not apply because the Secretary's warrant was itself illegal. There was neither 
Common Law nor statutory authority for an individual Privy Councillor to act as a Magistrate 
except in cases of high treason. Nor, supposing such a jurisdiction to exist, was there any 
authority for warrants of this type. 
Passing judgment in the case, Lord Chief Justice Camden of the Common Pleas agreed, declaring 
the warrant unlawful. He went further. In their alternative submissions - in case they lost on the 
strict legality of the warrant - the Crown lawyers had argued that public policy required a certain 
arbitrary discretion in crimes affecting the stability of government. He rejected this argument, 
saying: 
With respect to the argument of state necessity, or a distinction that has been 
aimed at between state offences and others, the common law does not understand 
that kind of reasoning, nor do our books take notice of any such distinctions.42 
42 Entick v Carrington (1765), 19 State Trials, al col. 1073. Oddly enough, such warrants still are partially illégal -
despite the provisions of the Police andCriminal Evidence Act 1984, the Public OrderAct 1986, thc Sccurity Services Act 1989, 
and a multitude of othcr récent statutes. 
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By this judgment, Camden Struck down the main remnants of a power that existed unquestioned 
at the time in every other civilised country, and that exists again unquestioned in both Britain and 
America. It was the classic Statement of a view that had prevailed with increasing force since the 
beginning of the traditionalist opposition to royalist centralism in the days of James I - that it was 
the duty of officiais not to do the bidding of government, but to obey the law. In Entick v 
Carrington, David Hume's comment on the Revolution Seulement finds its most concrète 
expression: 
No government, at that time, appeared in the world, nor is perhaps to be found in 
the records of any history, which subsisted without the mixture of some arbitrary 
authority, committed to some magistrate; and it might reasonably, beforehand, 
appear doubtful, whether human society could ever arrive at that state of 
perfection, as to support itself with no other control, than the gênerai and rigid 
maxims of law and equity. But the parliament justly thought, that the King was 
too eminent a magistrate to be trusted with discretionary power, which he might 
too easily tum to the destruction of liberty. And in the event, it has been found, 
that, though some inconveniences arise from the maxim of adhering strictly to 
law, yet the advantages so much overbalance them, as should render the English 
forever grateful to the memory of their ancestors, who, after repeated contests, at 
last established that noble principle43 
In gênerai, whether local or national, the tendency of government was to atrophy. Even had 
anything been desired of it, what remained of the central administration was too modest and too 
corrupt to interfère. Funds were embezzled or unaccounted for during years on end. An actual 
civil service barely existed. The two Secretaries of State, who directed most Government 
business, had a total working staff, including caretakers, of about two dozen. As for the local 
justices and corporations, with the supervisory Councils abolished, thèse could govern as much 
or as little as they pleased. Since they had to raise their own fimds, they generally preferred the 
latter. Without express repeal, much of the older regulatory législation - even what needed no 
4 3 David Hume, History of England (1762), Vol. V, p.280. 
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administrative discrétion to enforce, fell quietly into désuétude.4 4 
Now, in looking at eighteenth century England, we see a state of affairs quite unlike any others 
that have existed anywhere else in the world, before or since. The anti-Stuart reaction in the 
previous century was unusual in its opposition to the whole trend of Continental thought; but its 
success can be explained by virtue of the wild passions aroused in the debates of the âge. 
Obviously, the stifling of administrative law had been welcomed by the local élites into whose 
hands the remaining powers of the State was passed. Just as obviously, the final settlement made 
in the Glorious Révolution had been accepted by the commercial and noble classes as a whole. 
Those who had not minded the despotism of Charles I had suffered under that of Cromwell. 
Both Whigs and Tories inherited a fear of centralised power from their fathers; and this was 
renewed by the impartial despotism of James II. But, during the 18th century, while the relevant 
interests continued to benefit, the practical reasons to fear centralisation diminished. 
We should, then, have expected to see a renewed impulse towards centralised government. The 
arguments used by Joseph Chamberlain in the late nineteenth century should have been heard in 
the eighteenth. Big government had been a bad thing under the Stuarts, the argument might have 
gone, because it was then the instrument of Kings who wanted to abolish the ancient 
Constitution. They had ail been hostile to Parliament and the Common Law; and one of them 
had tried to undo the Reformation in England, and had briefly undone it in Ireland. It had 
therefore been right to resist them. and right to accept a conception of government that barred 
many désirable ends from being achieved. But now the Révolution was complète, and power 
rested in the hands of a Parliament chosen by the nation and a King whose title had no higher 
source than Act of Parliament, why keep up the old suspicions? Why not forget some of them 
4 4 On this point, see Oliver Goldsmith: 
There is scarcely an Englishman who does not almost every day of his life offend with impunity against 
some express law, for which in a certain conjuncture of circumstances he would not receive punishmcnt. 
Gaming-houses, preaching at prohibited places, assembled crowds, nocturnal amusements, public shows, 
and an hundred other instances arc forbid and frcqucnted. Thèse prohibitions are useful; though it be 
prudent in their magistrates, and happy for their people. that they are not enforccd, and none but the vénal 
or mercenary will attempt to enforce them. 
(Oliver Goldsmith, Citizen of the World (1765), quoted, Dicey, op. cit.. Lecture V, "The Period 
of Old Toryism", p.75) 
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for the sake of convenience? With the great contest over, the passions used to exalt the Common 
Law might have subsided, and the more usual contest recommenced - in which the special 
interests wheedle and push for influence, resisted only by a general préjudice in favour of liberty. 
But this did not happen. A l l through the eighteenth Century, the passions that had inspired the 
Revolution Seulement were visibly subsiding, but the Seulement itself persisted - and, as said 
above, even continued shedding the despotic éléments that had survived the Revolution. Men 
whose grandfathers had been too young to Hve under James II, let alone Charles I or Cromwell, 
retained préjudices against central and discretionary power that were not only irrelevant to their 
immédiate interests, but often hostile to them. Even landowners, whose taxes would at least have 
fallen, were prominent in opposing Walpole's Excise Bill . Even householders, whose lives and 
property might have been better secured, opposed the slightest move towards a police force''5; 
and, as Jurymen, they showed no mercy to officers of the law indicted for going beyond their 
legal powers in quelling riots and other disturbances. 
The Revolution Seulement was preserved by the dominant legal and political philosophy of the 
age. This set the agenda of debate. It set the criteria by which people conceived their interests. 
Though not the same as the one that had justifïed résistance to the early Stuarts, this 
philosophical outlook was a plain development of it. The challenges of both antiquarians and 
4 5 Opposition to a State pólice forcé was as firm as opposition to a general excise - and for the same reason, that it 
vvoutd have required the existence of powers alien to the Common Law. See William Paley: 
The libcrties of a free people, and still more the jealousy with which thosc liberties are watched, and by 
which thcy are preserved, permit not trióse precautions and restraints, that inspection, scrutiny and control, 
which are exercised with success in arbitrary govcrnmcnts. For example, neither the spirit of the laws ñor 
the people. will suffer the detention and confinement of suspected persons, without proofs of their guilt, 
which it is often impossible to obtain; ñor will they allow that masters of families be obliged to record and 
render up a description of the strangers or inmatcs whom they entertain; ñor that an account be demanded, 
at the pleasure of the magistrate, of cach man's time, employmcnt. and means of subsistence; ñor securitics 
to be required when those accounts appear unsatisfactory or dubious; ñor men to be apprehended upon the 
mere suggestion of idleness or vagraney, ñor to be confined to certain distriets; ñor the inhabitants of each 
district to be made naponsible for one anothcr's behaviour: least of all will they tolérate the appearance of 
an armed forcé, or the military law, or suffer the streets and public roads to be patrolled by soldiers; or, 
lastly. entrust the pólice with such discretionary powers as may make sure of the guüty, however they 
involve the innocent. These expedients, although arbitrary and rigorous, are many of them efTectual: and 
in proportion as they render the commission or concealment of crimes more diftícult, they subtract from the 
necessity of severe punishment. 
(William Paley. Principies of Moral and Poiilicat Philosophy{\785), I7th edition 1809, Vol. II, 
pp. 295-97). 
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naturalist philosophy had been faced and overcome. The enlightened urbanity of eighteenth 
century thinking removed further rough edges from it. What emerged by about 1760 was a clear 
and persuasive set of arguments in favour of maintaining an order of things inherited from the 
past. 
The older fictions abandoned, it was now recognised that the Constitution was the product of a 
long evolutionary growth of rules and institutions. The Constitution of 1750 was not the same 
as that of 1550, and still less that of 1350 or 1150. Between each of these dates, innovations had 
been made. Which were good and which bad had been shown by experience. And innovations 
would continue to be made in the future, either because needs would arise that were not yet 
provided for, or because earlier innovations would turn out to be defective. 
The Common Law view of the past remained, but in a modified form. It was still maintained that 
the Constitution was of immemorial origin, having been brought to England by the Angles and 
Saxons. This no longer meant asserting that Henghist and Horsa had carried with them the full 
English law of real property as known by Coke. It meant instead that English political culture 
had always placed high emphasis on the rights to life and liberty and of resistance to despotic 
power. This emphasis had been seen repeatedly at work throughout English history, shaping the 
growth of a free Constitution and preserving it against external and internal attack. The growth 
had been checked by William the Conqueror, but was restarted with new vigour in the national 
revolt that forced John to sign the Magna Carta. It had been checked again by the relatively 
despotic Tudors; but it was restarted with overpowering vigour during the Stuart period. In a 
sense, the Glorious Revolution introduced new principles into English Government - for instance, 
that Ministers had to be not merely responsible to Parliament, but continually acceptable to it. 
But it was also a deeply conservative reaffirmation of the ancient liberties of Englishmen.46 
There was still the question, as in the previous century, of how to maintain those liberties and 
hand them on undiminished to the following generations. The answer now was to develop the 
w For perhaps the most developed expression of this view, see Chapter I of Macaulay's History (op. cit.), and the noble 
passage that concludes Chapter X. 
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flashes of insight in the works of Coke and Davies and Hale into a general theory of social order. 
How this was done can be stated in a series of connected propositions: 
First, human beings are not "rational" in the sense claimed by the philosophers of the European 
Enlightenment. We exist within frameworks of rules and expectations that are always complex 
and are usually well-suited to some standard of convenience, but which we have not ourselves 
made, and which were never in the past consciously designed or discussed, and which are mostly 
not even folly understood. Instead, these frameworks are the product of a social evolution 
analogous to the natural evolution that Darwin later discovered to underlie the variety of animal 
forms and their adaptation to environment. 
An act is done and it benefits the actor. Sometimes, its benefit will be recognised. If so, it will 
be repeated by the actor as appropriate and imitated by others. Most often, it will not be 
recognised as a cause of benefit. If so, it may never be repeated, or it may be repeated and 
imitated along with much else that is purely incidental or even of contrary value to the benefit. 
Its adoption may entail the rejection of some other behaviour, or perhaps will need less radical 
modifications, in order for it to be fitted into an internally consistent body of existing custom. 
After a while, its origin - even if ever known - will be forgotten; and future generations will 
inherit another of the customs or institutions by which they will unthinkingly guide most of their 
behaviour. 
In some cases, an institution can be explained and given rational justification in a later, more 
enlightened age than the one in which it emerged - private property, for example, or marriage. 
But this can happen in only a small number of cases, for much of the information that is available 
to us for directing our lives cannot be reduced to the status of discussible hypotheses. It will be 
instead embodied in custom and prejudice, the justification of which must often be obscure. 
This view of human understanding is less flattering to human vanity than the rationalist notion 
of the conscious, designing intelligence. But it is more in accord with the known facts, 
explaining how people - no matter how learned or ignorant - have access to far more knowledge 
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than they can develop for themselves, or prove by themselves. 
Second, the view raise a presumption in favour of whatever is old and established. It may seem 
on first inspection that some particular law or public custom has no use. But the fact of its 
survival into the présent indicates that it once was, and might still be, useful - or that, even if 
useless or harmful in isolation, it is necessary for the survival of something that really is useful, 
or even for the survival of the whole System. 
When, therefore, we corne to an examine a functioning social order such as our own, the most 
proper attitude is one of curiosity mingled with révérence. We are not to seize on its apparent 
faults and reject it in favour of something eise spun out of a single head. Nor are we to advocate 
sweeping reforms simply on the grounds of "modernisation" or some other modish slogan. We 
must instead try to widerstand the inner workings of society - to conjecture by what innumerable 
and infinitesimal stages the présent order of things evolved to its présent sophistication. This will 
require us to look even to those habits and institutions that rest on justifications manifestly 
absurd, asking whether they might not nevertheless serve a useful purpose. Then, and only then, 
shall we be ready to consider what deliberate changes may be necessary, and how thèse may best 
be combined with what already is. 
Third, the greatest danger to society in an enlightened âge is the very attitude responsible for 
progress in the arts and sciences. These proceed most smoothly by a continuai questioning of 
existing knowledge - asking if it is most in accord with the known facts, or if there is some other, 
more economical means of explanation. Applied to matters of social organisation, the scientific 
method must inevitably raise doubts regarding the wisdom of what is. As said, not everything 
can be readily justified. Certainly, there are arguments to be put for presuming that customs and 
institutions contain a hidden rationality. But thèse will often seem - and occasionally will be -
nothing but a sophisticated defence of great social evils for which a complète answer seems 
within easy reach. And one victory for the forces of radical enlightenment will establish a 
précèdent for other attacks and victories, until the whole social is overthrown in an orgy of 
apparent reforms. 
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The danger must be avoided by doing nothing to shake the existing power of custom. One of the 
mental habits with which the évolution of customs has equipped us is a révérence for whatever 
is old. It can be found in every primitive Society, and is the essential preservative of what little 
civilisation is possessed by such societies. There is a psychological value in âge. Institutions that 
are old, or that appear to be old, can shelter within a ring of associations that may be powerful 
enough to restrain ail but the most determined tyrant or démocratie mob. Changes there must be, 
of course. But the best change is to be so cautious and incrémental that only those directly 
affected notice its happening. Even the most radical, sudden change is best achieved so that 
within only a few years it becomes difficult to tell the old from the new. 
A l l this has so far been expressed in abstract terms. An example may be best to complète the 
explanation. In giving this, let us avoid the standard ones that can be drawn from the French 
Revolution at the end of the eighteenth Century. Let us look instead at one from a later time and 
from an alien and now dead civilisation. 
In 1911, there was an épidémie of bubonic plague in Manchuria. This was large enough to worry 
all the usual governments and international organisations - there were fears of a new Black Death 
- and so much effort was put into Containment. 
Now, it was soon discovered that the carriers of the fleas which in turn carried the Pasteurella 
pestis bacillus were marmots, large burrowing rodents who were hunted for their skins. It was 
also discovered that the nomadic tribesmen who had hunted marmots for centuries were largely 
unaffected. Mostly affected were the Chinese hunters who had just poured into Manchuria 
following the collapse of the Manchu dynasty and the lifting of ail controls on movement into 
the région. 
The reason for this différence was that the native hunters followed certain customary rules that 
tended to minimise the risk of infection. They never trapped marmots, but only shot them. If an 
animal moved sluggishly, it was left alone. If an entire colony showed signs of infection, the 
hunters would at once pack their tents and move on. 
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Only in 1894 had the causes of bubonic plague been identified. Before then, its means of 
transmission had been an absolute mystery. Yet here was a nation of illiterate nomads not only 
doing as the newest research might have advised them, but doing it by custom since time 
immemorial. Asked why they acted so, they gave the most bizarre mythological justifications 
that said nothing about the avoidance of infection. There was no talk of some divinely inspired 
ancestor whose teachings had avoided the anger of the gods, or whatever. A l l the evidence 
pointed to a long history of slight and unconscious adjustments to environment. As with a purely 
natural selection, there had been small revisions of habits. Those contributing to greater well-
being had been copied and passed on to later generations as ritual. 
Ignorant of epidemiology, the Chinese hunters were rational enough to sneer at these rituals. 
Even if at second hand, they enjoyed the fruits of Western science and technology; and the 
Manchurian natives lacked the philosophical framework to justify customs in general for which 
they had no specific justifications. The Chinese went about their business of catching their 
marmots in the most cost-effective manner. They died in their thousands, and sent the bacillus 
down the new railway lines towards the rest of humanity. It was only because the causes of 
plague were now understood that the bacillus did not sweep the world again as it repeatedly had 
in the past.47 
This whole line of thinking finds its most perfect expression in Burke's Reflections on the French 
Revolution of 1790. In place of the poor exposition given above, it might be better simply to 
quote at length from this marvellous distillation of all social wisdom: written with one great 
public event in mind, it remains a work of universal significance. But let us instead recall a 
single passage: 
...[I]n this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess that we are generally men 
of untaught feelings, that, instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we 
cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, 
we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted and 
4 7 For those interestcd in following this case further, its full citations can be found in the notes to Chapter 4 of William 
H. McNeill, Piagues and Peopies, Basil Blackwell. Oxford, 1977. 
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the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid 
to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason, because we 
suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuáis would do 
better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages. 
Many of our men of spéculation, instead of exploding general préjudices, employ 
their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find 
what they seek, and they seldom fail, they think it more wise to continue the 
préjudice, with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of préjudice and 
to leave nothing but the naked reason; because préjudice, with its reason, has a 
motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which will give it 
permanence.48 
In England, it was the "men of spéculation" who ensured that the eighteenth century saw no 
reaction against the Revolution Settlement. The consensus of opinion among them was almost 
total. Even Edward Gibbon, supposedly the least English of eighteenth century English writers -
with his French tastes and Swiss éducation - was unable to judge the Roman Empire except by 
Common Law standards. Writing on the complexities of legal procédure, he comments: 
The expérience of an abuse from which our own age and country are not exempt 
may sometimes provoke a generous indignation, and extort the hasty wish of 
exchanging our elabórate jurisprudence for the simple and summary decrees of 
a Turkish cadhi. Our calmer reflection will suggest that such forms and delays 
are necessary to guard the person and property of the citizen; and that the 
discrétion of the judge is the first engine of tyranny; and that the laws of a free 
people should foresee and determine every question that may probably arise in the 
exercise of power and the transactions of industry.49 
Sir William Blackstone is still more emphatic. At the end of Book IV of his Commentaries, he 
breaks forth in this eulogy of the established order of things: 
Of a constitution so wisely contrived, so strongly raised, and so highly finished, 
it is hard to speak with that praise, which is justly and severely its due:- the 
thorough and attentive contemplation of it will furnish its best panegyric... To 
sustain, to repair, to beautify this noble pile, is a charge intrusted principally to 
4 8 Edmund Burke, Reßections on the Revolution in France (1790), "Everyman" édition, J . M Dent and Sons, Ltd. 
London, 1910, p.84. 
4 9 Edward Gibbon, History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-87), "Everyman" édition, J.M Dent 
& Sons Ltd, London, 1910, Volume Four, Chapter XLV, pp.443-44. 
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the nobility, and such gentlemen of the kingdom as are delegated by their country 
to parliament. The protection of THE LIBERTY OF BRITAIN is a duty which 
they owe to themselves, who enjoy it; to their ancestors, who transmitted it down; 
and to their posterity, who will claim at their hands this, the best birthright, and 
the noblest inheritance of mankind.50 
These men of speculation were not liberals in the manner of John Locke. They did not believe 
in the unrestrained right of individuals to life, liberty and property. Their defence of custom did 
often include a defence of burning injustice - the negro slave trade, for example, the press gang, 
the religious and sexual discrimination by law, the often barbarous criminal punishments, the 
general sloth and confusion of the procedural law, and so forth.51 But they did surround the 
Revolution Settlement with a palisade of words that no interested sophistry could break through. 
Such reforms as were achieved they carried through quietly, and most often by judgments of the 
courts - that is, by means that enabled reform to be presented as a statement of what always had 
been. They saved England from the same tendency to administrative despotism that emerged in 
Europe in the sixteenth century, and that was to continue undiminished into the nineteenth 
century, reaching its highest expression before our own century in the Napoleonic police state. 
By itself, then, English liberalism was too weak or timid to explain all the freedom that was 
actually enjoyed during the 18th century. Its effect was magnified by the administrative collapse 
of 1641. This had in turn been brought about, and was in part maintained, by adherence to 
conservative ideologies that justified only a limited freedom. At first, this strange circumstance 
was wholly beneficial. Except after a foreign invasion, or some immense public calamity, no 
other country has come so close to administrative anarchy as England did. The restraints that 
held the rest of mankind back were broken down; and the way was cleared for the development 
of free market capitalism. 
w Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765), quoted. Dicey, op. cit.. p.71-72. 
" One defect worthy of particular mention was the survival in Common Law procedure of what may be described as 
torture. If a man accused of a felony refused to plead guilt)' or not guilty and to be tried "by God and my country", he could not 
be tried. To make him plead, he was subjected to the peine forte et dure. His wrists and ankles were shackled, and he was 
suspended by these from the walls of a dungeon. He was fed only a scrap of bread and a mug of dirty water. Every day, a new 
iron weight was placed on his chest. So he continued until he agreed to enter a plea in court or until he died. Many preferred 
death, because, by dying unconvicted, they saved their families from the forfeiture of assets that followed a conviction for felony. 
This disgraceful practice was not abolished until 1771, after which a refusal to plead was to be interpreted as a plea of not guilty. 
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Four: The Decline and Fall of English Liberty 
From here, we move into the nineteenth Century - to the dawn of the age which Reade was to 
celébrate as one of almost perfect liberalism. The case in favour of his claim has already been 
put, and is a persuasive one; and it must be kept in mind throughout ail that is now to be said. 
It cannot be denied that liberal ideas came to dominate public thought and policy in Victorian 
England to a degree unmatched before or since. It must ever be for libérais what Periclean 
Athens is for Hellenists, or what the thirteenth Century is for Catholics - as the füllest 
embodiment of an ideal, and as the criterion by which ail other ages are to be judged. But, rightly 
examined, the age is also one of liberal decay. There is no contradiction. A house may appear 
in its füllest order and beauty even as its foundations are crumbling. In the same way, Victorian 
liberalism, beneath its fine exterior, was crumbling. 
And it was crumbling throughout the Century. When A . V . Dicey took 1870 as the date of 
transition between liberalism and collectivism, he was mistaking Symptoms for causes.52 A i l that 
happened around 1870 was that the subsidence cracks began to show unmistakably through the 
stucco. The whole Century, not just its end, was an age of liberal decay. For its beginnings, we 
must go another 80 years back from 1870, to 1789. This was a year notable for two great events. 
It was the year in which the French Ancien Régime collapsed under the weight of its own 
corruption. And it was the year in which Jeremy Bentham published his Introduction to the 
Principies of Moráis and Legislation. 
This was not intended to be an illiberal work. Nor has it usually been regarded as one. Bentham 
states three principies. First, législation is a science. Second, its purpose is to allow "the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number". Third, since individuáis are the best judges of what can make 
them happy, législation should clear away all those barriers to free action not required to protect 
the equal freedom of others. Applying these principies to English law and government, he 
denounced the ancient Constitution as nothing but a fraud. 
" See Dicey, op. cit., Lecture VIII, "Period of Collectivism". 
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Where Gibbon saw necessity and Blackstone wise contrivance, Bentham saw only a chaotic 
mess. English law, he said, had begun as the customs of an illiterate Germanie tribe, and then 
been added to and adapted in succeeding ages of feudalism and religious frenzy. Over the 
centuries, almost nothing had been abolished, and the additions had nearly ail been made by 
adapting existing forms and names to new purposes. The parts were often ingenious, but the 
whole was best regarded less as a "noble pile" than as a labyrinth of fictions in which the smallest 
conveyance or action required an army of expensive lawyers. As John Stuart Mi l i wrote half a 
Century later in summarising the Benthamite critique, 
the law came to be like the costume of a full-grown man who had never put off 
the clothes made for him when he first went to school. Band after band had burst, 
and, as the rent widened, then, without removing anything except what might 
drop off of itself, the hole was darned, or patches of fresh law were brought from 
the nearest shop and stuck on. 5 3 
Bentham spent the rest of his long life examining and rejecting the détails of what had been 
rescued and maintained by the Common Law thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The overall justifications he brushed aside as self-interested sophisms. Instead, every 
specific law and legal practice was examined, and the question was asked - "what use does this 
serve? If there is a use, can it be served by more direct means?" What need, he asked, to pay two 
fees for one appearance before a Chancery Master? Why had an action to establish title to land 
to begin with a mass of fictions about John Doe and Richard Roe? Why was a man denied 
counsel when charged with a felony, but not when charged with treason or a misdemeanour? 
Why were the parties to a Common Law action not allowed to give évidence in court? Why 
might the same dispute require separate actions in a Common Law court and in the Court of 
Chancery - one to obtain damages, the other to obtain an injunction? Why, in short, was 
everything so slow, so expensive, so disorderly, so otten grossly unjust? 
In place of this jumble, he proposed a comprehensive remodelling of the law. The rubbish of 
S î John Stuart Mili. Bentham (1838), in Mary Wamock (ed.), Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Essay on Bentham, together 
with Setected Writings ofJeremy Bentham and John Austin, Fontana, London, 1962, p. 107. This work also contains the first 
part of Bentham's Introduction to the Principies of Moráis and Legislation. 
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past âges was to be swept aside and replaced with a set of clear rational codes of law, enforced 
by courts with procédures so easy to widerstand that justice would be swift, and compréhensible 
and affordable to ail. 
With this went similar arguments for administrative reform. The great Councils had been swept 
away in 1641, and the Sanctions of administration had withered thereafter. But hardly a single 
office had been abolished. In place of anything worth calling a civil service, the Government at 
the end of the eighteenth Century had an immense mass of patronage to distribute among its 
servants and supporters. Most of thèse offices had names stretching back to Tudor or even 
mediaeval times. Every area of government was filled with sinecwes. The more lucrative were 
taken by the Ministers and Judges to swell their officiai salaries, or given to their friends and 
relatives to cernent the bonds of obligation on which English politics then rested. Very few had 
actual duties attached to them. Some - such as the Tellership of the Exchequer - combined an 
absence of duties with salaries of more than £20,000 (which translates into about £1 million in 
1990s terms). A few were even hereditary. 
For personalities who filled thèse offices in the early nineteenth Century, look at Lord Auckland, 
who received £1,400 a year as Vendue-Master at Demerara, a place he had never visited, and 
£1,400 as Auditor at Greenwich Hospital, without the least compétence to audit an account, nor 
any obligation to try.54 Or look at the Duke of St Albans, who was Hereditary Grand Falconer 
and Hereditary Registrar of the Court of Chancery. Without touching a single falcon or 
registering a single suit, he took an annual salary of £2,000. 5 5 Or look at the hundreds of 
aristocratie "wine-tasters", "sweepers", "store-keepers", "harbow-masters", "packers", and "tide-
waiters" who dirtied their hands only to the extent of going once every quarter to the relevant 
office in Whitehali to sign their names in a ledger and receive the latest payment of their salary. 
There were thousands more of less valuable places. These were handed out as incentives to 
3 4 John Wade, Extraordinary Black Book, 1816, pp.488-9, quoted, W.D. Rubinstein, "The End of'Old Corruption' 
in Britain*'. Past and Présent, London, Number 101, November 1983, pp.66. 
5 i ibid.. 
{39} 
Chapter One 
friendly journalists and organisers of élection campaigns, or as rewards to favoured poets and 
painters, or as consolations to well-connected unfortunates. 
Such duties as did attach to thèse offices were performed by clerks employed at a fraction of the 
salaries attached. Because the pay and prospects were so limited, these Clerks were usually of 
little ability and often corrupt. At best, they were fitted for nothing beyond a drudging routine. 
At worst, their follies and peculations compromised the effectiveness of the armed forces. 
Anyone who reads their dispatches must half suspect that Nelson and Wellington fought their 
battles largely to relax from their much harder war to get their men paid on time and to get 
munitions that might be usable against the enemy. 
The cost of this bizarre Substitute for a civil service cannot be accurately known, but must have 
consumed a noticeable share of the British national income. 
Then there was Parliamentary reform. The électoral System had been settled centuries before. 
The counties were each to send two Members, elected by the 40 shilling freeholders. Certain 
boroughs were each to send two, elected on whatever franchise might evolve locally. Apart from 
the addition of Scottish and then Irish Members, after the Acts of Union, there had been no big 
changes since the end of the middle ages, and none whatever since the reign of Charles II. Thus, 
by the end of the eighteenth Century, there were boroughs where no one now lived - or which had 
even disappeared through coastal érosion - but which still returned their two Members; and there 
were new cities, like Manchester, growing up without any représentation. In those boroughs 
which still existed, some allowed virtually every adult male to vote; others confined the vote to 
a closed corporation. There were "pocket boroughs", where Members could be nominated by 
a landowner, whose tenants would vote as directed; and there were "rotten boroughs", where the 
few eligible voters could turn every élection into an auction for their votes. 
Overall, fewer than five per cent of the adult population had the right to vote. It was possible for 
great shifts in public opinion to bring corresponding changes at a General Election - as in 1784 
or 1830. But the bewildering inconsistency of franchises from one constituency to another meant 
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that in ordinary times, the House of Commons only reflected the public mood by accident. 
Serious calls for reform had began in the 1770s, during the debate over the status of the American 
colonies. The Colonists had demanded "no taxation without représentation". They were told in 
answer that much of England had no représentation, but was still taxed. This failed to satisfy the 
colonists, and set their English supporters on an examination of home abuses. At first, they had 
only wanted a modest redistribution of seats. As ever, Bentham and his followers preferred more 
radical solutions - abolishing the distinction between counties and boroughs, a redrawing of 
boundaries to equalise représentation, and a standardising of the franchise. For them, indeed, 
Parliamentary reform was to become the means of achieving their vision of a rational, humane, 
centralised new order. 
It would be wrong to suppose that Benthamism and nineteenth Century liberalism were identical. 
They were not. The "philosophie radicals" - as the more ardent followers of Bentham called 
themselves - despised the Whigs and the modérâtes in generał for their commitment to the past. 
These in turn were often flatly opposed to the fuli agenda of reform, entailing as it would a 
rejection of the Revolution Seulement. But with his writings on legal and administrative reform, 
Bentham reached out to a large audience. People whose eyes glazed over at the mention of his 
Panopticon scheme aeeepted his critique of actual abuses. It was both reasonable and pragmatic -
qualities highly regarded in England. And his followers themselves exercised a wide influence 
over the public mind: George Grote in history, John Austin in law, Samuel Romilly in law 
reform, Ricardo in économies, the two Mills in philosophy and psychology and just about 
everything eise; and there were many others. They never dislodged the English habit of tmnking 
of liberty as something inherited, rather than as something granted by a sovereign lawmaker. 
They certainly never gained so complète an aeeeptance as the Common Law thinkers had. But 
they did make the old complacency much harder to maintain. Insensibly, they shifted the 
foundations of English liberalism from reliance on the ancient Constitution to arguments about 
the Utility of limited government. 
The unsettling effect of Benthamism was combined with that of the French Revolution. Like the 
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rush of water from an unblocked drain, the meeting of the National Assembly led to reform after 
reform. There was religious freedom and freedom of the press. The administrative map was 
redrawn on rational principles. The system of justice was entirely replaced. The power of the 
Monarchy and aristocracy was forever broken. Some English observers came to look on the 
French as having travelled further towards liberty in two years than they had in two centuries. 
"How much is it the greatest event that ever happened in the world" said Fox on hearing that the 
Bastille had fallen, "and how much the best". For Richard Price, Louis XIV was now "almost 
the only lawful king in the world, because the only one who owes his crown to the choice of his 
people".56 For such people, the Glorious Revolution appeared less as a final settlement than as 
unfmished business. 
Without any further cause, it was inévitable that the Revolution Settlement would be challenged 
after 1789 in ways that the earlier men of spéculation had feared and tried to prevent. In the 
1790s, however, the whole timidly liberal consensus of the eighteenth Century collapsed in 
England. The Reign of Terror tore English opinion in two. On the one side, there were the 
radicals, Had thèse been only Bentham and his middle class followers, it would still have been 
impossible to overlook their break with the past. But there was also the émergence for the first 
time in English history of an autonomous working class movement. The minimal demand within 
this movement was manhood suffrage, to be followed by legal révolution. An extremist minority 
was even demanding a copying of the French example - the whole way to régicide and 
collectivist dictatorship. 
On the other side, there were the defenders of the established order. These came quickly to 
associate any talk of reform with revolutionary violence. Instead of concluding that France was 
showing what happens when a régime resists ail change for long periods, and then concèdes it 
ail at once out of weakness, they took events there as a warning to stop their own indulgence. 
Edmund Burke is the standard example of the liberal turned reactionary. In the 1770s, he had 
supported the American rebels. In the late 1780s, he had made a nuisance of himself to the 
5 6 Quoted, Burke, op. cit., p. 12. 
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authorities though his part in the impeachment of Warren Hastings for misgovernment in India. 
After 1790, he was known - however unjustly it may be seen in a careful reading of his 
Reflections51 - as the suprême philosopher of reaction, his old friends now his bitter enemies, and 
his old enemies now his adoring friends.58 
The resulting debate was won by the extreme conservatives. They did not entirely get their way. 
The press remained free. Juries were often unreliable at returning guilty verdicts in cases of high 
treason. The Parliamentary opposition functioned unchecked regardless of the country's 
domestic and foreign crises. But there was a consistent drive to limit the liberties which had been 
secured in 1688 and widened during the next Century. Acts of the period limit the rights of 
assembly and of speech for the working classes. The Government made furious efforts to 
suppress public reading rooms, where the working classes would corne to read the newspapers 
and discuss their contents; to sharpen the laws against trade unions; to seek out and punish 
anyone who published words that might be construed by a Jury as seditious. Letters were opened 
and read as they went through the Post Office. Spies and entrappers were unleashed on the non-
Parliamentary opposition.59 
5 7 See, for example: 
A state without the means of somc change is without the means of its conservation. Without such means 
it might even risk the loss ofthat part of the constitution which it wished the most religiously to préserve" 
(Burke, op. cit.. pp. 19-20). 
S ï Rather than quote Burke again, I turn to Edward Gibbon, notorious before the Paris mob ran wild as an encmy of 
superstition and an Opponent of the slave trade. Writing in 1791 to his friend Lord Sheffield, who had just spoken in Parliameni 
against abolishing the slave trade, he retractcd thus: 
In the slave question, yöu triumphed last session, in this you have been defeated. What is the cause of this 
altération? If it proceeded only from an impulse of humanity. I cannot be displeased, even with an error; 
since it is very likely that my own vote (had I possessed one) would have been added to the majority. But 
in this rage against slavery, in the numerous pétitions against the slave trade, was there no leaven of new 
democratical principlcs? no wild ideas about the rights and natural equalityof man? It is thèse I fear. Some 
articles in newspapers, some pamphlets of the year, the Jockey Club, have fallen into my hands. I do not 
infer much from such publications; yet I have ncvcr known them of so black and malignant a cast. I 
shuddercd at Grey's motion; disliked the half-support of Fox, admired the firmness of Pitt's déclaration, and 
excused the usual intempérance of Burke. 
(Letter to Lord Sheffield, 30th May 1792; in Âuiobiography of Edward Gibbon as Ohginally 
Editedby Lord Sheffield (1796), Oxford Univcrsity Press, London, 1907, pp. 277-78). 
Thousands, or even tens of thousands, of similar conversions look place within the English political class after 1790. 
5 9 For an account of the treason trials of 1793, see Scan Gabb, Thomas Erskine: Saviour of English Liberty, 
"Libertarian Héritage No. 1", The Libcrtarian Alliance, London, 1990. 
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When the great revolutionary panic at last subsided, after 1822, the spirit of the Constitution had 
been entirely altered. Before 1789, its development had been broadly in line with public opinión. 
By the 1820s, it had fallen behind. In the 1780s, Parliamentary reform had been on the political 
agenda; and its only real impediment had been how far to go and how much to spend on buying 
off the vested interests. Even William Pitt the Younger, while Prime Minister, had introduced 
a Reform Bil l . Forty years later, it seemed to many that the Constitution had been captured by 
a band of diehard reactionaries, who had blocked every reform to the point where only sweeping 
changes could bring it back into line with public opinión. 
Between the extremes of reaction and remodelling lay the modérate reformers. Perhaps the 
leading spokesman for this point of view was Thomas Babbington Macaulay. Though willing 
to agree with Bentham on specifíc matters, he was deeply suspicious of the main Benthamite 
project. His attacks on James Mi l i and the demands for manhood suffrage caused serious 
damage to that project, and helped push MilFs son, John Stuart Mi l i , into a nervous breakdown.60 
Looking beyond the Benthamites, he utterly loathed and feared the socialists, calling them the 
common enemies of mankind.61 In every sense, he was a conservative. In literature, he was "the 
last of the Augustans".62 As an historian, he saw his task as explaining the achievements of the 
seventeenth century Whigs to the readers of the nineteenth. In politics, he was no less 
conservative. He supported Parliamentary reform because he believed that timely compromise 
would head off the more radical demands. A generation of Benthamite propaganda and Tory 
reaction had combined to discredit much of the Revolution Settlement as a mass of abuses. By 
abandoning the less defensible parts of that Settlement, he hoped that its essentials could be 
6 0 The three relevant essays were published in The Edinburgh Review - "Mill on Government" (March 1829), 
"Westminster Reviewer's Defence of Mill", (June 1829). "Utilitarian Theory of Government" (October 1829); all republished 
in Macaulay (1889). 
6 1 See his speech in the House of Commons on the People's Charter, 3rd May 1842; 
My conviction is that, in our country, universal suffrage (one of the Chartists' demands] is incompatible, 
not with this or that form of government, but with all forms of government, and with everything for the sake 
of which forms of government exist; that it is incompatible with property, and that it is consequently 
incompatible with civilisation. 
(Macaulay (1889), p.626) 
6 2 See G.M. Young, Portrait of an Age, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1936, p.102. 
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preserved. "Reform" he said in Parliament, "that you may préserve...." 
[N]ow, while the heart of England is still sound, now, while old feelings and old 
associations retain a power and a charm which may too soon pass away,... take 
counsel,... of history, of reason, of the âges which are past, of the signs of this 
most portentous time.... Save property, divided against itself. Save the multitude, 
endangered by i-ts own ungovernable passions. Save the aristocracy, endangered 
by its own unpopulär power. Save the greatest, and fairest, and most highly 
civilised Community that ever existed, from calamities which may in a few days 
sweep away all the rich héritage of so many âges of wisdom and glory.63 
At first, the gamble seemed to have paid off. The Great Reform Act had raised immense 
passions on both sides; and its passing into law had been an overwhelming psychological defeat 
for conservative opinion. It revealed that there were no untouchable fundamentals in the 
Constitution; that if the représentation could be changed so radically, so in principle could 
anything eise. But there was no forward lunge into remodelling of the sort that many had hoped 
or feared. The Benthamite agenda was not enacted at füll speed into law. Instead, Reform was 
followed by a return to political stability. Two moderate parties competed for the new middle 
class vote, with one and now another winning power. Other reforms followed, but came slowly 
and in an orderly mariner. 
Düring the rest of the Century, English law and administration were remodelled on broadly 
Benthamite Unes. The Poor Law was reformed. First the town corporations were replaced, and 
then the county Magistrates were largely superseded, by local authorities elected by consistent 
franchises. Substantive and procédural law were both reformed, the first in a séries of codifying 
Statutes - the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, for example, and the Sale of Goods Act 
1893 - the second in the Judicature Acts 1872-76, which replaced the mediaeval jumble of 
Common Law and Equity courts with the modem hierarchy of first instance and appellate courts 
applying both Systems of law. 
Law and administration were both immeasurably humanised thereby. And the reforms were 
6 3 Speech in the House of Communs, 2nd March 1831, Macaulay ( 1885), p,492. 
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carried through mostly in full realisation of the need to hide the fact that things were changing. 
The Victorians had a genius for hiding novelty behind the appearance of age. Probably not one 
in a hundred visitors to the High Court in the Strand realises that neither the building nor any of 
the courts housed there is more than 130 years old. And that has probably been so for the past 
hundred years. The move out of Westminster Hall and the Judicature Acts were wrenching 
changes for those who experienced them. But the scars of change were so quickly and perfectly 
healed. It is the same with the new Royal Family - an ancient institution no older than the 1870s 
- and most of the customs of Parliament. Even the London railway stations have an air of 
antiquity about them. On the eve of reform, Lord Eldon had warned: "Touch one atom, and the 
whole is lost".64 For Reade in 1872, reform had been followed by obvious and unalloyed gains. 
Even so, the gamble failed. Though concealed so far as they could be, and though their 
unsettling effects where thereby minimised, the reforms ultimately proved Lord Eldon right. The 
reformers tried to go carefully, but could not avoid destroying part of the Constitution's hidden 
rationality. Inevitably, the reforms of the 1830s and 40s included the creation of a civil service. 
This has usually been regarded as not merely a necessary but also a good development. W.D. 
Rubinstein, for example, sees the absence of a civil service before this time as a paradox. The 
Old Corruption that it replaced was, he says, 
pre-modern and non-rational in the Weberian sense of failing to obey the rational 
criteria of all modern bureaucracies which Weber and other sociologists have 
distinguished as crucial to, and inherent in, the process of modernization.65 
And yet, 
Britain was unique among European nations in the degree to which it had, long 
before, rid itself of pre-modern modes of thought and consciousness and 
adopted... a national mentality of rationalism in Weber's sense and an all-
M Quoted, Rubinstein, op. cit., p.76. 
6 i ibid. p.65. 
Chapter One 
pervasive cash nexus which dissolved ail pre-existing bonds.66 
But there is no paradox. As we have seen, "modernity" - which in this context can be taken as 
roughly équivalent to liberalism - was the resuit of administrative paralysis. ït was precisely 
because the English people had no directing, ordering State above them in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries that they had entered the nineteenth so free and independent. Those 
European states that came closest to the ideal of "enlightened despotism" - Prussia and the 
Habsburg Empire, for example - had been fitted out with "modem" bureaucracies powerful 
enough to keep their subjects in leading strings. England was "modem" not in spite of Old 
Corruption, but in part because of it. 
The préjudice against any form of Jurisdiction outside the Common Law prevented the growth 
of an effective civil service. The lack of an effective civil service then acted in turn as a 
préventive of such jurisdictions, even when ends otherwise unattainable were strongly desired. 
Dr Rubinstein himself gives a perfect instance of how the ancient Constitution stifled any reform 
that needed administrators to give it effect: 
Sydney Smith opposed the appointment of factory inspectors [under the Factory 
Act 1802] because he was sure that, if such were appointed, they would not 
inspect any factories!67 
The inspectorships would instead become more sinécures. 
Administrative reform removed this préventive. Gradually, the sinécures were abolished. In 
their place, a new, professional administration was created, with appointment by compétitive 
examination and promotion on merit. The liberal reformers were very proud of this. But they 
had deliberately given up the rigid defence of the ancient Constitution. Now, they had - mostly 
without realising - given up the main practical barrier to government activism. They believed 
that an attack on incompétence and corruption would resuit in smaller, cheaper government. The 
66 Ibtd.,p.7\. 
6 7 Rubinstein, op. cit., p.83. n.65. 
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real effect - not obvious, perhaps, till after the second Reform Act - was to provide what remains 
the greatest illustration that history affords of public choice economics. 
According to James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock 6 8, there are forces at work in politics 
analogous to those at work in economics. Among the most common desires of individuals are 
wealth and status, usually in some combination. Businessmen in a free market are driven, as if 
by an invisible hand, to offer new products to their customers, and to cut costs and prices. They 
do this not because they love their customer, but because this is only way in which they can 
struggle through to fortune and perhaps a place in the history books. In politics, these things are 
achieved by gaining and keeping office. This is most easily done in a democracy by promising 
the electors benefits for which others must bear the costs. These others may be later generations 
or a minority of the present generation. In either event, the benefits will be offered; and politics 
becomes a competitive auction for votes with other people's money. 
At the same time, the personal interest of most administrators will lie in welcoming and even 
proposing such schemes, because they must be put in charge of delivering the benefits. This will 
mean an increase in their budgets, in the number of their subordinates, and in the status that they 
possess in the public mind. 
The public choice trinity is completed by pressure groups. Typically, though not always, these 
will have a personal motive. Political and administrative reformers nearly always stand to benefit 
from the adoption of their "reforms". And for all they may celebrate private enterprise in their 
public utterances, few businessmen really like having to operate in a free market. It means 
competition in which they might lose, but in which they must always be acting against their own 
convenience. Even if they are not complete cynics, it takes little persuasion to make themselves 
believe in "market rationalisation" or "safeguarding the national interest", or whatever. Other 
things being equal, these groups and their demands will be taken up by the politicians and 
6 8 See James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 1962. 
Sec also: Gordon Tullock, The Vote Motive.. Institute of Economic Affairs. London. 1976; and James Buchanan. The Economics 
of Politics, Institute of Economic Affairs, London. 1978. 
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administrators in proportion to how well their schemes require a bigger and more active State. 
Quite often, opposition will fail even when what is proposed is not remotely in the public interest 
as conceived in the wider sense. The reasons for this have been most rigorously explained by 
Mancur Olson in his writings on collective action.69 A l l voluntary associations involve their 
members in costs and benefits. When the actual or potential benefits to each member are large, 
the members will be happy to incur heavy costs. When the benefits to each are small, there will 
not be the same incentive to incur costs. Typically, producer groups in search of market privilege 
fall into the first category, and consumer groups into the second. The first will have the money 
to buy the best and most intensive publicity in favour of their desired privilege. They can hire 
economists to draw up the relevant graphs or tables of statistics, and to make the worse appear 
the better case. The second are compelled by lack of finance to reply with general arguments that 
do not seem actually to address the main points at issue. The first will be helped by politicians 
and civil servants who see their own interests served thereby. The second can rely, at best, on 
the support of political outsiders who have no interest in the present state of affairs, but who also 
have little popular or party support. 
Today, examples of how we are ruled by this public choice trinity are beyond counting. Look 
at the de facto marriage between the Ministry of Defence and the arms companies, between the 
Department of Transport and the road building companies, between the Police and the moral 
purity campaigners. Look at the rigging of the gas market, at the professional closed shops, at 
the Common Agricultural Policy. These are marriages obviously against the public interest; but 
few members of the public have an interest great enough to spend money and effort in trying to 
annul them. And this process began with the sweeping away of Old Corruption. It cleared the 
path for the emergence of the boards of public health and public education, of the factory and 
food inspectorates, of the police forces, and of the municipal enterprises, that by the end of the 
century had utterly transformed the face of English government. 
6 9 Mancur Olson. The Logic of Collective Action, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1964, and The Rise 
and Decline of Nations, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut. 1982. 
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The most striking différence between the end and the beginning of the Century lay in the use of 
delegated législation. In 1800. any new powers conferred by Parliament on the authorities were 
specified in the Act. There was no allowance made for administrative discrétion. By 1900, it 
was normal for powers to be conferred by an enabling Act. Nothing would be specified. Instead, 
there were phrases such as: "The Secretary of State shall make rules to bring this section into 
effecfor "in any dispute arising over the exercise of powers conferred by this section, the 
Minister shall adjudicate; and the décision of the Minister shall not be questioned in any court 
of law.". For Secretary of State or Minister, read officiais. They were silently acquiring the 
power to make laws, and to enforce or waive thèse laws as they saw fit. Even in 1888, Maitland 
was able to tell his students that 
[y]ear by year, the subordinate government of England is becoming more and 
more important. The new movement set in with the Reform bill of 1832: it has 
gone far already and assuredly it will go farther. We are becoming a much 
governed nation, governed by all manner of Councils and boards and ofïïcers, 
central and local, high and low, exercising the powers which have been 
committed to them by modem Statutes.70 
It must be emphasised that the libérais were entirely to blâme for this. There is no point in 
blaming the avowed statists. These all had some agenda of control. There were the Tory 
paternalists, wanting a return to a past golden âge of déférence and protection. There were the 
militant imperialists, deeply impressed by German collectivism. There were the eugenicists, with 
their scheme of a master race - in the création of which the State would stand to its Citizens as 
a breeder stands to his pigs. There were the Christian activists, crying out for the suppression of 
sin. There were the professional bodies, Willing to combine with any movement whatever for 
the sake of increasing the status and earnings of their members. Later, of course, there were the 
socialists, with their own plans for big government. But none of thèse movements, even 
combined, could have been powerful enough to change the course of English development. 
70 The Constitntionat History of England, A Course of Lectures Delivered by F.W. Maitland, Cambridge, University 
Press, 1908,"Period V: Sketch of Public Law at the Présent Day (1887-8), p.501. For arull discussion and attack on the growth 
of delegated législation, see: Lord Ffewart of Bury (Lord Chief Justice of England), The New Despotism, Ernest Benn Limited, 
London, 1929. 
{50} 
Chaptcr One 
It is the libérais who did this. By relaxing the old worship of Common Law, and by promoting 
administrative reform, they Untied the straitjacket of the Revolution Settlement. 
The case against them is still worse. They could, even so, have prevented the worst effects of 
the untying; but they failed to do so. Public choice économies is about tendencies, not automatic 
laws of growth. These tendencies can be checked, and sometimes reversed, by the force of ideas. 
We have seen how this happened in the seventeenth Century. To a limited extent, we can see this 
in the nineteenth - in, for example, the steady rejection by the authorities of any calls for a return 
to trade protection. Long after every other great nation had retreated behind a tariff wall, the 
British commitment to free trade remained unshakable. There was no shortage of special interest 
groups with money to spend and lies to tell. Every time, they were repulsed by a body of opinion 
for which tariffs were as abhorrent as Ship Money had once been. 
The nineteenth Century libérais had an ideology of immense power. The older arguments about 
the value of free development could now be supported by the discoveries of political economy. 
Here was an example of spontaneous order. A few psychological and physical laws sufficed to 
explain the growth of trade and industry without any coordination by the State. The value of 
letting alone couid be shown by arguments from principle as well as from expérience. It was the 
consensus that an economy grew best when left to the laws of the market supplemented by a few 
obvious human laws against force and fraud. Had anyone challenged him in 1830, Macaulay 
could have appealed to the whole existing weight of economic science in support of his claim 
that 
[i]t is not by the intermeddling of... the omniscient and omnipotent State, but by 
the prudence and energy of the people that England has hitherto been carried 
forward in civilisation.... Our rulers will best promote the improvement of the 
nation by strictly confining themselves to their own legitimate duties, by leaving 
capital to find its most lucrative course, commodities their fair price, industry and 
intelligence their natural reward, idleness and folly their natural punishment, by 
maintaining peace, by defending property, by diminishing the price of law, and 
by observing strict economy in every department of the State. Let the 
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Government do this: the People will assuredly do the rest.71 
But, however powerful, such arguments were blunted by three defects of reasoning: 
First, the power of the economic arguments often allowed the others to fall into disuse. They 
were a deadly weapon against ail restraints justified on economic grounds, and only its most 
famous victory was the repeal of the Com Laws in 1846. Yet, as a defence of freedom, the 
arguments from economic efficiency were of little psychological value. Their advócales tended 
far too often, by ignoring the wider issues of human libération, to reduce liberalism to a set of 
prudential wamings about the rate of industrial growth. This allowed a gradual painting of 
liberalism as a desiccated, calculating ideology that could not be avowed by anyone with a heart. 
We see this most famously in the works of Charles Dickens. Hard Times, he contrasts the neat, 
philosophie justifications of Ralph Gradgrind for the reality of a Coketown run by the dreadful 
Josiah Bounderby. "How can one refute a sneer?" it was famously said of Gibbon's attack on 
religion. The same could be said of the attacks on "phüistine Manchesterism". 
Second, defects in the early théories of value and distribution played straight into collectivist 
hands. The labour theory of value, found in both Adam Smith and David Ricardo, was taken 
over by Karl Marx and a legion of - at the time - better-known socialist agitators. By the time 
Jevons and Menger could introduce the concept of the margin into économies, the härm was 
done. In any event, later economists tended to drop the habit of writing for the general public. 
They preferred instead to retreat ever more deeply into a mathematical mode of expression that 
could be understood only by other economists. Perhaps M i l i was the last economist who could 
be understood by everyone. After him, the public was left to find its économies where it could. 
Not surprisingly, it came to believe all manner of things about exploitation and the goodness of 
government action. 
Third, the most important liberáis of the age never seem to have understood the public choice 
7 1 T.B. Macaulay "Essay on Southey's Colloquies" (January 1830), reprinted in his Cńtical andHistońcal Essays, 
"Everyman" édition, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1907, Volume H, p.224. 
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danger they had unleashed. Though more Lockean in their view of individual rights than the 
Revolution Whigs, they thought they could do without the same uncompromising defence of their 
ideology. Instead, having created an administrative state, they thought they could pick and 
choose the objects of administrative action, without regard to the specific precedents thereby set, 
and without regard to the general dynamics of the new machinery. 
This allowed them to make endless exceptions in the ideology of laissez-faire. To be sure, it was 
to be a general rule - but.... Not one of the main classical economists gave an unqualified 
endorsement to laissez-faire. McCulloch, supposedly the most doctrinaire of his school, wrote: 
The principle of laissez-faire may be safely trusted to in some things but in many 
more it is wholly inapplicable; and to appeal to it on all occasions savours more 
of the policy of a parrot than of a statesman or a philosopher.72 
This is true. Only an anarchist would deny any place for state action. For other liberals, there 
must be a formula to allow exceptions. To use the jargon of the law, there are certain state 
actions against which there should be an irrebuttable presumption - that is, they should never be 
allowed. Against others, there should be a rebuttable presumption: they should be allowed, but 
only on proof that the effects of doing nothing would be the greater of two evils. Where 
McCulloch and the other liberals of his age went wrong was in their standard of proof. The 
sophistry of the special interest groups is always such that the criminal standard - of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt - should be adopted. The standard adopted instead was the civil one - of proof 
on the balance of probabilities. This left the way open for being led to accept a mass of 
exceptions to the rule until the rule itself was forgotten. 
Look again at Macaulay. He understood better than most the risks involved in disturbing the 
Revolution Settlement and its emphasis on government by Common Law principles. But he was 
also a strong supporter of limiting hours of work in the factories, of public education, and even 
of state direction of investment. In 1846, speaking on factory regulation, he commented: 
7 2 Quoted, Lionel Robbins, The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Economy, Macmillan. London, 1952, 
p. 154. 
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Fifteen years ago it became evident that railroads would soon, in every part of the 
kingdom. supersede to a great extent the old highways. The tracing of the new 
routes which were to join ail the chief cities, ports, and naval arsenals of the 
island was a matter of the highest national importance. But, unfortunately, those 
who should have acted for the nation, refuses to interfère. Consequently, 
numerous questions which were really public, questions which concerned the 
public convenience, the public prosperity, the public security, were treated as 
private questions. That the whole society was interested in having a good system 
of internai communication seemed to be forgotten. The speculator who wanted 
a large dividend on his shares, the landowner who wanted a large price for his 
acres, obtained a füll hearing. But nobody applied to be heard on behalf of the 
Community. The effects of that great error we feel, and we shall not cease to 
feel.73 
The importance of this illustration is that Macaulay may have had a good point. It seems 
reasonable to believe that the country would have had a better railway network if the Board of 
Trade had been able to make the same kind of plans as the officiais of Napoleon III later made 
for France. What is missing here is a wider conception of the public interest. Yes, planning 
would have given us better railways. It would also have added immensely to the prestige of 
administrative planning. The civil servants and the special interests would have used the 
précèdent as ruthlessly as later in the Century they used the précèdent of municipal enterprise. 
Government grew until the Great War hardly ever by way of denying the truth of liberalism. In 
almost every case, it grew because of what are now called arguments from market failure. Non-
intervention was to be the rule, it was conceded - but not in this case. "The community" needed 
to be heard against the private interests. Sometimes, as conceded, there may have been market 
failure. More often, though, it was manufactured and then fed to libérais. It is astonishing how 
seldom they bothered looking beyond the packaged statistics to the truth. Even more astonishing, 
outside purely commercial matters, they generally accepted the antithesis offered them - on the 
one hand of an unreformed State unable to provide éducation and clean water and policing, and 
on the other a reformed State that could provide them. They ignored the other alternative that 
was then available, of private action. They were so thoroughly deceived, it is only since the 
1960s that historians have begun to uncover the reality. 
Speech in the Housc of Commons, 22nd May 1846, Macaulay (1885), p.719-20. 
{54} 
Chapter One 
Take education. Long before the Education Act 1870, the majority of the people in England had 
access to at least a basic education. Studying the records of accused crimináis committed for trial 
in the late 1830s, R.K. Webb notes that 44.6 per cent were reported as able to read and write.74 
Of the children maintained in the workhouses of SufTolk and Norfolk in 1838, 87 per cent could 
read to some extent, and 53 per cent could write. Similarly, in 1840, 79 per cent of mineworkers 
in Northumberland and Durham could read, and more than half could write.75 These figures are 
taken frora surveys of the poorer classes. They compare well with the 1960 literacy figures for 
Portugal, where less than 60 per cent of the whole population could read or write.76 
There was in England a vigorous and rapidly expanding private market in education for the 
poorer classes. Aside frora those run by the various religious denominations, few schools had 
anytliing like a qualified, salaried staff. Instead, they took an endless number of forms - run by 
retired naval ofñcers, or foreign refugees, or bankrupted tradesmen, or widows. Some taught a 
full curriculum of studies comparable to that in the oíd grammar schools. Others taught just 
basic literacy and arithmetic. Fees varied from a few pennies to a few shillings per week. 
Parents chose the best education they could afford, moving their children to better schools as 
these opened or finances improved.77 But, without any prompting by the authorities, or help from 
them, millions of children were receiving an education of sorts before 1870. 
After the beginning of state education in 1870, these private initiatives were gradually killed and 
then forgotten. First, the School Boards were able to offer subsidised education. Then it was 
made free. Then, in 1891, it was made compulsory. By the end of the century, the huge red brick 
schools were being built that still punctuate the older districts of English cities. The School 
Board Man was beginning his war on truancy. The introduction of a standard curriculum and 
strict - at times overtly military - discipline was creating a generation for whom the horrors of the 
7 4 R.K. Webb, "Working Class Readers in Early Victorian England", The English Histórica! Review, 1950 - citcd, 
E.G. West, Education and the State: A Study in Political Economy, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1965, p. 128. 
7 Í West. op. cit., pp. 129-30. 
7f' Ibid.. 
11 fbid.:p.\69. 
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Flanders trenches were an unpleasant but not unnatural development from their school days. 
And the reason why these private initiatives were killed? Because the more statist special 
interests wanted it that way. The teaching organisations wanted freedom from what they saw as 
the degrading need to sell their services on the market, and from the need to compete with the 
unqualified. The Benthamites wanted a centralised and rational system of education in which 
they could write the curriculum. Others wanted state education because they feared the effects 
of an expanding working class over which there was no directing moral authority. Since the facts 
showed no reason to claim that private effort was failing, the facts were simply misrepresented. 
The commonest misrepresentation was to assert that the "school age population" consisted of 
those aged between five and thirteen, and then to show what per centage of children attended "no 
school whatever". This could always be used to support claims of national illiteracy, because the 
average length of schooling for working class children was not eight years, but just under six 
years. 
In 1869, for example, a Government report found that the school age population of Liverpool was 
80,000. Of these, 20,000 were not at school. A further 20,000 were discounted on the grounds 
that they were getting an education "not worth having". Extrapolated across the whole country, 
the headline statistic revealed that half the children of England must be growing up illiterate. No 
one noticed that reducing the assumed length of schooling to 5.7 years produced a school age 
population of 60,000 in Liverpool - the same number as were attending a school of some kind. 7 8 
It was this report that propelled the Education Act 1870 to the statute book. 
Again, take policing. Most of the submissions to the 1839 Constabulary Report denied the need 
for a state police force, and expressed satisfaction with the existing means of protecting life and 
property. The lack of policing by the State before 1829 did not mean the absence of policing. 
In England, between 1750 and 1850 a network of private law enforcement agencies grew up to 
n /old. p. 146. 
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provide services that ranged from the systematic use of newspaper advertising for the return of 
stolen property, to professional détectives and thief catchers.79 
A significant contribution was made to law enforcement by private associations dedicated to 
prosecuting criminals - which was then a private matter. People came voluntarily together to 
share the costs of prosecution. Between 1744 and 1856 some 450 such associations were set up. 
By 1830, the larger groups - for instance, the Barnet Association - had effectively become private 
police forces in their own right, serving communities and responding to local conditions. By no 
means confined to serving the wealthy, this market-based System proved to be efficient, populär, 
and responsive to consumer demand. 
But Edwin Chadwick, one of the "founding fathers" of the new Civil Service, was responsible 
for the final draft of the Constabulary Report; and he took care to suppress whatever évidence 
failed to support his own case for State action.80 In the case of sanitation, he not only drafted the 
final Report in 1842, but had himself appointed Head of the Department set up in conséquence 
of the Report. Because of the lip service paid to liberal ideology, the myth was quietly accepted 
of a dirty, illiterate, insecure England that had only been rescued by heroic civil servants resisted 
at every point by the corrupt and the ignorant. 
Or look at John Stuart M i l l , the "apostle of liberalism", whose influence on the liberal English 
mind was second only to Macaulay's. His service to the cause was decidedly ambiguous. In his 
essay On Liberty, he makes the famous claim that everyone must sometime have read: 
[T]hat the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, 
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. 
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilised Community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot 
7 9 Stephen Davies, The Suppression of Public Provision; The Privaie Supply of 'Public Goods ' in Nineteenth Century 
Britain, "Historical Notes No. 3'\ Libertarian Alliance, London, 1988. 
8 0 Sir Léon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law; Stevens, London, 1968, Vol IV, pp.259-60. 
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rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, 
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so 
would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, 
or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for 
compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify 
that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to 
produce evil to someone eise. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which 
he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely 
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his 
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.[81] 
This is wonderfully eloquent. Paid any close attention, though, it falls immediately apart. Mill 's 
distinction between "self-regarding" and "other-regarding" acts - a distinction seized on by every 
one of his critics, from James Fitzjames Stephen all the way down to Mary Whitehouse - is an 
absurd formulation. It even destroys the case for freedom of speech, which is normally supposed 
to be the one freedom on which Mi l l is consistent. 
The breach in his argument opens at commercial freedom of speech. His distinction of acts lets 
him proceed to the conclusion that 
trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to seil any description of goods to the 
public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in gênerai; 
and thus his conduct, in principle, cornes within the Jurisdiction of society.... 
[T]he... doctrine of Free Trade... rests on grounds différent from, though equally 
solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay.82 
This in turn lets him flirt with socialism without having to admit its incompatibility with freedom 
in any normal sensé. The flirtation, though, does not end in itself. If I incite or procure you to 
commit a murder, I can be punished as a principal to the act. There is no difficulty here, and Mi l l 
admits none. But suppose I persuade you to drink yourself into alcoholism. You ought not to 
be punished, for you are harming only yourself. Ought I to be punished, for having advised you 
to harm yourself? No, he says, for that is a self-regarding act: 
*' John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), publishcd with other cssays in the "Everyman" édition, J.M. Dent and Sons, 
London, 1972, pp. 72-73 (Chapter I, "Introductory"). 
n Ibid., p. 150 (ChapterV, ^Applications"). 
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If people must be allowed, in whatever concerns only themselves, to act as seems 
best to themselves, at their own péril, they must equally be free to consult with 
one another about what is fit to be so done; to exchange opinions, and give and 
receive suggestions. Whatever it is permitted to do, it must be permitted to 
advise to do.83 
But suppose I am a publican, or have some other financial interest in the sale of alcoholic 
beverages - does this defence cover advertising? That is an activity intimately connected with 
trade, and "trade is a social act". Mi l l continues, with evident perplexity: 
The question is doubtful only when the instigator dérives a personal benefit from 
his advice; when he makes it his occupation, for subsistence or pecuniary gain, 
to promote what society and the State consider to be an evil. Then, indeed, a new 
élément of complication is introduced; namely, the existence of classes of persons 
with an interest opposed to what is considered as the public weal and whose mode 
of living is grounded on the counteraction of it. Ought this to be interfered with, 
or not?84 
He devotes a page and a half to equivocation, giving no clear answer. He plainly hâtes the 
thought on any limitation on his arguments for freedom of speech, but also wants to leave the 
way open to some public control of economic activity. But, whatever M i l l may have thought of 
advertising, his chosen distinction between acts has allowed a potential distinction between kinds 
of speech that can be exploited by anyone who cares to read him. 
Or take Walter Bagehot, another of the great Victorian libérais. He is famous for his warnings 
about the dangers of extending the vote to the working classes - for his fears that democracy 
would be made the means of a systematic plundering of the rieh. Yet near the end of his English 
Constitution, he makes virtually the same point as Joseph Chamberlain about unshackling the 
State: 
One of the most curious peculiarities of the English people is its dislike of the 
executive government.... By définition, a nation calling itself free should have no 
Ibid.,p. 154. 
ibid.. 
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jealousy of the executive, for freedom means that the nation... wields the 
executive.85 
And he laughs at the older prejudices: 
I remember at the census of 1851 hearing a very sensible old lady say that the 
'liberties of England were at an end'; if Government might be thus inquisitorial, 
i f they might ask who slept in your house, or what your age was, what, she 
argued, might they not ask and what might they not do? 8 6 
So far as they really believed in a limited state, the mid-Victorian liberals were behaving like the 
Sorcerer's Apprentice. They conjured up the power to do what they wanted, but they neglected 
to learn the spell for stopping that power from running out of control. 
Now, not every liberal was so ambiguous or foolish. The democratic fallacy was repeatedly 
exposed. The Liberty and Property Defence League has already been mentioned. Scholars like 
Chris R. Tame delight in uncovering forgotten liberals of the age who understood exactly what 
was happening, and who cried out against it. 8 7 But this is beside the point. The liberals 
mentioned above were the influential ones. It was they who were most widely read and admired. 
It was not their intention. To repeat the point, it was not their immediate achievement: they 
created the pillars of the Victorian liberalism that Reade celebrated in 1872. But, ultimately, they 
did all that was required to undermine the conservative foundations on which English liberty had 
rested for centuries, and to send it sliding into oblivion. 
That it has not yet reached oblivion says much for the forces of English conservatism. Even now, 
those objects of Benthamite scorn - the Monarchy, the House of Lords, and the Established 
Church - remain unabolished. Even now, the Common Law has not been superseded by 
a i Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (1867), Fontana, London, 1963, p.262. 
86 Ibid., pp.262-63. 
8 7 When it is published, Mr Tame's Bibliography of Freedom will become an instant classic. It lists thousands and 
thousands of works by liberals that cover every subject. It goes far beyond the Locke-Smith-Bentham-Mill narrative of other 
writers. A separate work will give quotations from these works, showing how there were liberals who were not fooled by the 
statist arguments. 
{60} 
Chapter One 
codification. Even now, England remains one of the two or three freest countries in the world, 
where no one rots in prison merely for having published unpopulär opinions, and where the 
Courts can occasionally hit back at the masters of a Parliament that is now absolutely suprême 
to do as the placemen who sit there are directed to vote. 
Conclusion: The Prospects for Liberty 
When John Major became Prime Minister in November 1990, the prospects for liberty in this 
country had reached what seemed their lowest point short of actual despotism. The Thatcher 
Government had done much that was good. It had privatised a mass of state assets, and lifted 
many of the more destructive barriers to enterprise. It had also stopped the steady rise in 
Government spending as a share of national income. Its achievement was to stop and even 
reverse the country's relative economic décline. But ail this had been accompanied by the 
shredding of the Common Law and Constitution. Outside those areas of national life seen as 
economically usefiil, the State was rolling forward like Juggemaut over his worshippers. 
And there was almost no intelligent criticism of this in the media. On the one hand were the 
socialists, whose loudest complaint was against the Government's positive achievements. On 
the other were the leaders of the "New Right". The great revival of classical liberalism over the 
past two décades had thrown up a génération of activists who knew their economic analysis and 
nothing eise. Let the drains be privatised, they argued, and whatever was happening with police 
powers and legal procédure could safely be ignored. They would have applauded identity cards, 
so long as the issuing of them were contracted out in the approved manner. The few libertarians 
who saw the gathering collapse of what remained were confined to small circulation news letters 
and pamphlets. 
However, when John Major left office in May 1997, everything seemed to have changed. The 
collapse of Communism was breaking down the old catégories of left and right; and libertarians 
from ail traditions were beginning to realise that the enemy was neither capitalism nor socialism, 
but the bureaucratie corporatism of a "New World Order". At the same time, the Internet was 
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Connecting libertarians and conservatives from ail over the English-speaking world. For a long 
rime, the threat had been international. Now : so too was the response. The small newsletters and 
pamphlets were suddenly reaching an audience of tens and hundreds of thousands. Individuals 
who had spent their lives raging in silence against the horrors fo the âge were beginning to fmd 
an international voice. Abuses of power that would once have been misrepresented into 
nothingness by the controlled média were being revealed and discussed without the smallest 
chance of censorship. 
Looking ahead, the growth of the Internet and of strong encryption technology will not merely 
spread the various messages of anti-authoritarianism, but will also make it possible for 
individuals to conceal their assets and activities from surveillance. Already, governments are 
being forced to contemplate a réduction of their activities, as the taxes begin growing harder to 
collect. 
We may stand at the beginning of another cycle of liberty - not just in England, but in ail those 
parts of the world moulded by or settled from England, A i l this is far too early to say. But one 
thing is clear. Unless we can understand the ways in which ideology and material forces work 
together to maintain an establishment, and how the last period of liberalism grew and flourished 
and decayed, we can expect little permanence for such liberty as circumstances may be about to 
enable. 
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Ten years ago, I gave way to one of my rare bursts of enthusiasm. I was at the time, 1*11 grant, 
still a schoolboy; and thèse things are always more permissible in them than in others. But. even 
for a schoolboy, it was a very great burst of enthusiasm. I seriously thought that, along with Mrs 
Thatcher, the second dawn of classical liberalism had arrived. This was it, I thought. No more 
socialism. No more national décline. No more Road to Serfdom. Oh, even as lads of my âge 
went, I was naive. 
To give praise where due, there been a loosing of market forces. Wage and price controls are 
gone. Exchange and crédit controls are gone. There are no controls on foreign investment either 
way. We have a tax System designed more for collecting revenue than confiscating wealth. Most 
of the nationalised industries have been sold off, or made to operate on something like sound 
business principles. Since 1981, we've been unusually prosperous. We even had five years of 
lowish retail price inflation. The Government's économie record hasn't been one tenth as 
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wonderful as I expected, or as I hear it proclaimed. Ifs been quite good even so. It might easily 
have been worse. 
But the economic record isn't the only test of a government. There are all those rights that don't 
bring a fïnancial return: how they are respected. And, while the Tories have supervised the 
building of an impressive number of Japanese car factories here, they haven't rolled back the 
fronùers of the State. What they have done is bring about an unprecedented concentration of 
power at the centre. Every one of those bodies, public or private, which used to stand between 
the State and its Citizens has been pushed aside: local government, the press and other media, the 
unions, the universities - each has been humbled. And the Bar may soon be about to fol low. 
But all this is common knowledge. Enough already has been said about it. What I wish to do 
in this article is describe the new and unusual ways in which this concentrated power is being 
used. I shall discuss to what extent we've ceased being a nation under the rule of law, 
Now, this is a grand phrase, and Tory politicians love rolling it out on grand occasions. Nine 
times outof ten for them, it'sjust aeuphemism for making people do as they're told. Rather, ifs 
the most completely effective check on State power ever yet discovered. Put as fully and exactly 
as I can, it requires this: that no person be arrested. or imprisoned, or fined, or by any other 
means harmed, except in accordance with unambiguous laws of gênerai scope, that have been 
laid down in advance, that are equally binding on ail, and that are enforceable only by 
independent courts in which the prosecution is at a procédural disadvantage. Whoever has not 
been, or is not in process of being, adjudged in breach of any such law is to be as free of 
interférence by the State as a foreigner living outside its Jurisdiction. 
The usual objection to this is that it lets crime go unpunished. Everyone knows of some 
evidently guilty person who's gone scot free thanks to a clever lawyer. But, in judging any set 
of legal rules, what must be looked at isn't the effect of a single instance, but of the whole 
scheine through Urne. Where the ruie of law is concemed, it is invariably true that the greater 
security of life and property, and the readier public acceptance of those uses of power which are 
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made, are well worth the occasional specific inconvenience. 
I'd be as bad as the people in donkey jackets hawking Socialist Worker if I blamed every 
violation of the rule of law on Margaret Thatcher. Faith in it was already crumbhng before her 
father was a little boy. Nor, in every case, has she been the greatest violator. In respect of the 
first of thèse listed below, she's been so far a distinct improvement on Harold Wilson and James 
Callaghan: she hasn't tried fixing wages and priées by decree. But, taken as a whole, what she 
and her colleagues have been about thèse past ten years can have only one meaning. They've 
been hard at work, freeing the State from ail constitutional restraints. 
Consider: 
In Accordance with Law 
In the July of 1988, the Prime Minister was asked in Parliament what she thought of gazumping. 
In the late 1970s, when making libertarian noises was more to her taste than now, she might have 
answered that breaches of faith are always regrettable, but what eise can one expect when the 
Government's monetary policy is making house prices rocket? Instead, she called on estate 
agents to adopt a voluntary code of conduct. If they refused,"the Government might have no 
alternative but to introduce statutory rules" 
I know that estate agents are deeply unpopulär. Having been one myself, I know that they're 
often deservedly so. But this apparently offhand remark is a perfect instance of what Enoch 
Powell calls "the rule of the Threat of Law". "Do as I tell you" a minister says. "Or I shall make 
a law compelling you to do it - and then you'll be sorry." Usually, the person threatened does 
obey. Perhaps he thinks saying "No" isn't worth the effort. Perhaps he'd rather deal with a 
single minister than many lawyers. Perhaps hc thinks the Government has a right to push him 
around. For whatever reason, he usually obeys. 
The estate agents haven't obeyed yet. But the press has long been kow-towing to a D-Notice 
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Committee, the Orders of which have as much legal force as one of my New Year resolutions. 
The tobacco companies almost fall over themselves obeying the Secretary of State for Health. 
Early in 1987. they agreed to eut their advertisîng budget at sports events sponsored by them 
from thirty per cent to twenty per cent of the total of any one event. At the same urne, they 
increased the size of the Government Health Warning by fifty per cent. 
Calling thèse agreements voluntary is a sinister misuse of language. Bad in themselves, they 
form ready précédents for a much larger use of arbitrary power. Compared with what it was, 
Parliament is a joke. But, it isn't yet entirely a rubber stamp. The Commons do occasionally 
put the Government front bench in a sweat. The Lords can be very stubborn, even if only for 
a year at a time. Though we have nothing like the American Suprême Court, the Judges do see 
off whole Acts of Parliament when the mood takes them. Even formulae like "the décision of 
the Minister shall not be called into question in any court of law" have been effectively voided. 
But when the Government can rule simply by stating its wishes and having them complied with, 
there's an end to ail but the most extraordinary scrutiny in Parliament, and of all scrutiny 
whatever by the Courts. Ministers are freed from worrying whether they're acting ultra vires. 
or in bad faith, or for an improper purpose, or in breach of the rules of natural justice. They can 
be as selectively indulgent or severe as the whim takes them. With a bit of arm-twisting, with 
a few nods and winks, safeguards that have taken eight hundred years to evolve can be pushed 
aside as easily as I delete a paragraph on my wordprocessor. 
Laws of General Scope 
The rule of law isn't synonymous with freedom. As a doctrine, it governs the making and 
enforcement of laws, not their content. An Act imposing the death penalty on every person 
reaching the âge of sixty-five would be perfectly compatible with the rule of law. For obvious 
reasons. Parliament would never make any such Act. If politicians and their friends and relatives 
were to be exempted, of course, that would be another matter. It would also create privilèges 
decidedly incompatible with the rule of law. 
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Except where the revenue is concerned - and this is a cause so lost. I 'll not discuss it further -
the Thatcher Government has created no explicit legal privileges. But it has made laws, in form 
binding on all, in essence directed against specific groups. The most scandalous of these, of 
course, has been section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988. This bans the promotion of the 
teaching in any schools maintained by it of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended 
family relationship. True, there were Labour Councils pushing the ratepayers' money at any 
group with the word "gay" in its name. True, this had to be stopped. But why this alone, when 
there was other political funding besides? What about the funding of anti-smoking groups? 
These are political. I, for one, find them infinitely more offensive than a few proselytising 
homosexuals. What, for that matter, about the promotion of knicker sniffing, or any other 
minority sexual taste that the Labour left might one day care to buy into its "coalition of the 
disadvantaged". If a law was needed, it should have been a general prohibition laid on the 
funding of anything controversial beyond a certain point. Instead, a law was made, useless for 
any other purpose than heaping indignity on an unpopular minority of our fellow subjects. 
Laws Laid Down in Advance 
The panic following the Hungerford Massacre made a tightening of our gun control laws 
inevitable. Under the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988, it became a serious offence to own, 
among others, semi-automatic rifles and pump-up shotguns. It's a shame the Government gave 
in so readily to the panic. It's a shame there are any controls at all. But this is beside the point. 
Taking away the right to bear arms may be oppressive, but it isn't in itself contrary to the rule 
of law. Under section 21 of the Act, the Home Secretary was enabled to make a scheme of 
compensation for those surrendering or otherwise disposing of their newly prohibited weapons. 
Delegating legislation is politically dangerous, but, again, not contrary to the rule of law. Under 
the scheme eventually made there was to be a flat payment of £150 per gun, or a payment of 
fifty per cent of the average retail price of the gun in the summer of 1987. Taking property 
without just compensation is theft. But this I deal with below. For the moment, I'll discuss 
sections 21 (a) and (b) of the Act. These provide for compensation only to those owners who 
lawfully acquired, or contracted to acquire, their guns before the 23rd September 1987. The Act 
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was passed in the spring and summer of 1988. Possession of the weapons prohibited under it 
became an offence on the 30th April 1989. No one who bought any such weapon between the 
23rd September 1987 and last Sunday - as I write - was breaking the law. Anyone whodidbuy 
one has been punished as if he had. 
When laws can be made tomorrow lhat pénalise what was lawfully done yesterday. there's an 
entire end to limited govemment. The only safe course lies in anticipating what may be said. 
anddoingit. As above, ifby other means, the distinction between the law of the land and what 
the government wants is abolished. This much the Home Office cheerfully admits. 1t was 
known long in advance, we've been told, that certain weapons were likely to be banned, Anyone 
who didn't immediately take account of this has only himself to blame. 
Laws ex posl facto are expressly forbidden under Article I, 9:3 of the American Constitution. 
It used to be assumed they were equally unconstitutional here, whatever the theoretical right of 
Parliament to make them. The modern view is made quite piain in section 139 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988. This mainly does something rather nasty that I shall discuss below. 
Subsection (8), however, reads: "This section shall not have effect in relation to anything done 
before it cornes into force". What a splendidly cool admission of the Coming tyranny! 
Laws Enforceable by the Courts 
There's an old parliamentary device called Attainder. It's a means by which penalties -
sometimes death, sometimes a fine - can be imposed without due process of law, the Bill going 
through Parliament like any other. Naturally, it was a device shockingly abused from beginning 
to end. It hasn't been used in centuries. Yet if section 21 of the new gun law isn't in effect a 
little Act of Attainder, I don:t know what is. 
The Local Government Finance Act 1988 is the one forcing the Poll Tax on us. When I first 
learned I was to be put against my will on a computerised register. I couldn't believe I was 
awake and living in England. But, again, this is only frighteningly oppressive and politically 
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stupid. Giving false information to the people compiling these registers is an offence, carrying 
fines that range from £50 to £200. Under section 23 and Schedules 3 and 11 of the Act, these 
fines are to be imposed by tribunals set up by the authorities collecting the Tax. Though a 
tribunal may at any time quash or amend its sentences, there is to be no automatic right of appeal 
to the proper courts. Anyone who doesn't supply every last detail wanted by the registration 
officers has been made subject to the penal jurisdiction of a town hall committee. But this 
jurisdiction will at least bear some resemblance to legal proceedings. There is worse. 
Under section 27 of the Transport Act 1982 - given effect in the summer of 1986 - the Police are 
empowered to hand out fines to motorists whom they believe to have been speeding or 
committing some other traffic offence. The money involved is negligible - £24 at the most. The 
principle is a disgrace. Penalties are now imposed without the ghost of due process. I'm told 
that, in many European countries, the Police have still wider judicial powers: they even collect 
the fines. But there hasn't been a properly limited government anywhere in Europe since the 
middle ages. Foreigners are so used to misgovernment, it's no surprise if they stand by grinning 
while their wallets are gone through by men in uniform. What they're willing to put up with is 
no precedent for us. 
Prosecution At A Procedural Disadvantage 
One of the acknowledged glories of the common law tradition is its procedural safeguards in 
criminal trials. An accused person is presumed innocent until found guilty. The Court is 
forbidden either to rely on involuntary confessions or to construe silence as an admission of 
guilt. In the absence of a truly voluntary confession, the prosecution must make out its whole 
case without assistance. Any other evidence offered by it must have been obtained without 
general searches or other means contrary to right or custom. For at least the graver crimes - and 
preferably in any matter affecting life, liberty or property - trial must be by independent Jury of 
the Accused's peers. I can't say that these safeguards were still securely in place before 1979. 
The cumulative growth of executive and, especially, of Police power has already largely eroded 
them. But it is true that the past ten years have seen a revolution in criminal procedure. 
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Consider again: 
Innocent Until Proved Guilty 
Section 1 of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 brings into English law the penalty of the 
Criminal Confiscation Order. Someone is found selling heroin, and is arrested, tried and 
convicted according to law. Trying to stop the sale and use of recreational drugs is oppressive 
in that it isn't called for on the grounds of individual or public justice. It's also dangerous by 
reason of the subsidy it places on all real criminal activity. But, as with the possession of 
weapons, this has nothing directly to do with the rule of law. It's what now follows conviction 
that is so outrageous. The Court may direct an inquiry of the Défendant's assets insofar as thèse 
may be the fruits of the crime of which convicted or any other similar crime and exceed £10,000. 
The prosecution submits a statement of assets, partieularising those which it allèges to have been 
corne by dishonestly. If s up to the defence to challenge each of thèse allégations. If it fails to 
challenge them, or doesn't challenge them to the Courfs satisfaction, the assets are confiscated. 
Except that the courts administer it, this is as gross a déniai of due process as any of those listed 
above. Taking away the proceeds of what may well be, but haven't been properly decided. 
criminal acts is nothing but a kind ofjudicial attainder. Leaving ail challenges to the defence 
is an exact reversai of the traditional bürden of proof. Everyone knows the advantage of this is 
in ordinary argument. A clever flat-earther stands up in Company. "The earth is flat" he asserts. 
Someone laughs. "Prove to me that it isn't" he demands. On the defensive, he has to prove 
nothing himself, but only to deal with individual - and perhaps half-baked - objections. In court, 
it makes the job of prosecution so delightfully easy, that no one but a fooî can have believed the 
procédure would remain confined to drug offences. Section 71 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
extends it to cover every indictable offence. 
Section 139 of this Act créâtes the new offence of having a knife in a public place without "good 
reason or lawful authority". This does away with what now evidently seems the cumbersome 
requirements of section 1 of the Prévention of Crime Act 1953. whereby the prosecution was 
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put to the inconvenience of proving that any knife found was indeed an offensive weapon within 
the meaning of the Act, or was carried with intent to commit a crime. Now, it merely needs 
prove possession in public of a sharp or pointed implement that isn't a folding pocket knife with 
a blade of three inches or less. This done, it's up to the defence to prove "good reason or lawful 
authority". 
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act came into force last March 15th. 
Section 9 makes it an offence to handle money for any person, "knowing or having reasonable 
cause to suspect that it may be used by that person for the purposes of terrorism". This offence 
carries an unlimited fine or a sentence of up to fourteen years in prison. Murder, theft, 
intimidation - these are offences that ought probably to carry the same penalties whatever the 
motive behind them. But, in any case, someone who knowingly transfers or helps to transfer 
funds for the commission of a crime should be regarded as an accomplice, and so liable to be 
punished. What, however, do the words "reasonable cause to suspect" do except make a crime 
of stupidity? If an English bank clerk quietly takes in money for an American group called Kil l 
A Brit For Ireland Inc., maybe he is assisting in the commission of a crime. Caught taking in 
money for the Patrick Sarsfield Foundation, he's in serious trouble unless he can prove his 
ignorance of Irish history. 
This bizarre provision isn't the effect of sloppy drafting. It's deliberate Government policy. 
Said Douglas Hogg, justifying it in the Commons: "My feeling is that to accept an exclusionary 
subjective test... would be to erect too high a hurdle for the purposes of securing convictions". 
It used to be a boast of the common lawyers that the purpose of English law was to secure 
justice, not convictions. Better that ten guilty men go free, said Blackstone, than one innocent 
be made to suffer. I believe I could quote Mr Hogg's own father to the same effect. 
No Self-incrimination 
The Police don't often beat confessions out of suspects. They don't often need to. At most, a 
few veiled threats are enough. Usually, all that's needed is sustained questioning of a suspect, 
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alone and in the unfriendly surroundings of a Police Station. What is required, then, is that no 
one should be questioned without access to legal advice. In America, the courts regularly throw 
out indictments where the Police haven't observed this requirement to its letter. Here, section 
58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 does give an arrested person the right to 
consult a solicitor at any time. But, in the case of "serious arrestable offences", this right can 
be deferred for up to 36 hours; and the whole period of questioning between arrest and before 
any charge must be made can be extended to 96 hours. 
A member not merely of the Bourgeoisie, but arguably also of the Establishment, I rather hope 
I'd be treated with the fullest, wariest respect if ever arrested. For all the Act lays down, others 
haven't been so lucky. In 1985, following the Broadwater Farm riots, a boy of thirteen was 
interrogated alone in a Police Station for three days. Wearing only underpants and a blanket, he 
eventually confessed to murder. He might possibly have been guilty. But the j udge was so 
aghast, he felt he had no choice but to direct an acquittal. This, however, was a use of 
discretion, not, as in America, the application of a fixed rule. For lack of one, it stands to reason 
the Police will go on pressuring suspects too young or ill-informed to be worth being frightened 
of. 
The Right to Silence 
There is an essential part of the foregoing. Just as a suspect traditionally can't be pressured into 
giving evidence against himself, neither does he have to risk being duped into doing so by 
skillful examination. Nor can his remaining silent be construed as any admission of guilt. I 
treat this separately, however, by reason of the current debate over its continuance. 
There have been periodic clamours against the right for twenty years. It lets sophisticated 
criminals gel away far too often, we're told. But this is the first Government to acL on the 
clamour. In 1988, an Order was laid before Parliament allowing the Judges in Northern Ireland 
to make what they pleased of a suspect's silence under prior interrogation or in court. From 
extended Police questioning to plastic bullets, there's little tried in Ulster that doesn't eventually 
{72} 
Chapter Two 
find its way to England. It's only ever a matter of time and opportunity. 
In one part of the law, indeed, the right has already been lost in England. Under section 1 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1987, the Serious Fraud Office was set up. Section 2 of the Act allows this 
body to require a person under investigation for serious or complex fraud, or any person who 
is reasonably thought to have information relevant to such a fraud, to attend before it and answer 
questions or furnish information. Anyone failing to comply commits an offence. Though 
statements made under compulsion can be used only to contradict other statements made later 
by the defence in court, documents surrendered may be used by the prosecution for such 
purposes as it may think fit. The writers of the standard commentary on this Act - Emmins & 
Scanlan, p. 6 - are driven to say: 'Thus significant inroads are made on the privilege against 
self-incrimination and the maxim that 'no one shall be required to be his own betrayer'." 
No General Searches 
The Fourth Amendement to the American Constitution is a codification of English law as stated 
in the various cases connected with John Wilkes. I cite the whole Amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be 
seized. 
I cite the relevant parts of section 19 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: 
The powers conferred by subsections (2), (3) and (4) below are exercisable by a 
Constable who is lawfully on any premises. 
(2) The Constable may seize anything which is on the premises if he has 
reasonable grounds for believing 
(a) that it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an 
offence; and 
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(b) that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent it being concealed, 
lost, damaged, altered or destroyed ... 
(3) The Constable may seize anything which is on the premises if he has 
reasonable grounds for believing 
(a) that it is évidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating or 
any other offence; and 
(b) that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent it being concealed, 
lost, damaged, altered or destroyed.... 
(5) The powers conferred by this section are in addition to any power otherwise 
conferred. 
Beyond saying the italics are mine, I don't think I need point out anything further here. Looking 
at thèse two documents one after the other, I'm left speechless. This second is the modem law 
of England. 
Means Contrary to Right Or Custom 
If I testify in court, I do so under two great sanctions. First, I swear by my God or my honour, 
whichever I décide the greater, that I will tell the truth. Second, if caught lying, I face being 
prosecuted for perjury. The assumption behind this first is that I understand the différence 
between truth and falsehood. That behind the second is that I can be held legally responsible for 
what I say. Section 34 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides that an accused may be 
convicted on the uncorroborated évidence of an unsworn child. Perhaps, as was extensively 
argued at the time, chiidren are less prone to telling lies than was always assumed. Certainly -
and I don't recall this being mentioned - they can, with complète personal impunity below the 
âge of ten, have someone convicted of what are currently viewed as the most atrocious of crimes. 
They don't even need to appear in court, but can say ail they need over closed circuit télévision. 
It was Esther Rantzen and her friends in the gutter press who demanded this déniai of natural 
justice. But it was the Government that willingly gave in to it. 
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Trial by Jury 
This Government doesn't like Jury trials. The bloody nose it got in the Ponting trial has kept 
it out of the criminal courts as much as possible ever since. Also, while it didn't begin the 
progress towards the abolition of Juries, it has done much to hasten its speed. 
1. Sections 37 and 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 have made theft of a motor car and 
common assault and battery offences triable by magistrates alone. The excuse given for this was 
that Crown Courts were too overloaded for there not to be a certain shedding from the list of 
indictable offences. Between 1979 and 1984. we were told, indictments rose by 48 per cent. But 
this wasn't the only answer to the problem. There were at least two others. The first was to 
stop creating so many new offences. The second was to build and staff more courts. This would 
have been expensive. But what is expense to a Government that takes and spends upwards of 
£150 billion every year? If the Department of Trade and Industry was allowed to spend£13 
million last year on what was essentially Conservative propaganda, what is the objection to 
giving a few dozen million extra to the Lord Chancellor's Department? Which is a more basic 
function of the State - financing Lord Young's vanity or pro viding justice? 
2. Section 118 of the Act abolishes the right to peremptory challenge in Jury trials. Much was 
said last year about how careful challenging could alter the composition of a Jury in favour of 
the defence - as if this were anything new and unnatural. Under the old common law. an 
accused had the right to challenge thirty-five Jurors without showing cause. Anyone who has 
looked into Howell's State Trials will know how extensively this right was used in the 17th and 
18th centuries. It was there to ensure a more subtle and reliable fairness in the composition of 
a Jury than could be achieved by the means of showing cause to the Judge. To be fair, the right 
had already been substantially taken away. The number of peremptory challenges was reduced 
to twelve in 1925, to seven in 1948, and to three in 1977. But it has fallen, as ever, to this 
Government to take the décisive step, and reduce the number to zéro. The prosecution, of course, 
keeps its old right of unlimited peremptory challenge. 
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Conclusion 
If anyone wants to contest this, I'm operi to argument. I really would like nothing more than to 
believe I'm hopelessly in the wrong and that we are returning to those values which - far beyond 
any mere expansion of territory or power - set this country apart from ail others. But I don't think 
I can be accused of having misunderstood the drift of things. Whatever was promised. whatever 
may novv be said, the Thatcher Government has brought into being the füll coercive apparatus 
of a police state. As yet, this has had scarcely more to do than stand in reserve. Prosperity and 
a lingering habit of obédience have kept us sufficiently governable. But let either of thèse falter, 
and then, in their regulär, familiär use, we shall see the potential of the new powers made actual. 
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Reflections 
on the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Bill 
"Anthony Furlong and Edward Hume" 
(by Sean Gabb) 
3,469 words 
First published in Free Life, 
issue no. 20, London, August 1994 
Introduction 
When this Bill was first published earlier in the year, we read it in a mood of astonished horror. 
[fever passed, we assured each other, it would mark a significant step frorn the remains of liberty 
to a police state. It would be the most oppressive Act of the most oppressive Government this 
country has known since 1688. 
We now have before us the Bill as amended on Report. Published this 12th July, it is the version 
that will go for Royal Assent. It has in some degree been softened during its passage. Its buik 
has even been partly offset by the welcome, if timid, lowering of the âge of consent for 
homosexuals, from 21 to 18. Nevertheless, for ail the changes great and small that have been 
made since its first publication, the Bill remains as astonishingly horrible now as it was last 
January. 
At 211 pages inclusive of Schedules, the Bill contains so much objectionable matter that we 
cannot hope to cover all of it in this short article. We will instead concentrât^ on three 
particularly ominous measures. These are: the abolition of the right to silence, the perversion 
of due process in terrorism cases, and criminalising the possession of pornography. 
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One: The Abolition of the Right to Silence 
This right comprises the following: 
1. At the moment of arrest, a suspect must be cautioned by the Police as follows: "You have the 
right to remain silent. but anything you do say will be taken down and may be used in évidence 
against you". This caution must be repeated in similar form at the police station every time he 
is questioned. If he décides to remain silent under questioning, no compulsion may be used 
against him. Nor may his having remained silent be later revealed in court. 
2. This right extends from the police station into court. An accused person cannot be compelled 
to give évidence, or to submit to any cross-exarnination. If he décides to fali or throughout to 
remain silent, the prosecution is allowed to make no comment whatever.88 The Judge is allowed 
to comment, but if he does, he must remind the Jury that failure to testify cannot be regarded as 
évidence of guilt.89 
Because in many cases évidence of guilt is something that émerges under police questioning, this 
right has long been unpopular among those who claim to stand for "law and order". It has been 
cailed an accidentai right. Much has been said of its allegedly récent origin. and of how 
unconnected it is to the generał body of légal protections. 
Much has also been said about its abuse by hardened criminals. We are told that, disturbingly 
3 8 See the Criminal Evidence Act 189Ss.l(b): 
The failure of any person charged with an offence to give évidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by 
the prosecution. 
3 9 On this point, see the following obiter guidance given by Lord Chief Justice Parker: 
...the accepted form of comment is to inform the jury that. of course, he [the accused] 
is not bound to give évidence, that he can sit back and sec if the prosecution have 
proved their case, and thaï while the jury have been deprived of the opportunity of 
hearing his story tested in cross-exam i nation, the one thing they must not do is to 
assume that he is guilty because he has not gone into the witness box. 
(R v Bathursl [1968] 2 Qucens Bench 99. pp. 107-08) 
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often, the Police will arrest someone who is manifestly guilty. but who escapes conviction 
because he refuses to answer questions in the police station, and only speaks out after he and lus 
lawyers have made up enough lies to convince a Jury. 
And so : in the Bil l , the right is effectives abolished. Clause 34 states: 
(1) Where in any proceedings against a person for an offence, évidence is given 
that the accused -
(a) at any time before he was charged for the offence, on being 
questioned under caution by a constable trying to discover whether or by 
whom the offence had been committed, failed to mention any fact relied 
on for his defence in those proceedings; 
or 
(b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might 
be prosecuted for it, failed to mention any such fact, 
being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time the accused could 
reasonably have been expected to mention when so questioned, charged or 
informed... 
(2) ... 
(d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the 
offence charged, 
may draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper. 
Clauses 36 and 37 allow the same inference to be drawn from failure to explain any objects found 
on a suspect's person at the time of arrest, and to explain why he was in any place when arrested. 
Clause 35 allows the Court or Jury to draw inferences from an accused person's refusai to testify 
or to answer questions. 
We will note that thèse Clauses have been softened since their first publication. In their original 
version, the Judge was even to act as inquisitor during a trial, calling on a silent accused to speak 
in his own defence. It says much about our democracy that it was the Judges in the House of 
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Lords who forced this to be taken out. 
The claims made to justify this part of the Bill are so much nonsense. There is nothing accidental 
or contingent about the right to silence. It follows naturally from the privilege against self-
incrimination, which is perhaps the most distinctive feature of English criminal law. In our own 
law, the privilege is so old that it vanishes into the mists of time. In the United States and in 
every civilised Commonwealth country, it is an entrenched constitutional right.90 Its justification 
is that it compels the authorities to go out and look for objective evidence of guilt, and not rely 
on tricked confessions of guilt. 
Here, it is worth pointing out that there is no evidence that the right has been abused in the 
manner claimed. It is, however, common knowledge that confessions unsupported by objective 
evidence are unreliable. The past generation has seen a whole series of cases, beginning with 
Confait, in which the use of unsupported confessions has resulted in gross miscarriages of justice. 
If there is any case for amending the right to silence, it is for expanding its scope, by disallowing 
the use of unsupported confessions. 
It is no argument to say against this that the right has not been abolished, but instead only that 
in future the Court or Jury may draw inferences from its exercise. Strictly speaking, this is so. 
According to Clause 35(3): 
This section does not render the accused compellable to give evidence on his own 
behalf, and he shall accordingly not be guilty of contempt of court by reason of 
a failure to do so. 
See, for example, the Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on 
a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger: nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense lo be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb: 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself '[our italics], 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
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But, in all but the written word, the right has been abolished. It is the refuge of any suspect who 
fears that he may be pressed into making ill-considered statements after arrest, or in response to 
aggressive questioning. The knowledge that a use of the right may be regarded as evidence of 
guilt is as near its abolition as may be made without the positive legalising of torture. 
Two: The Perversion of Due Process in Terrorism Cases 
Clause 82 of the Bill amends Part IVA of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 
Act 1989. The sections relevant to our present investigation read as follows: 
16A. - (1) A person is guilty of an offence if he has any article in his possession 
in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the article is in his 
possession for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism to which this section applies.... 
(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove 
that at the time of the alleged offence the article in question was not in his 
possession for such a purpose as is mentioned in subsection (1) above. 
The maximum penalty for this offence is imprisonment for ten years or a fine or both. 
Now, again, the scope of this Clause has been greatly limited since we first read it last January. 
The limitation is contained in 16A(2): 
The acts of terrorism to which this section applies are -
(a) acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland; and 
(b) acts of terrorism of any other description except acts connected solely 
with the affairs of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom 
other than Northern Ireland. 
However, as with the abolition of the right to silence - made for Ulster in 1988 - oppressive laws 
made for one part of the United Kingdom have a habit of being extended to the other parts. We 
are glad that this particular law is not at least for now intended for Great Britain. But, whether 
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or not it is ever extended, we find it perhaps the worst Clause in the entire Bi l l . Our objection 
is on two grounds: 
First, it makes a crime of being merely suspected. Let us suppose that our Editor - who, for ail 
his unionist sympathies and lack of spécifie interest in Ulster, has an Irish Catholic name - should 
be sent a review copy of The Poor Man 's James Bond by Kurt Saxon.91 Now, this is a book that 
describes, among much else. how to make bombs and other weapons. It is clearly an article 
within the terms of the Clause. Let us suppose that the book is found in Mr Gabb's possession 
by a Polîceman. Here is what seems to us suspicion that it is "connected with the commission, 
préparation or instigation of acts of terrorism" in Ulster. There is no need to prove that he has 
the smallest criminal intent. The fact that he may be reasonably suspected is be made a crime 
in itself. 
Of course, half an hour in a police station will be enough for Mr Gabb to clear himself of 
suspicion. But here is the second ground of our objection: that the burden of proof has been 
reversed. In this case, the presumption of innocence does not apply; and, if he is for whatever 
reason unable or disinclined to prove that "at the time of the alleged offence the article in 
question was not in his possession for such a purpose as is mentioned in subsection (1) above", 
then he may find himself in very serious trouble. 
This is not an isolated instance of the perversion of due process. It is. sadly, becoming a normal 
mode of legislating for Ulster. For example, Section 9 of the 1989 Act makes it an offence to 
handle money for any person, "knowing or having reasonable cause to suspect that it may be 
used by that person for the purposes of terrorism". This offence carries an unlimited fine or a 
sentence of up to fourteen years in prison. We ask - What do the words "reasonable cause to 
suspect" do except make a crime of ignorance? If an English bank clerk quietly takes in money 
for an American group called K i l l A Brit For Ireland Inc., maybe he ought to be accused of 
, J | This book is published by Loompanics Unlimited, an advertisement for which appears elsewherc in this journal. 
Il is available for $17 plus 12 percent postage and handl'mg charge. As ever. thisjoumal's policy of not breaking or advocating 
any breach of the law compels us to advise thosc Ulster résidents who may be interested in this book to buy it before the Bill 
passes into law. 
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assisting in the commission of a crime. Caught taking in money for the Patrick Sarslield 
Foundation, he is in serious trouble unless he can prove his ignorance of Irish history. 
Perhaps the courts can be trusted to throw out frivolous or vexatious charges. But this is not the 
point. It is our repeated expérience that many laws allow the authorities to harass or destroy 
people without going to the trouble of bringing them into court. It will be remembered how the 
search and seizure powers of the Customs Consolidation Act 1876 were used against Gay's the 
Word bookshop in 1984. Property was seized. Charges were laid. Although the case was 
dropped before it could corne into court, the bookshop was almost driven out of business by the 
defence and associated costs of the action. Less famously, the Journalist AI Baron received 
similar attention last year, when his computer and papers were seized and held for nine months 
until the Crown Prosecution Service dropped the charges for lack of any answerable case against 
bim. 9 2 
We will say emphatically, that we abhor the terrorist violence connected with Ulster, and desire 
that the firmest action be taken against the Republican and Loyalist terrorists - but only so far as 
is consistent with a maintained rule of law. The présent Clause does not meet this requirement. 
It is simply another set of excuses for State harassment. 
Three: Criminalising the Possession of Pornography 
Section 1 of the Protection Act 1978 reads: 
It is an offence for a person -
(a) to take, or permit to be taken, any indécent photograph of a child 
(meaning in this Act a person under the age of 16); or 
(b) to distribute or show such indécent photographs; or 
9 2 For details, sec Chris R. Tamc and Sean Gabb, "AI Baron and Freedom of Speech: An Argument in Two Parts" 
Free Life No. 19, November 1993. 
{83} 
Chapter Threc 
(c) to have in his possession such indécent photographs, with a view to 
their being distributed or shown by himself or others; or 
(d) to publish or cause to be published any advertisement likely to be 
understood as conveying that the advertiser distributes or shows such 
indécent photographs. or intends to do so. 
Section 160(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 amends this Section by adding that 
It is an offence for a person to have any indécent photograph of a child (meaning 
in this section a person under the âge of 16) in his possession. 
Clause 84(2) of the présent Bi l l further amends the 1978 Act as follows: 
In section 1 (which pénalises the taking and indécent photographs of children and 
related acts) -
(a) in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) -
(i) after the word "taken" there shall be inserted the words "or to 
make", and the words following "child" shall be omitted; 
(ii) after the word "photograph" there shall be inserted the words 
"or pseudo-photograph.... 
The wording of the other paragraphs of the 1978 and 1988 Acts is similarly changed to reflect 
the création of the new offence. 
Section 7(5) of the 1978 Act is amended to read as follows: 
(6) "Child". subject to subsection (8), means a person under the âge of 16. 
(7) "Pseudo-photograph" means an image, whether made by computer-graphies 
or otherwise howsoever, which appears to be a photograph. 
(8) If the impression conveyed by a pseudo-photograph is that the person shown 
is a child, the pseudo-photograph shall be treated for ail purposes of this Act as 
showing a child and so shall a pseudo-photograph where the prédominant 
impression conveyed is that the person shown is a child notwithstanding that 
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some of the physical characteristïcs shown are those of an adult. 
In this Clause the laws of Scotland and Ulster are also amended to the same effect. 
Those of our readers who have read the lengthy quotations above will have noticed the création 
of three offences. 
The first, created in 1978, is, in our view. entirely acceptable. Children enjoy, and always have 
enjoyed. a separate legal status under the laws of every civilised country, This is on account of 
physical and intellectual immaturities that we do not need here to describe. Children are not 
allowed to do many things that either are or ought to be permissible for adults. Being induced 
to pose for "indécent" photographs is one of thèse things. 
Prohîbiting the distribution of such photographs we also believe to be justified. What 
photographs people look at is, of course, their business - but only so long as the models cannot 
be said to be harmed by being identifiable, which is plainly the case with children 
It may be argued against us that the 1978 law was made in response to a moral panic over the 
alleged activities of the Paedophile Information Exchange, and that it only criminalises acts that 
were already criminal under the Obscène Publications Act 1959. This is true. But, since we 
believe that the 1959 Act should be repealed, the 1978 Act is only what we should like to see 
preserved from the gênerai repeal. 
The 1988 Act, however, goes further. By criminalising the possession of such photographs, it 
créâtes an entirely new and undesirable offence. We will say that what someone has for his own 
use - however it got there - is not a proper subject for legal control. As said, child models may 
be harmed simply by being looked at. But the risk of any potential harm here is outweighed in 
our view by the actual harm done to adults. This harm is the wide power given to the authorities 
of supervision over our libraries. This establishes a principle that we are quite certain will be 
sooner or later be applied for further supervisions that will be made for what we consider to be 
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trifling or even bad ends. 
Not only does the présent Clause go still further, it also loses sight of the what we consider to be 
the justifiable ends of the 1978 Act. which is the protection of children. A pseudo-photograph 
need not involve the use of any child in its création. It may be generated whoily from an artist:s 
imagination, or from photographs of adults. 
Of course, there are people who claim that the use of children as models for such photographs 
is not the only evil involved. Further evils are said to be the encouraging of sexual violence 
against other children, or the private corruption of adults who enjoy looking at such photographs. 
or both. We will not argue this point. We will say only that the private effect on adults of 
looking at any pomography is their business alone; and we have yet to see any évidence whatever 
that the availability of child pomography leads automatically to the committing of assaults on 
children. It may suggest the pleasurablity of assaults - just as The Bible may have suggested the 
murder of prostitutes to Peter Sutcliffe, or as the works of Karl Marx and Adolf Hitler certainly 
encouraged mass-murder and the enslavement of millions. But here, as with any political or 
religious text, the answer is not to suppress the prompting text, but to punish the prompted person 
for his actions. 
The natural end of the présent Clause is not the protection of children, but the criminalising of 
masturbation - and not only of masturbation over pictures of children. It will be seen that a 
pseudo-photograph is defined to include one "where the prédominant impression conveyed is that 
the person shown is a child notwithstanding that some of the physical characteristics shown are 
those of an adult" Much pomography now fully legal even in this country - which has by far the 
most restrictive laws in Europe - includes photographs of models dressed in white ankle socks 
or school uniforms, or with shaven pubic hair. Is all this now to be made illegal? God help us! 
Conclusion 
As said, the above does not by any means exhaust our objections to the Bill . There are hundreds 
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of other objections that we could make. We can only ask how much of this will be brought into 
effect. and how much will be Struck down by the European Court? We will also ask - and invite 
our readers also to ask - whatever next? For there are worse proposals floating around - enough 
to keep Parhament busy well into the next Century. Is this Bill to be the last and heaviest belch 
of authoritarianism? Or has the main course yet to begin? 
We wish that we could say otherwise, but we do very much suspect that the latter is the case. 
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Sado-Masochism and the Law: 
Consent versus Paternalism 
by "Anthony Furlong" 
(by Sean Gabb) 
5,798 words 
First Published as Legal Notes No. 12 
by the Libertarían Alliance, 
London, 1991, 
ISBN 1 85637 030 5 
The laws of God, the laws of man, 
He may keep that will and can; 
Not I: let God and man decree 
Laws for themselves and not for me; 
And if my ways are not as theirs 
Let them mind their own affairs. 
Their deeds I judge and much condemn, 
Yet when did 1 make laws for them? 
Please yourselves, say I, and they 
Need only look the other way. 
A.E. Housman, Last Poems, XII 
"Over himself, over his own body and mind, the Individual is sovereign" 
J.S. MUI, On Liberty, "Introductory" 
'Ello, 'Ello, 'Ello... 
SOME TIME IN 1989, while leafing through their copies of the Gay Times and Euroboy, the 
officers of the Metropolitan Police Obscène Publications Squad came on an unusually interesting 
advert. It is, of course, their job to check into thèse things. They are paid to stamp out any but the 
mildest hint of sexual enjoyment. It is, of course, in their interest to do their job well. Even in 
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these days of AIDS and incurable herpes, it is on the whole safer to persecute sexual 
nonconformity than to go looking for real crimináis. There is less chance of a violent reaction. 
There is more chance of public approval. Unless they have done something extraordinarily bad, 
thieves and murderers quite often find more sympathy than condemnation in the courts. But 
prostitutes and pornographers are guaranteed a bad reception. They are usually convicted. They 
are always pilloried by the gutter press. The officers who go after them are not ordinary 
policemen. They are the upholders of public morality. By both politicians and the media they are 
treated with the kind of defererential respect that your ordinary PC Plod only receives when a 
rioting mob cuts his head off. On this occasion, they had found an advert promising the ultímate 
in depravity and corruption to anyone who would reply to it. It was time to launch "Operation 
Spanner". 
This went well from the start. At first, indeed, the officers thought they had hit the absolute 
jackpot. A videotape fell into their hands. It showed scenes of unimaginable violence and 
perversión. Men were hung up by chains and beaten insensible. Hooks were pushed deep into 
flesh. One man had a nail hammered through his foreskin. The actors ran about, dressed variously 
as schoolboys and officers in the SS. A dog was sodomised. A l l this was set to a soundtrack of 
Gregorian plainchant. This, the officers told each other, was surely a "snuff' video - a horror film 
where there are no special effects, but the participants really are tortured and killed. The moral 
purity fanatics had been claiming these things to exist since the I940s. So far, not one had ever 
come to light. Now, it seemed, one had. 
The search ended in Shropshire, in a country house shared by Ian WÜkinson. aged 56, a forester, 
and Peter Grindley, aged 41, a care assistant in a home for the mentally handicapped. The officers 
took dogs with them, to help search for bodies buried in the garden. No bodies were found. But 
there was no need for disappointment. Instead, they had uncovered the biggest homosexual vice 
ring in British history. The house was fitted with a spacious and exceptionally fine torture 
chamber. Men would go there and torture or be tortured all the way to orgasm. And, since this 
was the 1980s. they could relive their experiences afterwards by watching them at home on 
videotape. 
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Some of the men, moreover, were living double lives. They were married or had girl-friends. 
Some were even very well- to-do. There was an international lawyer with limited diplomatic 
immunity. There was a missile designer with security clearance. There was a lay preacher -
whom, as a matter of interest, I used to know in my days as an estate agent. There were the 
makings here, the investigating officers knew at once, of a real scandal. Al l they had to do was 
come up with a reason for making arrests. 
The Offences 
There was, it must be admitted, ample reason. Homosexual acts are illegal in this country, unless 
between two consenting adults who have reached the age of 21 or over and who act in private.93 
The presence of a third party - or even the commission of the act in a place to which third parties 
lawfully have access - is deemed to render such an act public, and the participants liable to 
imprisonment for up to two years. Bestiality - that is, to have carnal knowledge of an animal to 
the extent of penetration - is an offence carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.94 
Youths below the age of consent had taken part in a few of the orgies. One of them was aged 15. 
Sodomy or gross indecency with a male under the age of 21 carries a maximum penalty of five 
years.95 As with animals and women, sodomy with a boy under the age of 16 carries a maximum 
penalty of life imprisonment.96 
Other offences had been committed. The house had been made into a brothel - into premises 
habitually used or resorted to for the purposes of prostitution or for lewd homosexual practices. 
It is no defence to prove that no public nuisance was committed, or that no money passed hands. 
This offence carries a maximum penalty on summary conviction of three months' imprisonment, 
y 3 By s. 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, as amended by s. 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967. 
9 4 The penalty under common law was death until 1861. The current law is contained in s 12 (1) of the SOA 1956: 
''It is an offence for a person to commit buggery with another person or with an animal". 
9 5 S.3 SOA 1967. 
% See Note 2 above. 
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or six months on a second conviction.97 
Indecent and obscene material had been published. Again, it is no defence to prove that no money 
was had in exchange. Publication, or possession with intent to publish, is sufficient. The 
maximum penalty is six months' imprisonment on summary conviction, or three years' 
imprisonment on indictment. As an alternative or in addition, unlimited fines may be imposed.98 
Some of the material included pictures of the 15-year-old boy. It is a summary offence, carrying 
a maximum sentence of six months' imprisonment or a £2,000 fine, to take or to possess an 
indecent photograph of a young person who is or who appears to be under the age of 16." 
Some of the material had been sent through the post. This, again, is an offence. On summary 
conviction, it carries a fine of £1,000, and on indictment a maximum of 12 months' 
imprisonment.'00 
At least one of the accused was charged with the possession of illicit drugs. The gravity of 
punishment for this offence depends on the type of drug possessed, and on the possessor's further 
intentions regarding its use.101 
At least some of these are crimes that ought not to exist. So long as there is no public nuisance, 
I see no reason whatever why the authorities need to bother themselves over homosexual orgies 
that only involve consenting adults. Bestiality should not be an offence unless it can be shown 
to have caused pain to the animal. The same argument applies to pornography. Children should 
be excluded. Animals should be protected. Beyond that, the only proper grounds for constraints 
Ss.33-36 SOA 1956. For the definition of homosexual brothel, s.6 SOA 1956. 
S.2 Obscene Publications Act 1959. 
Protection ofChildren Act 1978. as supplemented by s.33 Criminal Justice Act 1988. 
S.l 1 Post Office Act 1953. 
S.5 Misusc of Drugs Act 1971. 
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on publication are those having as their end the avoidance of public affront. Our drug laws are 
a disgrâce to civilisation. They allow the State to stand over the citizen as a father stands over his 
chidren. They put a bounty on organised crime. They divert resources from the one legitimate 
function of the State - the protection of life and property. 
As 1 have already indicated. I do believe that there should be an âge of consent. ï reject the 
extreme libertarian argument, that children are entitled to the same rights as adults. Even so. the 
current âge of consent for homosexuals, at 21, is at least five years too high. It certainly ought 
to be consolidated with the heterosexual âge of consent, at 16. Both might even be brought down 
by a year or so. This is no radical suggestion. In France, the âge of consent for all sexual activity 
is already 15. In Italy, it is 14. In Spain, it is 12.1 0 2 
But, while this may be worth saying, it is a digression. The officers had found évidence that 
crimes had been committed. It was their undoubted duty, whatever nasty pleasure can be imputed 
to their doing it, to make their arrests and leave the Crown Prosecution Service to do the rest. 
This they did. I may think the Obscène Publications Squad a pack of fascist goons who ought to 
be sacked, or sent en masse into the next race riot. But they did nothing unusual. They acted 
entirely within the letter and spirit of laws not made by them. What makes the case of R v 
Wilkinson & Ors so mémorable is what the lawyers did with it. 
The Trial 
Of the 43 men investigated, 15 were eventually brought to trial, charged among much eise with 
various crimes under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. To this part of the indictments 
the defence put in a plea of consent. The essence of such crimes is that injury is inflicted on an 
unwilling victim. Since here there had undeniably been fiill consent, thèse charges would have 
to fail, Not so, said the Judge, Mr James Rant QC: 
1 0 1 Source: Peter Tatchell. Ont in Europe: A Guide to Lesbian and Gay Rights in 30 European Countries, Channel 
Pour Books. London. 1990, pp 18-19. 
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Much has been said about individual liberty and the rights people have to do what 
they want with their own bodies, but the courts must draw the line between what 
is acceptable in a civilised society and what is not. In this case, the practices 
clearly lie on the wrong side of that line.10* 
These acts, he continued, were peculiarly degrading and vicious. Mr Michael Worsley QC, for 
the prosecution, agreed, adding that the case went far beyond what the law allowed in that it 
involved "the violent and deliberate inflicting of injury and pain on human beings often to the 
point of real torture". It involved "brute homosexual activity in sinister circumstances about as 
far removed as can be imagined from the concept of human love". 1 0 4 
Some of the seized video tapes were shown. After one of them, white in the face, the Judge 
ordered an adjournment. He later said: "I am not likely to forget that one. No one would". 1 0 5 
The Sentences 
Their sole grounds for defence cut away from under them, all 15 defendants pleaded guilty. They 
were sentenced, on the 19th of December 1990 as follows1 0 6: 
Ian Wilkinson, for keeping a disorderly house and causing actual bodily harm, was jailed for 
three and a half years. 
His accomplice. Peter Grindley, for the same offences and for possessing drugs, was also jailed 
for three and a half years. 
Colin Lasky, 46, a computer operator of Pontypridd in Glamorganshire, for causing or aiding 
101 The Times, 20th December, 1990. 
m ibid. 
105 Ibid 
I U 6 The following paragraphs are compiled from The Times (20th December, 1990) and The Daily Telegraph (21st 
December. 1990). 
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and abetting actual bodily harm and possessing an indecent photograph of a young person, was 
jailed for four and a half years. 
Graham Cadman, 52, an ice cream salesman of Bolton in Lancashire, for keeping a disorderly-
house and taking and possessing indecent photographs of a young person, was jailed for four and 
a half years. 
Anthony Brown. 54, a retired local government officer of Yardley in Warwickshire, for assault 
and aiding and abetting assault, was jailed for two years and nine months. 
Roland Jaggard, 42, a missile design engineer of Welwyn Garden City in Hertfordshire, for 
actual bodily harm, was jailed for three years. 
Saxon Lucas, 57, a restauranteur and lay preacher of Evesham in Worcestershire, for actual 
bodily harm, was jailed for three years. 
Donald Anderson, 60, a retired pig breeder of Hartford in Carmarthenshire, for keeping a 
disorderly house to which people came "to take part in acts of sadistic and masochistic 
violence and accompanying acts of a lewd, immoral and unnatural kind", was jailed for 12 
months. His plea of not guilty to buggery with a dog and donkey were accepted by the court. 
John Atkinson, 48, an antiques restorer and restauranteur of Broadway in Worcestershire, for 
aiding and abetting others to cause injury to himself, was given two years' probation. 
Christopher Carter, 37, a fancy dress hire proprietor of Shrewsbury in Shropshire, for aiding 
and abetting actual bodily harm, was jailed for 12 months, suspended for two years. 
Christopher Zimmerli, 51, a lawyer of Haverstock Hill in London, for actual bodily harm, was 
jailed for 12 months, suspended for two years. 
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John Lofthouse; 49, a retired fire officer of Lowestoft in Suffolk, for causing or aiding and 
abetting actual bodily harm to another and to himself, was jailed for 21 months, suspended for 
two years. 
Anthony Oversby, 56, a tattooist of Bayswater in London, for offences not disclosed in my 
newspaper reports107, was jailed for 15 months, suspended for two years. 
Albert Groom, 55, an hotel porter of Thornaby-on-Tees in Yorkshire, for conspiracy to send 
indecent photographs through the post, was given a conditional discharge. 
Graham Sharp, 41, a photographic developer of Coalpit Heath in Gloucestershire, for sending 
indecent material through the post, was fined £1,000. 
Paul Kelly, 23, of Horwich in Cheshire, for aiding and abetting Graham Cadman to keep a 
disorderly house, was given a two year conditional discharge earlier in 1990. 
"Operation Spanner" had entirely succeeded. The Obscene Publications Squad even managed to 
get a word in about the evil trade in pornography and its "snuffy" tendency. According to the 
main report in The Times, 
Det Supt Michael Hames, head of Scotland Yard's Obscene Publications Squad, 
said after the trial that sadistic pornography was becoming more bizarre, more 
violent and more widespread. He issued a warning that it would eventually lead 
to a death being filmed. 1 0 8 
1 0 7 He may be connected with Alan Oversby, who runs a tattooing and body piercing business in Central London under 
the name of Mr Sebastian. For a full account of the ancient and interesting art of body piercing, see: V.Vale and Andrea Juno, 
Modern Primilives: An Investigation of Contemporary Adornment and Ritual, Re/Search Publications, California. 1989 -
available from the Virgin Megastorc in Oxford Street for £12.95. 
Mr Oversby was also tried before Judge Rant in the December of 1989, for the crime of having unlawfully wounded a client 
whose penis he was engaged to pierce. His plea, that the client consented, had a predictably frosty reception, on which he pleaded 
guilty. He also admitted charges of unlawfully administering an anaesthetic and sending obscene material through the post. I have 
yet to discover what sentence he received. 
1 0 8 20th December, 1990. 
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Now, compare these above sentences with the following: 
On the I3th of November, 1990. a lorry driver who killed two people. vvhen he crashed into their 
parked car after fumbling for hís tobáceo pouch on the floor of his cabs was sentenced to 90 
hours' community service and disqualiñed from driving for two years.109 
On the 30th of August, 1989, an admitted thief and fraud, who had stolen nearly £350,000, of 
which about £50,000 was recovered, was put on probation for two years. Since his arrest, the 
aecused had converted to Christianity, and was now sorry for his offences.110 
But 1 am missing the point. These were only crimes against life and property. Messrs Wilkinson 
et al. had committed crimes against morality. There is no comparison. Any one of us might for 
some reason kill or rob another person. But to commit a sexual offence - especially a homosexual 
oíTence - why, that requires a particularly revolting turn of mind. It is, both legislators and public 
agree, the business of the law to suppress that sort of thing. Whatever else it may become, 
England shall not be allowed to become another Sodom or Gomorrah. 
The Law Relating to Consent 
The various offences relating to unlawful sex and publication and possession of drugs have 
already been mentioned. The law regarding them may be grossly immoral in its paternalism. But 
it undoubtedly is the law; and the "Shropshire 15" might have found their interests better served 
by paying attention to it. What may surprise the average reader is the strange ability of the courts 
to construe a sexual act between consenting adults as a criminal assault. Indeed, John Atkinson 
was convicted solely of having aided and abetted others to cause injury to himself. It must 
certainly have surprised the convicted men. Yet Judge Rant's decisión was by no means based 
m The Daily Telegraph, I4th Nüvcmber, 1990. 
110 The Daily Telegraph, 3 Ist August 1989. 
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purely on his own préjudices, lt is open to the Court of Criminal Appeal, or the House of Lords, 
to rule that his interprétation of the law was incorrect. Yet there is some reason for holding that, 
when two sado-masochists make love, they are committing a serious offence. 
As has already been said, it is the essence of a crime against the person that injury is inflicted 
contrary to the will of the victim. This is the admitted assumption of the law. Consent is a valid 
defence; and it is for the prosecution to prove its absence. " 1 It is not, however, a defence in every 
case. There are circumstances in which a plea of consent will be rejected by the courts. 
There is fraud. If you consent to my injecting a vaccine into your body, and I instead inject a 
useless irritant, I shall very likely be guilty of battery. It is the same if I lie to you that 1 am a 
qualified dentist and unnecessarily pull out one of your teeth. Fraud will negative consent where 
the injured party is deceived as to the identity of the person or the nature of the act. 
There is duress. If I hold you prisoner and will not release you unless you consent to have sexual 
intercourse with me, your consent will not be recognised by the courts; and I shall be guilty of 
rape or an indécent assault. There is doubt as to the amount of duress required to negative 
consent. It is thought that if I merely threatened to dismiss you from my employment, or to bring 
a prosecution against you - both lawful acts in themselves -1 might still be guilty. The probable 
test to be applied is whether, having regard to the gravity of the threat and the proposed act, the 
will of a reasonably firm person is likely to be overcome. 
There isthe incapacity of minors. Some years ago, a défendant tattooed boys aged 12and 13,and 
they suffered injury as a resuit. Although they had consented to be tattooed, the court decided that 
they were too young to understand the nature and likely conséquences of the act to which they 
had submitted, the defendant's plea was rejected."2 
111 RvDonovan [1934| 2 King's Berich Reports 498. 
112 Burreil v Harmer [ 1967j Criminal Law Reports 169, together with the printed commentary. 
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Finally, there is the public interest. There are supposed to be certain classes of act which the State 
ought not to allow, irrespective of whether the parties have given their füllest and most informed 
consent. lt is for the defence to prove that the act in question falls into one of thèse catégories. 
Now, this goes far beyond the two other limitations described above. Those are quite compatible 
with the right of adult individuals to do with their bodies as they will. They operate only where, 
on account of the circumstances of the injured party, consent cannot be taken as genuine. This. 
however, allows the füllest public supervision of private actions. There has never been a 
comprehensive définition of the concept. Instead, it is for the judges to décide whether any 
particular class of acts is in the public interest. lt is for them, Consulting their own sensé of right 
and propriety, to décide what we may do with ourselves and each other. It is their préjudices, and 
not an objective, logical rule, that are allowed to define the limits of our freedom. 
Take, for example, the case of sporting injuries. Prize fights are not in themselves illegal in 
England. But they have nearly always been held by the courts to amount to batteries. Yet boxing 
matches held in accordance with the Queensberry Rules have not. Both have entertainment value. 
Both involve considérable danger of injury or even death to the participants. But only the dangers 
in the former have been held to be too great for the public interest to be served by their toleration. 
As Mr Justice Cave said just over a Century ago: 
The true view is, I think, that a blow Struck in anger, or which is likely or is 
intended to do corporal hurt, is an assault, but that a blow Struck in sport, and not 
likely, nor intended to cause bodily harm, is not an assault, and that, an assault 
being a breach of the peace and unlawful, the consent of the person Struck is 
immaterial. If this view is correct, a blow Struck in a prize-fight is clearly an 
assault; but playing with single-sticks or wrestling do not do not involve an 
assault; nor does boxing with gloves in the ordinary way, and not with...ferocity 
and severe punishment to the boxers.113 
A professional boxer may consent to have his brains knocked out in the ring, so long as the 
customary rules of conduct are observed. That is in the public interest. It is a différent matter if 
llJ R vConeyO882)8 Queervs Bcnch Division 534. 
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those rules are not observed. If two people outside a legitimate boxing ring black each other's 
eyes, at least one of them commits an assault. In 1980, two youths decided to settle their 
differences by finding out which had the harder fists. One got a bloody nose a few bruises. The 
victor was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm, but was acquitted by the jury. 
The Attorney General referred the points raised in the case to the Court of Criminal Appeal for 
clarification. He was answered thus: 
...It is not in the public interest that people should try to cause or should cause 
each other actual bodily harm for no good reason. Minor struggles are another 
matter. So, in our judgment, it is immaterial whether the act occurs in private or 
in public; it is an assault if actual bodily harm is intended and/or caused. This 
means that most fights will be unlawful regardless of consent.... 
[Yet njothing that we have said is intended to cast doubt on the accepted legality 
of properly conducted games and sports, lawful chastisement or correction, 
reasonable surgical interference, dangerous exhibitions, etc. These apparent 
exceptions can be justified as involving the exercise of a lawful right, in the case 
of chastisement or correction, or as needed in the public interest, in the other 
114 
cases. 
Their Lordships mention "reasonable surgical interference". The test of what is reasonable is, 
again, what they consider to be right and proper. If my legs are so badly mangled in an accident 
that my life is endangered, I may consent to having them cut off. The preservation of my life, I 
am sure, would be held to be in the public interest. But, if, like one of the characters in Peter 
Greenaway's A Zed and Two Noughts, I had one leg cut off merely for aesthetic reasons, to 
balance the earlier loss of the other in an accident, my surgeon might well find himself in trouble. 
That degree of body modification might offend the Judge. He might not think that to be at all in 
the public interest. 
On a similar point, see Lord Denning 40 years ago, commenting on the legality of an hypothetical 
vasectomy: 
1IJ Attorney General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) [19811 2 All England Reports 1057. 
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When it is done with the man's consent for a just cause, it is quite lawful, as. for 
instance, when it is done to prevent the transmission of an hereditary disease; but 
when it is done without just cause or excuse, it is unlawful, even though the man 
consents to it. Take a case where a sterilisation operation is done so as to enable 
a man to have the pleasure of sexual intercourse without shouldering the 
responsibilities attaching to it. The operation is then plainly injurious to the public 
interest."5 
At the time only obiter dicta, this particular point is now obsolete. The National Health Service 
(Family Planning) Amendment Act 1972 authorises the performing of vasectomy operations for 
contraceptive purposes. But the passage is still important. It shows the inevitable bias of judicial 
reasoning when such a vague and illimitable concept as the public interest is received in the 
courts. There is no other guide available than the judge's own conscience. Lord Denning is a 
moderate Anglican. His church by then had accepted the propriety of contraception for certain 
reasons, but still condemned promiscuity. Had he been a Catholic, he might have taken a more 
restrictive view. Had he been a follower of D.H. Lawrence, he might have been considerably 
more liberal. The concept has been less vague in practice than it might have been only because 
most of the other judges have been moderate Anglicans, and have come from much the same 
background as Lord Denning. The concept remains manageable only because the number of 
views as to its meaning have been limited by the facts of judicial selection. 
Not surprisingly, the bias against sexual nonconformity retains all its old force. The intentional 
infliction of bodily harm is a criminal offence unless the injured party consented, and unless the 
injury falls into a class of actions considered to be in the public interest. It is for this reason that 
Judge Rant was able to dismiss the pleas of consent with his words about drawing the line 
"between what is acceptable in a civilised society and what is not". It is for this reason that 14 
of the Shropshire 15 were punished for beating each other up. It is for this reason that John 
Atkinson, the 15th, was punished for letting himself be beaten up: he was an accessory to an 
assault. It is for this reason that the law ought to be changed. 
"s Bravery v Bravery [1954J 3 All England Reports 59. 
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A Proposal for Reform 
The Government has recently introduced a Criminal Justice Bill into the House of Commons -
the third mass of substantive and procedural changes in four years. Most of the changes in this 
Bi l l , as in the previous two Acts, are decidedly for the worst.116 But, whatever else it contains, 
a Criminal Justice Bill is just the place for amending the law relating to offences against the 
person. To any Member of Parliament who may be interested in the extension of individual 
freedom, I offer this draft clause for inclusion in the Bil l : 
Where, in any prosecution for a non-fatal offence against the person, the consent 
of the injured party shall be pleaded for the defence, that plea shall be adjudged 
a full defence unless it shall be proved for the prosecution in rebuttal 
(1) that such consent was not given, or was obtained by fraud or duress; 
or 
(2) that the injured party was at the time of giving such consent 
below the age of 18; or 
(3) having regard to the gravity of the injury, or to the probable mental 
state of the injured party at the time of consent, or to both, that the form 
in which such consent was given was not sufficiently clear to sanction the 
injury. 
A Brief Commentary 
This amendment, I hope, is sufficiently clear not to require any long commentary. But there are 
a few points that might benefit from a further discussion. 
I l f ' See The Guardian, 29th December, 1990. Clause 25 reclassifies solicitation by a man, the procuring of homosexual 
acts and indecency between men as "serious" sexual offences. These acts ought not even to be against the law. They are directed 
against neither life nor property. In those cases where they may cause a public nuisance, the police are already able under the 
general law of the land to take action. Now they are to stand beside indecency towards children and indecent assault. 
1 have little time for homosexual activists. For the most part dullard socialists, they spend far too much of ihcir time crying out 
for grants of public money and the suppression of what they barbarously call "homophobia". Nevertheless, when Ihcy begin their 
campaign against Clause 25 of the Bill, they will be absolutely in the right. They will deserve - though they may not be clever 
enough to welcome - the support of all libertarians. 
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I specify "non-fatal" offences. I believe that euthanasia ought to be legal. At the moment, to assist 
someone to put an end to his life is a serious offence. To aid, abet, counsel or procure the suicide 
of another person carries a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment."7 If that person is 
unable to do more than plead for death, to grant his plea is to risk an indictment for murder, 
which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. What I shall want when my time comes 
I am unable to say. But I will maintain that I have the right to end my life in the manner of my 
choosing. If I am diagnosed early enough as suffering from a painful and fatal illness, the law 
places no impediment to my committing suicide."8 Why, if I delay until I am too feeble, can I 
not be helped by another, or simply appoint another to dispatch me? 
The prohibition of euthanasia is yet another example of moral paternalism. It is to be condemned 
on exactly the same grounds as the prohibition of sado-masochism. But I have drafted an 
amendment to a Parliamentary Bill , not a philosophical text. There are probably more Members 
in favour of legalising what they may never have noticed was a crime than for legislating on a 
subject that has been hotly debated for years. 
For the same reason, I take 18 as the age of majority. I have already said that I would see the age 
of consent lowered. There is a good case for drawing a single line between childhood and 
adulthood some time about a person's 16th year. But this, again, is a controversial point. 1 am at 
the moment interested in a single reform of the law. 
In sub-clause (3), I give a formula for deciding the reality of consent. This may not be in the ideal 
form. It may require elaboration, But something like it is undeniably necessary. If I go into a 
tattooist's parlour, and ask to have a skull and crossbones put on my chest, it is perfectly 
reasonable to assume that I know what I am asking for. I am an adult of sound mind. I ought to 
1 1 7 S2 Suicide Act 1961. 
1 1 8 Before the Suicide Act 196 L it was a felony at common law for a sane adult to commit suicide. The penalty was 
forfeiture of goods and exclusion from consecrated ground. Failed suicides were guilty of the misdemeanour of attempted felony, 
and was liable to imprisonment. For a good account of how suicide was regarded throughout Europe until the middle of the last 
century, see W.E.M. Lecky, History of European Moráis from Augustus to Charlemagne ( 1869), Longmans. Green and Co., 
London. 1911, Volume Two, pp 43-61. 
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know what a tattoo is, how it might hurt, how difficult it might be to remove. My consent may 
be taken as indicated by my saying what I want and removing my shirt and vest. 
Suppose, on the other hand, I asked for a "Prince Albert'' - that is, to have a steel ring put through 
my glans. Now, this is an extremely painful opération. It can take months to heal. It is also a 
dangerous opération. If the cavernosum is pierced, the whole member may need to be amputated. 
At least this latter fact is not common knowledge. It might, therefore, be well for the piercer to 
explain what I was asking for, and have me sign a consent form in which I acknowledged my 
understanding and acceptance of the risks involved. It might be well in addition for the piercer 
to check that I was sober and otherwise of Sound mind. 
For some more drastic modification, he might be advised to have my consent form witnessed by 
a third party. Whatever complexity may be needed in practice, the principle is simple. The more 
extreme or unusual the act that I required, the more explicit must be the évidence of my real 
consent to it. If that is what I want, I am to be allowed to have myself hung up on hooks and 
flogged within an inch of my life. My consent is to be a mil defence to any charge of assault or 
battery. But the person who has injured me must have a good counter-rebuttal prepared to any 
attempted rebuttal of my consent by the prosecution. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
It is frequently said that the modem Conservative Party believes only in economic freedom. It 
has lowered taxes. It has lightened the vast bürden of public restreints on enterprise. It has on the 
whole resisted calls for protectionism. But it has done this, we are told, not out of any 
commitment to the principle of individual freedom - only for the sake improving the performance 
of Great Britain pic against that of its main rivais. 
This may be true of some Conservative Members of Parliament. But it is untrue of other 
Members. It is most emphatically untrue of John Major, our Prime Minister. His belief in 
freedom goes far beyond any mere interest in economic efficiency. At the heart of his philosophy, 
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he says, is a détermination to 
reinstate the individual to his or her rightful place in society. To offer him new 
incentives and opportunities to use his initiative. To deploy his talents. To 
demand something of him. To enable him to achieve something for himself and 
his family. And to take control of his ovvn life 
[The rôle of government] is to take the Steps which will enable people to help 
themselves. Left to theïr own devices, people will create a spontaneous, 
wcll-ordered society.... 
Our appeal is unashamedly populist. Quite simply, it is that people know best. 
That they should choose for themselves, and not have the choices made for them 
by politicians. self-styled experts, or. for want of a better word, the 
establishment."9 
These sentences are worthy of John Stuart Mi l l . If my amendment is ever put before the house, 
I confidently trust that Mr Major's vote would be no less worthy. 
1 1 9 From a speech givert to the Radical Society in late 1989 - quotetl. The Sunday Times, 2nd Deccmbcr 1990. 
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On Wednesday the 19th August 1987, an unemployed Hungerford labourer named Michael Ryan, 
armed with a semi-automatic rifle, and in a mental state unknown to us, went through his home 
town, shooting anything that moved. He shot and killed 14 people., including his mother His 
suicide a couple of hours later, and the subséquent deaths of two of the 16 wounded, brought his 
total to 17. 
Such killings being a rarity in England, their effect was tremendous. Every smali detail of the 
event was collected and printed; and, when the stock of true détails ran low, tabloid imagination 
supplied the lack. A fund was set up for the survivors or the victims' next of kin. Within a few 
weeks it had raised £380,000. 1 2 0 Yet, with curiosity and sympathy, perhaps no other emotion 
competed for primacy in the public mind so strongly as détermination. The Hungerford 
Massacre, it was resolved, should not be repeated. And, as though the one naturally followed the 
other, the cry went immediately up for a tightening of the law Controlling guns. 
'The existing législation is wholly inadéquate ..." said the General Secretary of the Police 
The Times, 3 Ist August 1987. 
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Superintendents1 Association. "There are too many guns in circulation and a lot of people who 
have guns clearly should not be in possession of them."'21 Stephen Waldorf, perhaps, might agree 
with this. So might the relatives of Cherry Groce.1 2 2 But whatever may be thought of their 
speaker, the words themselves only expressed the general belief regarding firearms. Stricter 
controls were essential, it was agreed, if criminal shootings were not to become part of the 
normal run of things. Such was the opinion six months ago. Reinforced since by a spate of 
armed robberies and killings with shotguns, such remains the opinion now. "Weapons should 
be kept under conditions so secure as to exclude most householders from keeping them" wrote 
The Times.m Indeed, the latest Gallup Poll on the issue reports public favour at 75 per cent for 
the banning of all guns from private ownership.124 Leave aside the efforts of some Conservative 
backbenchers, and of all the measures likely this year to have the Royal Assent, possibly none 
will have had so easy and uncontroversial a passage as the Firearms (Amendment) Act. 
Yet for all its lack of controversy, the Bill is easily the most illiberal measure of this entire long 
parliamentary session.125 For legal access to firearms is already strictly and comprehensively 
limited. The "wholly inadequate" current legislation already forbids the public to own automatic 
weapons.126 Everything else, excepting shotguns, which have a less restrictive form of control 
- and the most feeble airguns - requires a Firearms Certificate, which is had from the local Police 
and is renewable every three years. On it must be recorded all transactions in weapons and 
ammunition. Applicants must satisfy the Police of their "good reason" for possessing any 
certifiable weapon, and that they can be trusted with it "without danger to the public safety or to 
IJI The Times, 22nd August 1987. 
1 1 1 Thesc were innocenl British citizens set upon and shol in error by thc police during tlie 1980s. Tłiere have becn 
many others, but thesc are the most notorious cases. 
123 The Times, I6th October 1987. 
, u The Daily Telegraph, lOth Fcbruary 1988. It should be noted that thc pol! was commissioned by the League Agaiust 
Crucl Sports, and that none of the questions asked was published in my sourcc. 
l ł i See the Bill revicwcd in Policing London for Dcccmbcr. 1987. produced by the Police Monitoring and Research 
Group of the London Strategie Policy Unit (a major part of the GLCs ghost). 
I 2 f' Firearms Act, 1968, s5. 
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the peace".127 "Good reason" is normally held to be membership of an approved shooting club, 
or use of land not open to the public - but not, at least since 1946, setf defence.128 Forfeit of a 
certifícate can result in loss of all firearms held.1 2 9 Unauthorised possession is a serious offence. 
bringing a penalty of three years imprisonment, or an unlimited fine, or both.130 There is a 
penumbra of controls in other statutes which, taken entirely. might seem already to discourage 
all but the most determined from lawfully keeping guns. Despite all this - despite levéis of 
control comparable to those in Rumania on typewriters - more is following. Some of the Bill 's 
harsher clauses have subsequently been softened.. Not all semi-automatic rifles and pump action 
shotguns will be prohibited, as was at first intended. Ñor are weapons to be taken without 
compensation. But certain kinds of shotgun are to be made fully certifiable, and access to other 
kinds restricted. There are still more than a million certifícate holders in this country. They are 
nearly all peaceful and responsible citizens. The new Act, when passed, will yet more ümit their 
right to lawful enjoyment of an activity quite as popular as any better known sport. 
But the rights of sportsmen, though important are not all that are threatened. There is the matter 
of our constitutional rights - those famous Rights of Englishmen, which have been the crude 
matter from which every liberal doctrine has been refined, and possession of which we trace back 
into the mists of time. To bear arms is one of those rights, and the one with which the others 
have repeatedly been protected. To go back only to the Revolution, it is specifically affirmed in 
the Bi l l of Rights; l j l and one of the grievances against James was that he had caused "several 
good subjects, being protestants, to be disarmed ..." , 3 2 A disarmed people was believed a sure 
127 lbid27(\). 
I 2 S Colin Greenwood, Firearms Control: A Stitdy of Armed Crime and Firearms Conirol in England and Wales, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972, p.92. This is one of the great classîc texts on the right to kcep and bear arms. It is citcd 
cantinually throughout this pamphlet. I make no apology for this. Mr Grccnwood's book repays the most thorough and continuai 
siudy. 
'"F.A., 1968, ss 51 & 52. 
r'"ibid. ss3(3). 51 (1). (2)&Schcdule 6, Part 1. 
m Bill of Rights, 1689, S II (7) - ''That the subjects which are protestants may have arms for their defence suiiable l'or 
their conditions: and as allowed by law". 
I3; Ibid, I (6). 
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sign of approaching or actual tyranny, and Gibbon, in the next Century, only voiced the gênerai 
préjudice in declaring that 
[a] martial nobility and stubborn commons, possessed of arms. tenacious of 
property, and collected into constitutional assemblies, form the only balance 
capable of preserving a free constitution against enterprises of an aspiring 
prince.133 
For centuries there has been no good rcason here for pulling down a government. The right to 
bear arms for personal defence was nonetheless jealously preserved, and still exercised into a 
time almost within living memory. Ninety years ago, it was possible for anyone in this country, 
regardless of âge or capacity, to walk into a gunsmith's and buy as many guns and as much 
ammunition as he could afford. Since no effort was made to count the number of guns in 
circulation, numbers are uncertain. But over 4,000 imported pistols and revolvers were 
submitted for proof at the Birmingham Proof House in 1889; and 37,000 British pistols were 
submitted in 1902. Price was no constraint on ownership: pistols of a kind started at l s6d , , 3 4 or 
eighteen times the cost of a daily newspaper. There was, it should be said, Section 4 of the 1824 
Vagrancy Act, which penalised the carrying of offensive weapons with intent to commit a felony. 
There was the Gun Licenses Act of 1870 - despite its name a revenue measure requiring a 10s 
license to be taken out before any kind of firearm could be carried or used outside of a private 
dwelling. Licenses were available without question at all Post Offices. These restrictions aside, 
guns could be had as readily and legally as télévision sets can today. 
Quite obviously, the mere assertion of rights is no defence of them; and it would be a very feeble 
case against gun controls that rested here. The function of constitutional rights is to safeguard 
freedom, the function of which in turn is to allow the pursuit of happiness - however this may 
be conceived. There is no value in calling for rights which, if had, would frustrate this purpose, 
or which would give more freedom than is compatible with its own survival. Certainly, they are 
not to be interfered with for any light, transient reason. Neither, though, are they to be enjoyed 
1 3 3 Edward Gibbon, Hisiory of the Décline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Chapter III - last sentence of first paragraph. 
1 3 4 Greenwood, op. ci'f..p.26. 
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absolutely, without regard for circumstances. Freedom of speech, for example, is one of the 
essential doctrines of liberalism; yet no liberal of any common sense would press equally hard 
for it in every instance. There are places where the open discussion of certain matters would 
produce not the élimination of error but bloodshed on a massive scale. Even in this country. 
there may be some danger that too much flaunting of blasphemy might provoke an otherwise 
indifferent majority to censoring the press. When therefore the exercise of any one right seems 
to endanger the continued exercise of others, or ot" itself in a milder form, its curtailment becomes 
a proper matter for thought. 
Now, perhaps the individual owning of guns is another such instance. There were few controls 
in the last Century because few were required. But the présent age is believed more violent than 
any before it. There has been both an increase in the effectiveness of most weapons and an 
increasing willingness to use them; and new threats to public safety call for new forms of 
protection. On this point, Peregrine Worsthorne draws an ingenious analogy with the road traffic 
laws - superfluous once but now essential.135 No one can know for certain what would happen 
without controls; but American expérience is normally taken as a good indicator. There, despite 
some controls, guns are to be had virtually on demand, the murder rate is regularly almost ten 
times that of England and Wales, and more than three fifths of all murders are committed with 
135 The Sunday Telegraph, 27th August 1987. 
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guns.136 Three Présidents have been shot this Century, tvvo of them fatally. And even 
Stockbrokers have not been immune from the anger or disappointment of an armed public. 
Perhaps, without what controls we have, armed violence in England might increase to similar 
levels. Or fears for life and property might even cause a lapse into a simpler, and more despotic, 
form of government and justice. For avoiding either of thèse, the limiting of freedom involved 
in gun controls is generally thought well worth the priée. Put forward as it is with great 
frequency and unanimity, the argument does have an appearance of plausibility. Critically 
examined, however, it is found to rest on a number of false assumptions. First, most obvious and 
most easily exposed, there is the belief that gun controls were put on in response to a need for 
them. Almost the exact opposite is true. 
Though guns were freely available, the late Victorians seem to have been anything but careless 
or violent in their use of them. According to Coroners' reports, in the three years from 1890, 
there was a total of 524 deaths attributable to tirearms. 443 of thèse were suicides, which, being 
voluntary matters, are not our concern. This leaves 49 accidentai deaths and 32 homicides. 
Accidents are not presently our concern, involving as they often do self-inflicted harm. This 
leaves an average of 10 instances per year of the lethal misuse of guns.137 Regarding their more 
générât use in armed crime, not much can be said owing to a lack of continuous statistics. But, 
Murder Rates Per 100,000 - Various Countries 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
U.S. 9.1 9.2 9.4 NA NA 
ENG. & WALES 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.8 
S WITZERLAND 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.9 NA 
N IRE LAND 13.7 14.3 5.7 NA NA 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1982-3, Washington D.C. 1982. Table 297. 
Murders in U.s. - Per Cent Rate Guns and Knives 
YEAR MURDERS GUNS percent KNIVES perccnl 
1970 13;649 66.2 17.8 
1975 18;642 65.8 17.4 
1980 21,860 62.4 19.3 
1981 20,053 62.4 19.4 
Source: Ibid, Table 298. 
1 3 7 Greenwood, op. cit., p.22. Despite ignoring accidents. 1 cannot help relating that, in 1892, accidentai deaths due 
to misuse of pistols were just three more than those due to misuse of perambulaiors (ibid). 
{110} 
Chapter Five 
in the nine years to 1889, 13 police offices were wounded by armed burglars in the Metropolitan 
Police District. During the next five years, three were so wounded in the whole of England and 
Wales. an area with a population five times larger. In the earlier period, 18 burglars escaped by 
using firearms in the Metropolitan Police District; in the later period, in England and Wales, the 
numberwasstill 18.138 Thèse were not unusually peaceful years. They knew the Fenian bombing 
campaign in London, and the Jack the Ripper killings. Yet guns were very seldom used. 
Controls, nonetheless, began in 1903, with the Pistols Act, which required the production of a 
Game or Gun Licence before buying certain kinds of pistol. In the absence of any crime wave, 
supporters of the Bill were reduced to giving anecdotal évidence of shooting incidents involving 
children.1 3 9 But it was not seen as controversial, and had an easy passage. 
Next came the Firearms Act of 1920. Still, the use of guns in crime was almost insignificant: 
between 1911 and 1917, there were 170 instance in London, or an annual average of 24. 1 4 0 But, 
with civil war in Ireland, fears in England of a Bolshevist coup, and the prospect of millions of 
demobilised weapons coming onto the home market, it was agreed that something ought to be 
done. Précèdent sanctioned temporary measures. The Government chose permanent ones; and 
its Act was substantially the modem scheme of control. Only one Member spoke of 
constitutional rights. He was ignored, and the Bill went through both Houses almost by 
acclamation.141 During the next twenty years, the rate of nearly every type of crime fell. Looking 
at the eighteen months to the end of 1937, for example, only seven people arrested in the 
Metropolitan Police District were found in possession of firearms.142 More controls, however, 
came in 1937, making sawn-off shotguns and smooth bore pistols certifiable weapons, and 
prohibiting automatic weapons. 
,ilIbid, Table 2. 
159 Ibid, p.29. 
1 4 0 /6iUTable5. 
m Ibid, Chapter 3. 
1 4 2 A further 12 had airguns, and one a toy pistol - Ibid. p.70. 
{111} 
Chapter Five 
Shotgun controls date from 1967, and were the direct response to the killing of tvvo policemen 
by criminals with pistols. Much was said about a trebling since 1961 of indictable offences 
involving shotguns. Probably there was an increasing use of shotguns. But, for every year since 
1961, the figures showing this increase had been collected on a différent basis; and the phrase 
"indictable offences involving shotguns" covered every crime from armed robbery to the theft 
of unusable antiques.143 Controls on the more powerful sort of airgun followed in 1969, though 
not one instance was produced of them having featured in a crime or accident.144 
And so we have ail but lost a right which our ancestors thought equal in importance to the 
Habeas Corpus Act and trial by jury. And we have lost it with scarcely a shred of good évidence 
that the loss was required on the grounds of public safety. It would be gloomy yet satisfying to 
think ourselves victims of despotic rulers or a coalition of special interests. Yet if there is one 
certain fact in the progress of our gun controls towards completeness, it is that they have been 
overwhelmingly populär. At almost every stage, they have been quietly accepted or loudly 
demanded. They are the outcome not of any specific unhappy circumstances, but of a gênerai 
lack of interest in being free which has been the mark of this country in the period of its décline. 
Against controls in the présent, of course - whatever suspicion against them it might raise - this 
purely in itself is no argument. Simply because they were not needed once is no reason for not 
having them now. Every hypochondriac, after all, does eventually die; and, in the âge of Michael 
Ryan, rather than criticise the superfluity of past législation, perhaps we should praise the 
foresight of its makers. But though it is nearly an article of faith that the Firearms Acts are ail 
that keeps London from becoming like Detroit, faith is no guarantee of truth. Différent nations 
have différent patterns of behaviour, and with thèse go différent propensities to violence. If there 
is greater misuse of guns in one country than in another, there is surely more to explaining the 
variation than knowing whether guns can be had on demand or by permission. The example of 
America tends to dominate ail talk of gun control. But America is by no means the model of 
143 Ibid, Chapter 8. 
U 4 /W,p .89 . 
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what a country without them must inescapably become. Switzerland has very moderate controls. 
and every man there of military age is even required to keep firearms on his property. Yet the 
murder rate is regularly lower than our own, 1 4 5 and guns are seldom used as a weapon of 
assault.146 
Or, to look near the other extreme, there is Northern Ireland. Controls there are more severe even 
than in England and Wales, only one ürearm being aliowed per certificate, and shotguns and all 
airguns being fully certifiable weapons. Nonetheless, the murder rate in that unhappy place was 
actually higher in several years than that of the United States.147 
Or there is even our own example to be looked at. A shared language and populär culture make 
England almost a satellite of America. It may be yet noted that the American murder rate with 
knives alone is far higher than the murder rate in England and Wales from all causes 
combined;1 4 8 and the only restriction on having any laufe whatever in England is at most the 
additional cost of a ferry ride across the Channel. If our crime rate is below the American even 
in those cases where no préventive barriers exist to parity, it hardly seems likely that our gun 
controls are all that contains the rate of murder by shooting. 
This being so, there remains the claim that controls, if not equally needed in all places, may still 
have a certain use. For, on the above principle, it is arguable that repealing ail our laws against 
murder might leave us safer on average than the Americans. though they were invariably to catch 
and exécute their murderers: and who would suppose this a good case for repeal? Therefore, 
though already low, the criminal use of guns in Switzerland might be even lower were they less 
easily available. Northern Ireland, without any controls, might well slip from endémie terrorism 
into civil war. But so far from saving the case for controls. this claim only rests it on and isolâtes 
1 4 5 M.B. Clinnard, Cities Without Crime: the. Case of Switzerland. Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 114-5. 
1 4 6 Sec Ibid. 
1 4 7 See Table above. 
m See Table above. 
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its most basic assumption, which is that they work. While there is little doubt that threatening 
the appropriate penalties may check the rate of murder or other crimes, it is very much less 
certain whether controls on guns do much to prevent their misuse. 
Take the incidence of professional armed crime, which is normally the main object of public 
concern. If controls had any substantial effect here, we might expect to see some reflection of 
it in the Statistical tables. We should see, that is, little use of fully automatic weapons, these 
being prohibited. Use of handguns, having been controlled nearly seventy years, we might see 
rather more of. But shotguns and powerful airguns, subject to control only these past twenty 
years, we ought to see as almost the général firearm. We see, of course, nothing of the kind. 
Choice of firearm seems determined far more by préférence than theoretical availability. In 1967, 
shotguns, though just controlled, were used in only 21.3 per cent of armed robberies. Pistols, 
however. were used in 45.6 per cent.'49 Twenty years later, the proportions have not greatly 
changed: the 1985 figure for shotguns was 26.8 per cent.150 For obvious reasons of convenience 
and firepower, most criminals who wish to carry a gun will prefer to carry a handgun - this in 
spite of the written law. But the law can regulate possession only of what the Police know to 
exist. How many uncertified weapons there are no one knows. Guns wear out slowly, and are 
not hard to repair. There might easily be millions of them in the country, held either since before 
the 1920 Act or since the War, when many controls were practically annulled by circumstances. 
Certainly, in the four amnesties between 1946 and 1968, weapons handed into the Police 
exceeded 20,000.131 Another amnesty is planned for this year, and it will be interesting to see 
how many warehouses will be filled this time with old service revolvers and exotic memorabilia. 
It seems unlikely in the nature of things that many of the weapons handed in were or will be 
owned for criminal purposes. The number is, however, vast; and it may be wondered how many 
others have found their way into the pool of uncertified guns available for criminal use. 
1 4 9 Greenwood, op. cit., p.236. 
' ! 0 From officiai figures (supplied by the Shooters' Rights Association). 
I ; l Greenwood, op. cit., p.236. 
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Otherwise, if demand for guns exceeded the domestic supply, imports could never be kept out.132 
The record of our drug laws illustrâtes how difficult it is to control the movement of small but 
greatly desired items. More specifically, opposed even by one of the best anti-terrorist forces in 
the world, the IRA has no shortage of personal vveapons, only of the men to fire them. For thèse 
reasons, if the use of guns in professional crime is increasing - and it almost certainly is - the 
speed of the increase seems almost wholly determined by fashions within the criminal classes. 
Take next the incidence of domestic violence. There can be few households that are completely 
peaceful, and disputes within them are often peculiarly savage. Whether there would be more 
disputes, and of greater violence, in the absence of control cannot be known. Perhaps more 
arguments than now become crockery fights would otherwise become shooting matches. But, 
writing of homicides in gênerai, the conclusion of at least one researcher is firmly that 
more than the availability of a shooting weapon is involved in homicide ... The 
type of weapons used appears to be, in part, the culmination of assault intentions 
or events and is only superficially related to causality.153 
It may easily be, then, that gun controls keep down the number of domestic murders by shooting, 
but do so largely in those cases where murders are committed anyway, though by other means. 
They may do little more than force a substitution for handguns of shotguns, crossbows or other, 
less convenient weapons. 
Finally, take Michael Ryan. How maniacs are to be abolished by Act of Parliament probably not 
the most fervent supporter of the Firearms Bil l can explain. Ryan is said to have been obsessed 
by guns, and there are few obsessions that are not more powerful than the law. Even if public 
opinion had had its way years ago, and civilian ownership of ail firearms had been absolutely 
prohibited, he might still have collected an armoury quite as impressive as the one he acquired 
1 5 2 It might also be said that guns are not difficult to make or convert. See L. Wesley's very interesting Air-Guns & 
Air-Pistols, Cassell, London, 1979. 
, i J Marvin E. Wolfgang, Patterns of Homicide in America, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1958, p.82 
(quoted in Greenwood, op. cit., p. 130). 
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by legal means alone. The existing controls did not put him off. The new conlrols will not put 
off anyone strongly inclined to follow his example. What they might do, indeed. is make his 
example ail the easier to follow. How far would Ryan have got that day had his victims been 
carrying guns of their own? - had not controls disarmed the law-abiding? As it was, nothing 
endangered him until armed police could be brought in from outside. 
None of this should be taken as denying that a problem does exist. The incidence of ail violent 
crime has increased alarmingly during the past four décades. The criminal use of firearms, once 
a rarity, is verging on the commonplace. It would be unnatural were people to look on thèse 
increases and not demand that something be done. Even so, it must be stressed - and repeatedly 
so - that gun controls are not the required solution. They take from us an important natural right 
without proper reason and without substantial benefit. Certainly, they do have some damping 
effect on the rate of criminal misuse. They put the lower class of street thug to the trouble of 
making phone calls or waiting in public houses before being able to go about armed. They 
ensure that enraged marriage partners reach out for carving knives more often than automatics. 
There are some people who would cry up even the smallest potential saving of life as justifying 
the controls. Similarly, there are people who believe the avoiding of a few disorders to justify 
censoring the press, or who want motor cars banned on account of the road casualty figures. 
Every kind of freedom is attended by particular ills, and looking only at thèse, ignoring its 
gênerai advantages, is a sure means of herding free men into a slave gang. As said, freedom may 
be limited for reasons of public safety. But, to justify any limitation, the balance of advantage 
must weigh far more heavily in its favour than it does in the case of gun control. This is so taking 
the measure only in itself. And the balance falls still heavier considering also the scheme of law 
enforcement of which control is an important part. 
According to the old jurisprudence, crime is most effectively deterred - of course assuming 
détection - by the severity of punishment. This is a harsh doctrine, sanctioning as it often does 
very severe punishments indeed. It is also a strictly limited one. It involves a précise and known 
use of State power - a collection and focussing of it over a small area, much as burning glass does 
to the sun's rays. Only criminals are to be in fear of that power: the rest of us are to be left freely 
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to go about our business. Today, harshness is no longer in fashion. There is no death penalty, 
nor flogging, nor hard labour. They are thought barbarously cruel by those vvhose opinions 
count. Therefore, when mildness and attempts at the reformation of character fail. the only 
means left of ensuring obédience to the law is to try restricting the means of breaking it. Yet. 
though apparently more humane than deterrence, prévention requires the most constant and 
unwelcome modes of State supervision. Acts which in themselves may be completely harmless. 
or at least innocent, corne under police inspection. Those who use guns in crime are an almost 
insignificant minority of ail who own guns. Yet the entire class of gun owners is treated as a 
potentially criminal class. Those who take out licenses open themselves to ail manner of légal 
harrying. Those who prefer not to, though perhaps without the least aggressive intent against life 
or property, become criminals - to be punished if caught. As best illustration of this, however, 
take not gun controls, but the great Miners' Strike. Violent mass picketing is a breach of public 
order, and should always be put down with whatever force may be required. Tear gas, bâton 
charges, severe punishment of ail taken on the scène after a stated time - thèse are the proper 
means of dealing with riots. But modem English law has no Riot Act. Instead of mobs being 
dispersed, road blocks were set up, for the Police to stop motorists and turn them back or arrest 
them if suspected of travelling to a picket line.1 5 4 Putting a rope round someone's neck is surely 
an unhappy thing to do. But is it so bad and unthinkable as trying to govern an entire nation as 
though it were a prison or a school? As was said against another species of prior restraint: 
He who is not trusted with his own actions, his drift not being known to be evill, 
and standing to the hazard of law and penalty, has no great argument to think 
himself reputed in the Commonwealth wherein he was born for other than a fool 
or a foreiner.155 
The normal conclusion to this kind of essay is to call for the dismantling of controls, and to 
discuss the ways in which it might be done. My own feeling, however, is that this would be to 
end on a note of inappropriate optimism. Much is said of a libéral revival in this country since 
1979. Certainly, the économie rôle of the State is smaller now than ten years ago, and this is 
1 5 , 1 See Policing London: Collected Reports of the GLC Police Committee, 1986, p. 100. 
John M\honf Areopagitica (\644), Clarendon Press, 1886, p.30. 
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reason to be glad. But it should not be rnistaken for more than it is. Just as even the Chinese and 
Russïan governments have abandoned the greater follies of socialism, so has our own tried a 
limited freeing of markets - and for much the same mercantilist reason, of preserving or 
maintaining a certain national status. The immédiate needs of economic efficiency are one thing. 
Liberalism is something rather larger, and altogether stranger and more frightening to 
Government and public alike. 
The Firearms Bill will become law, and after a décent interval will be followed by another, and 
then by another, until guns are in theory outlawed among the civilian population. There is no 
opposing the gênerai will on this point. There is no place for fantastical schemes of deregulation. 
AU that can usefully be done is to observe and record the progress of folly - and hope that its 
worst conséquence will be felt by a later génération than our own. 
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Putting the Case Against Gun Control: 
Reflections on an Outrageously Effective 
Télévision Performance - 2nd May 1996 
by Sean Gabb 
2,318 words 
First Published as Tactical Notes No. 17, 
by the Libertarian Alliance, 
London, May 1996, 
ISBN 1 85637 343 6 
Last 2nd May [1996], a Thursday, I was invited to Scotland to sit on the panel in Words with 
Warfe, a télévision discussion show which replaces Question Time there once every month. The 
researchers, it seems, had been unable to find anyone in the country to denounce gun control, and 
so had to make do with an English accent. Having found me, though, they did their best to keep 
me happy. I was offered a taxi from South Hast London to Heathrow, which I only turned down 
because public transport is faster during the day. 1 was given a business class seat on a flight to 
Glasgow - cost £120 - and a first class railway sleeper back down to Euston - cost £85. Then 
there was a stretched Rover to Ayr Town Hall, where the programme was to be recorded. 
Adding my fee - which 1 could probably have doubled had I been inclined -1 may have cost them 
more than the average MP. Nice work when you can get it. 
On the panel with me was the Editor of The Sunday Mail, and a Journalist whose name I never 
caught but who looked just like someone 1 knew and loathed at university. and Guy Savage, 
representing the Shooters' Rights Association. These first two were there to argue for a ban on 
the private ownership of guns, the third to claim that the Firearms Acts 1920 to 1988 strike a fair 
balance between competing interests, and that this should not be upset just because a pair of 
lunatics in Dunblane and Tasmania had decided to shoot lots of people. In the studio audience 
were four politicians - Sir Michael Hirst, Chairman of the Scottish Conservative Party. Margaret 
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Ewing. from the Scottish Nationalists, and two others whose names I again missed but which are 
not vvorth looking up. I have no idea how many people watch Words with Wark. But I imagine 
the BBC had given me a seven figure audience to regaie with my opinions. 
And my opinion is that gun control is wrong in any form. I believe that an adult should be able 
to walk into a gun shop and, without showing any permit or identification, be able to buy as many 
guns and as much ammunition as he can afford; and that he should be able to carry this round 
with him in public and use it to défend his life and property. This is not a popular view, 1 grant. 
On the other hand, I doubt if many armed criminals would take more notice of a gun ban than 
they do of the présent controls. And it is worth asking how many people Michael Ryan could 
have killed had anyone else in Hungerford High Street been carrying a gun. As the Americans 
say, "God made men equal, and Smith & Wesson make damn sure it stays that way". 
I earned my fee by saying ail this in the studio. I am sure I pleased the researchers. They spend 
much of their lives talking to people who say the most outrageous things on the téléphone, but 
who then lose heart in the studio and agrée with everyone else. The audience was another matter. 
Speaking on the Kilroy programme here in London, I could probably have made people bounce 
up and down on their seats with rage. Just as likely, there would have been a few Dunblane 
parents to sob pathetically into the caméras. Speaking in Ayr, the response I got was a shocked 
silence. I looked out into a sea of faces that reminded me of nothing so much as the Jewish 
audience in Mel Brooks' The Producers, during the opening number from Springtime for Hitler. 
At last, someone who claimed to be a minister of religion and a father of two denounced me for 
pulling God into politics - as i f that were not what He is there for. Someone else who said he 
fought in Korea claimed I was so plainly unbalanced that I should never be let near a gun. 
As soon as what passed for debate had started again, I took care to score a big "own" goal. An 
Olympic shooter spoke, followed by a clay pigeon shooter. They were not against a gun ban -
so long as their guns were left out of it. No said I, this would never do. The purpose of guns was 
to kill people. The only matter of importance was to make sure they were used to kill the right 
people, namely burglars and street criminals. From the look on the Olympic man's face, he was 
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thinking of quite another category of people to kill. 
Twenty minutes pass very quickly in a télévision studio. I had barely warmed up before my panel 
was ejected, to make way for the politicians to corne on and bore everyone stiff with rail 
privatisation and nursery vouchers. 
Afterwards in the réception, I found myself shunned like the lepers of old. The locals turned their 
backs on me. Sir Michael Hirst looked straight through me as I sidled up to him with my glass 
of orange juice - so much for the party of individual freedom! Guy Savage muttered that my 
comments had been "unconstructive". On the ride back to Glasgow, he pointedly ignored me, 
talking to the driver instead about negative equity. This was a shame. On the ride over, he had 
been very friendly, sharing with me his vast knowledge of the présent law on guns, and even 
agreeing to address a Libertarian Alliance conférence on the right to keep and bear arms. 
Realising that my présence was not desired, 1 pretended to sleep all the way back. 
On the whole, I did pretty well. One of the great falsehoods of modem life is that arguments are 
won by being "moderate" - by conceding the other side's point and then haggling over the détails. 
They are not. The gun lobby, for example, spent nearly half a million after Hungerford trying 
to stop the Firearms Bill that resulted from it. 1 imagine most of the cash went straight to a gang 
of sleazy PR hacks, who organised a few lunches with politicians too corrupt even to stay bought. 
What little found its way into the media was one long grovel, by clay pigeon and Olympic 
shooters begging for laws that would hurt only other gun owners. They rolled over and showed 
their bellies to Douglas Hurd. Not surprisingly, he gave them ail a good, hard kicking. 
Arguments are won by being honest - by saying what you believe as clearly as possible, as often 
as possible, and never mind how "unconstructive" it seems in the short term. Döing so has three 
effects. First, it shifts the middle ground in a debate. This is valuable in a country where being 
moderate is so in fashion. For this middle ground is not an independent point of view, but can 
be pulled sharpiy to and fro by what is happening at the extremes. Before about 1975, for 
example, the public spectrum on economic policy stretched between Soviet communism and 
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social democracy. Accordingly, the modérâtes were ail pink socialists. Now that there are 
libertarïans demanding a total free market, the modérâtes have become blue social democrats. 
And. though important, the collapse of the Soviet Union was not entirely to blâme for this - in 
those countries without a libertarian fringe, after ail, the consensus is still decidedly pink. In my 
own case, had I not been in that studio, the spectrum would have stretched between a total ban 
and the status quo; and anyone trying to sound moderate would have had to favour many more 
controls. As it was, Mr Savage came across as the centrist - a fact recognised by the people who 
did not shun him as they did me, and a fact worth noting by the Shooters' Rights Association if 
it ever wants to live up to its name. 
Second, it gets converts. Granted, my audience in the studio was füll of glum blockheads. But 
there must have been dozens of people at home who were hearing what I said for the first time 
and who agreed with every word of it. Most of thèse will stay at home. Others - one or two, 
perhaps - will become committed libertarian activists. They will join the Libertarian Alliance. 
They will h and out its publications. They will write for it. They will appear in télévision studios, 
putting the libertarian case on whatever they have been called in to discuss. Moreover, even the 
blockheads have a fonction. If they can remember what I said in the studio - not hard, bearing 
in mind how clear I was - they will spread it by explaining to friends and relations how 
scandalised they were by it. Sooner or later, the message will reach someone who is not at ail 
scandalised; and another convert will have been made. And that is how intellectuai révolutions 
get under way. With his claim that Hungerford and Dunblane were "failures of policing", and 
the like, I doubt if Mr Savage enthused anyone to go out and do something against the gun 
grabbers. 
Third, it establishes a position. Unusual ideas are generally ignored at first. Then, if they 
continue being put, they are laughed at. Then they must be argued with. Occasionally, they 
become the common sensé of the next génération. That is how it was with socialism in this 
country. More recently, it was like that with monetarism and Council house sales. I do not know 
if my dream of abolishing gun control will be so lucky. But, to be sure, no one will take notice 
of it unless someone goes to the trouble of clearly arguing for it. 
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Yes, I did pretty well in Scotland. I may do even better the next time I am allowed into a 
télévision or wireless studio. 
Supplément - Saturday 18th May 1996 
I was allowed back yesterday morning. I cast the first version of the above onto the Internet on 
May lOth. The following morning. Jim Hawkins of BBC Radio Northampton replied by e-mail, 
He had read my pamphlet and liked it, and he wanted me to repeat it on his programme on Friday 
the I7th. 
So there I sat for an hour yesterday morning, telling another million people why the gun control 
laws should be abolished. I was against Anne Pearston of the Snowdrop Campaign - this being 
a group set up after Dunblane to press for a total ban on handguns. Though honest, she was not 
very bright, and I went through her like a hot knife through butter. When I accused her of 
wanting to live in a slave state, she answered "Yes, I do". When I further accused her of trusting 
no one else with guns because she felt unable to trust herself with one, she started to panic. 
When I repeated my wish that someone else in Hungerford had been armed, she referred to my 
appearance on Words with Wark, saying only that I had worried her then, and I worried her now. 
I said much else. ranging from the Jews in Nazi Germany ("what if they had been able to shoot 
back?"), to Waco ("men, women and children murdered by the American Government"). In 
short, I indeed did even better this time than last - and if anyone doubts this, I have a tape to 
proves it. 
Enough of boasting, however. The reason for this Supplément is to emphasise that extremism 
does work. Consider: 
First, it was extremism that got me on Words with Wark, and an extremist report of what I did 
there that got me on the Jim Hawkins show. It annoys me that I can never make the national 
press - versions of my pamphlet, for example, came straight back to me from The Spectator and 
{123} 
Chapter Six 
The Sunday Telegraph, as if wafted on cries of horror. Nevertheless, the electronic media can 
hardly get enough of me and Brian Micklethwait and the rest of us. Whether or not we can ever 
win it, we lack no opportunity for putting the libertarian case. 
Second, it is extremism that makes us so effective in debate. The gun grabbers and other 
enemies of freedom have so far had an easy ride in the media. They have only had to argue with 
cowards and fools who, worried not to upset anyone, have failed to make most of the good 
points. They have never known principled, uncompromising opposition. Faced with it, they 
behave like rabbits faced with a new strain of myxomatosis: they have no defences. If Mrs 
Pearson was out of her depth with me, so at present are all of her colleagues. They have ready 
answers to the whinings of the clay pigeon lobby, but none to anyone who asserts a right of self 
defence against "burglars, armed robbers and other trash". 
Third, extremism really does shift the middle ground. In the main pamphlet above, I was unable 
to give examples from my own experience. Since yesterday morning, I can. Someone from a 
shooting club called in, and said "1 want to take a middle view between the speakers". He then 
argued against any change in the gun laws. Without me there, he could never have got away with 
that. He would have been denounced as a potential Thomas Hamilton, trying to save his penis 
extension. Half an hour of me, and Mrs Pearson nearly embraced him. Guy Savage and the 
Shooters' Rights Association - again, please take note. 
In a few minutes, I will send this revised pamphlet to Brian, for publishing by the Libertarian 
Alliance. Before he even sees it, though, it will be all over the Internet - there to be read by 
anyone else who happens to have a studio to fill. 
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Introduction 
Aside from Eire, ours is the only country in the European Union not to have some kind of identity 
card scheme. Elsewhere, it has long been common for people to carry, and be required to 
produce, identification. Here, by law and custom, there is no need for people to identify 
themselves, unless they are seeking some positive benefit or have been arrested. 
This différence is under attack. The Prime Minister, the Home Secretary, a former Deputy 
Leader of the Labour Party, and the Editor of The Sunday Express - to name just a few - have 
called for the introduction of identity cards.156 With the présent balance of votes in the House 
George Jones, "Major backs ID cards to fight crime", The Daily Telegraph, London, 8th June 1994; The Right 
Honourablc Michael Howard QC MP, Home Secretary, "Speech to the 11 Ith Conservative Party Conference.. Thursday 13th 
Oetober 1994", Conservative Party News Release 759/94. p.15; Roy Hattcrsley. "How Britain can solve its identity crisis'\ The 
Daily Mail, London, lOth August 1994; Brian Hitchen, "ID cards for all" The Sunday Express, London, 16th Octobcr 1994. 
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of Commons, it seems likely that thèse particular calls will corne to nothing. Even so, the issue 
is not one that will go away. With this in mind, I offer the following objections. They are 
Condensed from an earlier pièce written for the Libertarian Alliance, which. whatever its merits, 
has the defect of being too long for gênerai circulation. Readers are advised to buy a copy if they 
want more information than I have room to give here.157 
One: the Fighr Against Crime 
The commonest argument in favour of identity cards is that they will help in the fight against 
crime. After all. it sounds reasonable to claim that if we ail have to identify ourselves on 
demand, the opportunités for breaking the law will be diminished. 
Reasonable as this sounds, however, it is not entirely supported by the évidence. Let us consider 
some of the leading claims: 
Claim One 
According to Fred Broughton, Chairman of the Police Fédération: 
In relation to crime, terrorism and any investigation, [an identity card scheine] 
would be a great advantage. It would make the police more efficient because 
sometimes people lie about their identification, which can be very time 
consuming.158 
Reply - According to Dr Michael Levi, Reader in Criminology at the University of Wales: 
In ordinary policing terms, the value of ID cards is hard to discern. 
Many police officers to whom I speak tell me that they know, or believe they 
1 3 7 Scan Gabb. A Libertarian Conservative Case Against Identitv Cards, Political Notes No. 98. the Libertarian 
Alliance, London, 1994. £2.40. 
1 = 8 Source: ''National identity card high on Tories' agenda", The Independent, London, lOth September 1994. 
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know, who the offenders are in their neighbourhood. The problem is proving it. 
given that they don't have the resources to conduct surveillance. Tn this situation, 
identity cards are an irrelevance, a tough soundbite that has no practical effect. 
I cannot imagine how the chances of détection or conviction will be improved 
significantly by this measure in any form....159 
Claim Two 
According to Roy Hattersley: 
[Identity cards vvould make it] more difficult for conmen to talk their way into 
pensioners' bungalows....160 
Reply - This is a bizarre claim. Telephone engineers, police officers, and ail the other people 
whom conmen impersonate already have identification documents. Their victims suffer by not 
asking to see thèse documents. I fail to see how providing everyone with an identity card will 
change matters. 
Claim Three 
Mr Hattersley again: 
[They would also prevent teenagers renting pornographie videos....161] 
Reply - Another bizarre claim. There are no pornographie videos legally availabie in this 
country. And here, as with drugs and prostitution, illegal suppliers are more interested in how 
rich their clients are than how old. 
I i 9 Speech in Birmingham to the Council of Mortgage Lenders; Source: Christopher Elliolt, "ID cards :wil[ not reduce 
crime". The Guardian. London and Manchester. 15lh October 1994. 
1 6 0 Hattersley, op. cit.. 
161 Ibid.. 
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Claim Three 
According to the Editor of The Sunday Express: 
Illegal immigrants and dole scroungers would find it impossible to dip their sticky 
fingers into the welfare pot.162 
Reply - Not so. According to Peter Lilley, the Secretary of State for Social Security, identity 
cards would do little to curb benefit fraud, which at the moment is far more a matter of hidden 
earnings from the black economy than of impersonation.163 
As for illegal immigrants - according to a Peter Lloyd, a former Minister at the Home Office, "the 
main problem faced by the immigration officers at Dover is fake French ID cards".164 
Other Claims 
There are similar claims about bank fraud, impersonation at élections and in driving tests, about 
people who lie in job applications about their âge and qualifications, and so forth. But I will not 
continue making specific reply to specific claims. I will instead observe that they ail rest 
eventually on three assumptions that are, and will for the foreseeable future remain, unlikely: 
that everyone will carry the right identification; that the information to which identity cards give 
access will be entirely correct; that the costs of an identity card scheme can be precisely known. 
Consider again: 
1 6 2 Hitchen, op. cit.. 
l f'3 Charles Reiss, "Cabinet clash over ID cards hits Howard", The Evening Standard, London. 11 th October 1994. 
1 6 4 Source: Alan Travis, "Conservatives at Bournemouth; 'Rubbisrr cries greet Howard's ID card plan", The 
Guardian, London and Manchester, I4th October 1994. 
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First, all experience suggests that any document the authorities can produce can be reproduced 
by criminals. This has long been the case with coins, banknotes, passports, ration coupons, 
postage stamps, and any other thing of nominal value. In the United States, where official 
identification has become far more important than it is yet here, one can buy a green card, a social 
security card and a driving licence for as little as $ 120. Al l passable forgeries, they can be ready 
within the hour.165 These are for illegal immigrants needing to work and get their children 
educated, or for teenagers wanting to drink without official harassment. Doubtless, for criminals 
or terrorists, much better is available. 
To suppose that digital technology can change things is to know nothing of computers, and 
nothing of criminal ability. We can have identity cards with a photograph, a thumbprint, and a 
full retina pattern - and forgeries would be on the streets within a month. In Singapore, a country 
not famous for high levels of crime, perfect copies of the most elaborately bank cards presently 
issued are available as blanks for a few pounds.166 
Second, the official information held on us is riddled with errors more or less serious. According 
to a National Audit Office report, 35 per cent of the 12.2 million driver records, and 25 per cent 
of the nine million vehicle records, held by the Drivers and Vehicles Licensing Authority contain 
at least one error.167 Such levels of inaccuracy would soon wreck an identity card scheme. There 
would be wrong names on the cards, and wrong photographs. People would suffer perpetual 
inconvenience from the use of incorrect data. 
There is also the certainty of malicious hacking. There is nothing mysterious about hacking. Nor 
is it difficult. The newspapers are full of stories about information altered, destroyed, or illegally 
retrieved. Recently in south London, for example, someone broke into the local Health Authority 
l f l i Scan Mac Carthaigh. "Calilbrnians ponder cost of a proposition they didn't refuse". The Times, London, 2nd 
December 1994. 
1 6 6 Simon Davics. "Please may 1 sec your identity card, Sir?", The Daily Telegraph, London, 13th October 1994. 
1 6 7 See Dr Edgar Whitley, "Too many errors on the cards", Letters to the Editor, The Daily Telegraph, London, 12th 
August 1994. The National Audit Office report mentioned was reported in ibid., 22nd December 1993. 
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computer, and altered a standard letter that was sent out to 5.000 women before anyone noticed 
that a request to attend for a cervical smear had been altered to an invitation to drop in and "have 
your fanny examined".168 
Third, The Home Office has estimated that a compulsory scheme using a plastic card, with 
photograph, fingerprints, date of birth and signature, would cost £500 million to establish, plus 
£100 million per year to maintain thereafter.169 These costings we can dismiss unconsidered. 
Bearing in mind that the civil servants can be expected to buy the wrong computers, and that 
about five per cent of people each year will lose or damage their cards, the final cost - as with 
Concorde, and the Humber Bridge, and many other public works - is anyone's guess.170 
So far as law-enforcement is concerned, the immediate effects of identity cards would be a slight 
increase in the preparation costs of committing certain kinds of crime, and an expansion of 
forgery. For the rest of us, they would mean a multiplication of bureaucracy and yet another 
waste of public money. 
Two: the Destruction of Liberty 
The objections raised above are important. They are the sort of thing that can worry "right wing" 
Ministers and the more respectable thinktanks. As such, it is useful to raise them as often as 
possible. But they are not the most important objections, and they may not always be valid. 
Experience and better software will eventually reduce forgery and inaccuracies; and the 
accessibility of more information will diminish the opportunities for fraud. The primary 
ir'B Source: "Hacker hunl after smear campaign". Computer Weekly, London. 20th October 1994. 
According to the Audit Commission, hacking and other computer fraud is endemic. There arc almost no controls on access to 
sensitive data, and few intrusions are noticed until after harm has been suffered: see the Audit Commision, Opportunity Makes 
a Thief - An Analysis of Computer Abuse, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1994. 
m Source: Richard Ford. "Ministers facing a minefield". The Times, London. 14th October 1994. 
I ? 0 The figure of five per cent was estimated by the Australian Government in 1988. when it was considering an 
identity card scheme. See Simon Dimes, "Please may I see your identity card, Sir", The Daily Telegraph, London, 13th October 
1994. 
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objection is the very existence of most accessible information. And so far as the secondary 
objections can be overcome, so this one is magnitïed. 
Until recently, the amount of information that identity cards could make available was limited. 
There could be a photograph, name, address, and a few other détails. For anything eise, it was 
necessary to look through various paper archives - a process so slow and expensive, it was not 
worth even considering for everyone ail the time. Electronic databases remove this limitation. 
They ensure that information, once gathered, can be stored at almost zéro cost, and retrieved at 
once in any permutation. They are also ensuring that the range and depth of information gathered 
and stored can be greatly expanded. 
Already, MI5 is Connecting ail the government databases, to give access, "for reasons other than 
national security" to "personal information held on tens of millions of people, from tax files to 
criminal convictions".171 To this single database the Home Secretary wants to add the DNA 
records of ail suspected criminals - that is, of anyone arrested for any offence.172 
Then there is the information gathered and held by private organisations. Since 1979, fmancial 
confidentiality has been abolished in this country. A séries of laws, culminating in the 
incorporation of the Money Laundering Directive, gives the authorities open access to our 
banking and other financial records. For the moment, thèse records are stored in databases 
outside the public network; and the authorities must still ask for them to be produced. But this 
is too great an inconvenience to be allowed in the long term. 
The same will soon be true for our shopping records. My weekly receipt from Asda gives an 
itemised breakdown of all that I buy there. It also carries my credit card account number. I have 
receipts from other shops that do the same. A few years more of falling hardware prices, and 
m David Hencke and Richard Norton Taylor. "M15 hacks ils way into privacy row", The Guardian, London and 
Manchester 19thOctober 1994. 
1 7 2 The Right Honourable Michael Howard QC MP, Home Secretary, "Speech to the 11 Ith Conservative Party 
Conference, Thursday I3th October 1994", Conservative Party News Release 759/94, p. 13. 
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someone need only think it useful, and there will be no more shopping secrecy. Some of us. no 
doubt, will start paying in cash - especially for more personal items. But this will not long remain 
an alternative. The panic about money laundering is too strong: and there is too much talk about 
the smart card "e-purses" now being tested in America. 
Looking ahead, there are developments that can only now be imagined. At the moment, many 
of us must wear identity cards in our places of work. This helps the security staff. I have no 
doubt that someone will think it equally helpful for us to do the same in public. It will then be 
possible for digital video caméras to monitor and record identifies from the wearers of interactive 
identity cards. Moving somewhat further ahead, it will be possible to match the faces of people 
caught on video to digital images stored centrally - thereby dispensing with much of the need for 
identity cards. This again is a matter of no more than storage space and processing speed. 
I see the progressive intégration of every record ever opened on us - from our first weighing in 
the maternity ward to our assessed susceptibility to dying of heart disease. In this new order of 
things, an identity card must be seen not as a thing in itself, but as the key that each of us must 
carry to a vast electronic filing cabinet of information. 
Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear 
Now, I hear the montra endlessly chanted against this sort of argument; "Those with nothing to 
hide have nothing to fear". We do not live in a police State, but in a democracy. We have 
independent courts and a free media. And I must admit that the présent and likely extensions of 
surveillance are not the resuit of some evii conspiracy. Each extension can be justified by 
référence to some benefit. Once again, consider: 
If I fall under a bus and am rushed to hospital, to imagine the value of a card that will 
give instant access to my blood group, my allergies, any other médical conditions that I 
may have, and my next of kin; 
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If some non-invasive way is discovered of verifying DNA against details centrally 
recorded, how it will save billions in credit card and social security fraud; 
• If a terrorist bomb explodes, to think how the police computers might scan the street 
videos for the past six months, identify everyone there and check for previous 
convictions, or anything suspicious in any other records - the purchase, perhaps, of garden 
fertiliser; 
• If a woman is raped and left for dead in a park, how it will be possible, even if the rapist 
wore a condom and left no other body fluids, to profile the population - to see who has 
a taste for violent images, as recorded by the book and video shops, who is shown by 
evidence from other sources to have a tendency to violence, and who lives within easy 
distance of the park, or whose movements took him close to there; and who, therefore, 
is likely to have committed the crime, and should be pulled in for questioning. 
Agreed, these are benefits. But everything has a cost. And I can think of two very plain costs 
involved in this scheme of total surveillance. 
First - Any government that is able to know so much about its subjects is able to single them out 
for persecution. Even paper identity cards have been repeatedly used for purposes that range 
between the vexatious and the murderous. Without details of religion stamped on their papers, 
the Jews of Central Europe would not have been so easily herded into the concentration camps. 
The same is true of the massacres in Rwanda: it was the word Tutu or Hutsi on identity cards 
that let the murderers find their victims. I am not suggesting that the British Government will 
turn this nasty. But there are other, gentler forms of persecution. At the moment, for example, 
smokers are sometimes being denied medical treatment on the NHS. 1 7 3 There are suggestions 
1 7 3 For details, see Petr Skrabanck, The Death of Humane Medicine and the Rise of Coercive Health is m t The Social 
Affairs Unit, London. 1994, p.123 el passim. 
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for the licensing of childbirth, to bring an end to "irresponsible" procréation.174 For the moment, 
we can lie when the doctors ask if we smoke. We can put on suits and smile at the social 
workers, and hope they will not guess what substances we once consumed, or what we still do 
in bed. But identity cards will make that harder where not impossible. 
Anyone who is happy to have every last detail of his life known to the Government is gambling 
on the future. We are all members of some minority: and there is nothing that we are and 
nothing that we do that is not unpopulär with someone who is, or may one day be, in authority. 
"Those with nothing to hide have nothing to fear"? Well, this is fine enough for those who can 
believe that something about them presently innocuous will not one day be used against them. 
or their children or grandchildren. But who can infallibly believe this? 
Second - even if governments refrain from these mild persécutions, identity cards will tend to 
establish a despotism. This will not be openly horrible, lt will in its outward appearance be 
gentle and reasonable. It will remain démocratie, in the sense of allowing élections to office and 
the discussion of authorised topics. Its uses of power will be more or less in accord with public 
opinion. But it will allow no individuality. 
Even without other punishment, to be watched is often to be deterred. Most of us, after all, are 
quite timid. We do not pick our noses in public, or Scratch our bottoms, or cast openly lustful 
glances, for fear of how we shall be regarded by the world. Shame is a natural, indeed a 
necessary feeling. But to let shame act as a restraint in all our acts means a return to the minute 
surveillance of village life from which our ancestors so gladly escaped. We are looking at a 
future world in which there will be no privaey, no anonymity, no harmless déception, in which 
we shall all live as if on a stage under the watchful eye of authority. 
This homogenising pressure will be reinforced by economic policy. The State I am imagining 
l " See Judy Jones, "Top doctor urges legal controls on parenthood", The Observer, London, 7th August 1994. See 
also Skrabanek, op. cil., pp. 158-59. 
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will not be socialist in the oíd sense. of central planning. There will be enough of a market to 
ensure minimal coordination. But this will not be enough to lift the economy from permanent 
recession, with high unemployment and periodic bursts of inflation - and. most importantly, few 
prospects of personal independence. 
Until quite recently, it was possible for many people to say and do almost as they pleased, free 
from any need to court or keep the good opinion of others. I think of Edward Gibbon. I think 
of Charles Darwin. I think even of Friedrich Engels. These were men who outraged the 
dominant opinion of their age, but whose independent means placed them beyond the effects of 
this outrage. Today, most incomes are eamed, and all are heavily taxed. Few of us have time 
for dissenting spéculation; and then we must take care not to upset our employers or customers 
beyond an often narrow limit. 
The combined effect of surveillance and economic dependence will be an invisible but effective 
control. There will be no definiré formulation of what we must not do, no Act or article in a code 
against which protest might be made. Instead, people will come to realise that safety lies in 
trying to behave and to think exactly alike. The exposure conséquent on doing otherwise will 
be too awful if vague to contémplate. There will, of course, be some exhibitionists, willing - and 
perhaps happy - to expose their Uves to the interested scrutiny of others. But I will not think 
much of a world in which such people have become the only individuáis. 
And the death of individuality will mean the end of progress. The causes of the mass-
enrichments of the past three centuries are difficult to separate and weigh. But it is obvious that 
much is owed to individual genius. Think of the steam engine, the téléphone, the aéroplane -
even the computer: thèse have been much improved and cheapened by common ingenuity; but 
they ail came in the first instance from the mind of some inspired individual or séquence of 
individuáis who were often denounced in their own time as cranks or monsters, where not 
physically attacked. Cut down that tree of individuality - or, as I am now discussing, merely 
starve its roots - and it will blossom no more. The lack of overt régulation in this future state 
may delight the standard Thatcherites. But with an economy less formally hampered than the one 
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in which the Internet bas emerged, our descendants may sit as stagnant and self-satisfied as the 
Chinese were when the Jesuit missionaries first arrived. 
Three: Possible Restraints 
For many, this will seem wildly pessimistic. I have entirely neglected the possibility of a légal 
and institutional framework in which the dangers of identity cards will be restrained. Roy 
Hattersley, for example, believes that the corrupt or domineering use of 
information - who was where, when - [cjould be made a criminal offence.173 
Otherwise, we can have a privacy law. to let us say "no" to many demands for information, and 
give us légal redress against damaging uses of what information we must make available. 
It is, however, wishful thinking to suppose that the sinister potential of identity cards can be 
abolished by a few changes in the law. It is possible to establish a scheme in which information 
collected for one purpose cannot be used for another - so that a doctor could have access to 
médical but not shopping or tax records, and a Policeman access to détails of criminal 
convictions but not of a sex-change opération. It is possible to make laws against the passing of 
information, or the means of obtaining information, to unauthorised persons. 
But the value of a unified database is that the information on it can be shared very widely. We 
can start with ail manner of good intentions about limiting access. In practice, thèse will soon 
become a dead letter - at the insistence of those now calling for identity cards, and perhaps of 
those who now taïk about restraints. Why should a hospital not have access to a patient's 
immigration status? Why not to his sexual inclinations? Why should the Police not be able to 
check what books a suspect has borrowed from the library, or what bus journeys he makes? Why 
should a Social Security officiai not have access to a claimanf s tax and banking records, and 
hlattersley, op. cit. 
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détails of spouse and children? Why should an insurance company not have access to a 
customer's médical records, to see what prédisposition he may have to an expensive illness or 
early death? Why not to his shopping records, to see if he has filled out his lifestyle 
questionnaire truthfully? Why should a senior manager, in a "national champion" company not 
have access to the full range of a subordinate's private life - to see if he is drinking too much, or 
smoking, or taking bribes from a foreign rival, or putting on a wig to pick up sailors on a Friday 
night? 
I do not need to ask what pretence will be made for each spécifie knocking down of the original 
barriers. But, once the principle of identity cards has been conceded, it is a matter of time alone 
before everyone with a right to inspect part of the information to which they give access will have 
claimed and obtained a right to inspect the rest. And ail else will follow from that. 
Conclusion 
As said, the présent calls for an identity card scheme are unlikely to succeed. Too many 
Conservative MPs have promised to oppose them on principle - and have promised too 
vehemently for even politicians to back smoothly away. To others who have no principled 
objection, but who still cannot think of the poil tax without shuddering, cost may be a safe excuse 
for opposition. 
But only for the moment - not in the long term. On présent trends, identity cards must corne. 
That we do not yet have them is an aberration. It is like an area of the beach still dry long after 
the incoming tide has soaked ail around it. The central database exists, and it is rapidly filling 
with new information. The full evil of surveillance will require identity cards, so that we and the 
information held on us can be conveniently matched. But there is evil enough now without them; 
and more will inevitably follow. 
The only real salvation lies in recognising this fact. The great majority of those who are currently 
against identity cards take it for granted that a government large enough to impose and use them 
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is a good thing. They like the welfare State, and have nothing against a large bureaucracy. But 
this consensus must change. The one sure means of emptying the database is to bring about a 
permanent réduction in the size and power of the State. The welfare State must go. The war 
against drugs must be conceded. The snoops and regulators must be sent looking elsewhere for 
jobs. 
Of course, what I am asking is that everyone who dislikes identity cards should endorse and start 
calling for the füll Libertarian Alliance agenda. I cannot imagine that this will ever happen. But 
I can still hope. 
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Introduction 
During the past ten years, there has been a revolutionary - but largely unnoticed - change in the 
relationship between the British banks and their customers. Tradítionally, a bank in the United 
K-ingdom had an implied contractual obligation not to disclose information conceming the affairs 
of a customer. This obligation extended to all facts about a customer known to or discovered by 
the bank, and not merely to the state of his account. 
The obligation was qualified in various ways, the most importan! of which for this discussion 
was compulsión of law. By s.7 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act 1879 - amended by the 
Banking Act 1979 - a party could by court order inspect and copy entries in a banker's books. 
This allowed the Pólice to gain access to a suspected person's records, but only añer charges had 
been laid. If other disclosures were made to the Pólice, they were not strictly lawful; and they 
were very seldom made. 
By s.17 of the Taxes Management Act 1972, a bank was further obliged to inform the Inland 
Revenue of interés! paid to a customer above a certain level. 
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Beyond thèse exceptions, there was total banking confidentiality in this country. 
Money Laundering 
Düring the 1980s. however, governments all over the world began to intensify the "War on 
Drugs". Starting with the 1913 Harrison Act in the United States, this lias gradually expanded 
to an international prohibition of the production, sale and use of most mood altering substances. 
This "War" has not been a success. The prohibited substances are in high demand; and high 
demand has meant high priées thaï make it very profitable to transport and seil them in quite 
small quantities. Nobody knows for sure what proportion of drug imports are stopped by H M 
Customs and Excise, but I am told it may be as low as three per cent - and this is an island, where 
the control of imports is far easier than for landlocked countries. And so effort since the 1980s 
has increasingly expanded from merely trying to stop the production and sale of drugs to trying 
to stop profits from the trade from being reinvested. 
These profits may be very large. In 1989, the Financial Action Task Force of the European 
Community estimated that 
sales of cocaïne, heroïn and cannabis amount to approximately $122 billion per 
year in the United States and Europe; of which 50 to 70% or as much as $85 
billion per year could be available for laundering and investment}1(' 
Writing in the United States, E. Nadelmann has argued that 
insofar as criminals... act as they do for the money, the best déterrent and 
punishment is to confiscate their incentive. A second rationale is that, while the 
higher level and more powerful criminals rarely corne into contact with the illicit 
goods, such as drugs. from which they dérive their profits, they do corne into 
contact with the proceeds from the sale of thèse goods. That contact often 
1 7 6 Quoted by William C. Gilmore, in International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, Grotius Publications 
Limited, Cambridge, 1992, p.ix. 
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provides a 'paper trail' or other evidence, which constitutes the only connection 
with a violation of the law. A third rationale is that confiscating the proceeds of 
criminal activities is a good way to make law enforcement pay for itself.'77 
In 1988 came the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances. This was an international treaty to prevent the laundering of drug 
money. 
The Money Laundering Directive 
Then in 1990 came a Council of Europe Directive on money laundering. This was followed in 
1991 by the Council Directive on Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of 
Money laundering, a law made by the European Community. This Directive orders the Member 
States of the Community to create a number of criminal offences connected with drugs and 
money laundering in general. 
Most importantly, "money laundering" is defined by Article 1 of the Money Laundering Directive 
as: 
[T]he conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived 
from a serious crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin 
of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in committing such an 
offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his action, and 
the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from a serious crime. 
I will briefly pause here to explain the legal status of this Directive under British law. 
The European Union is a trading bloc of 15 Member States. It is regulated by a number of 
1 7 7 E. Nadelmann; "Unlaundering Dirly Money Abroad: US Foreign Policy and Financial Secrecy Jurisdictions ,^ 
Inter-American Law Review. No. 18 (1986). pp.33-34; quoted Gilmore, op. cit.. pp. ix-x. 
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treaties, the most important of thèse being the Treaty of Rome 1957 and the Treaty of Maastricht 
1991. To enforce the terms of thèse Treaties, it is able to make three kinds of laws: 
A Regulation becomes part of the domestic law of each Member State automatically. 
without regard to the wishes of any government or législature; 
A Directive becomes part of the domestic law of each Member State only after it has been 
incorporated by the relevant législation; 
A Décision is a particular command or judgment, and it affects only those for whom it 
is made. 
The Money Laundering Directive is a law of this second kind. As such, it is intentionally 
unspecific. It only takes effect when made specific in the domestic laws of each Member State. 
And so 1 will look at how the Directive is applied in this country. 
The Control of Moncy Laundering in the uk 
The laws against money laundering in this country are contained mostly in the Criminal Justice 
Act 1993 and the Money Laundering Régulations 1993 - which both give effect to the European 
Union's Money Laundering Directive. Apart from this, there are sections of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, the Criminal Justice Act 
1987, the Criminal Justice Act 1988, The Companies Act 1989, and the Prévention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. together with numerous statutory instruments and "voluntary" 
codes imposed by the Bank of England. 
These laws have entirely altered the old state of affairs. A bank today is obliged to disclose 
information virtually on demand to the Police, the Inland Revenue, the Department of Trade and 
Industry, and the Serious Fraud Office, to name only the most fréquent applicants. 
Further, the banks and other financial institutions must report ail "suspicious transactions". 
These include the making of unusually large cash deposits - that is, deposits larger than £10.000 -
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numerous deposits and withdrawals of cash, using night safes to make large deposits of cash. 
Failure to report is a criminal offence, and on conviction, a bank or other financial officiai can 
be jailed for a maximum of five years. In many cases, usually connected with drugs or terrorism, 
it is for an accused officiai to prove he had no reason to suspect that a transaction was irregular. 
If it can be proved that he actively assisted to hide a transaction, he faces a maximum of 14 years' 
imprisonment. 
Still further, even if no suspicious transactions can be proved, a senior manager can face a fine 
or two years' imprisonment, or both, for failing to put adéquate safeguards in place.1 7 3 This 
requires every financial institution to appoint a "money laundering reporting officer", to make 
and maintain regular contact with the authorities. A part from this, financial staff are encouraged 
to make anonymous reports to the National Criminal Intelligence Service.179 
In addition, "financial institution" is defined not merely as bank, building society, insurance 
Company, and so forth, but also as solicitor. accountant, estáte agent, auctioneer, antique dealer 
and general shopkeeper, and casino. Anyone who receives large sums of money from the public 
1 7 8 Source; Paul Durman. "Bankers face jail over laundering: Institutions witl need Systems lo deal with suspicious 
transactions", The independen!, London, 28th Octobcr 1993; also Dan Atkinson. "20/20: Liberty lost in the wash"\ The 
Guardian, London and Manchester, 22nd August 1992. 
See also Michael Curtís and Christy Sinclair, "Law Times: Obliged to act on suspicion", The Times, London, 25th August 1992 : 
To avoid potentiul difficultés in proving knowledge of the money's origins. the EC directive requires the législation 
to say this 'may be infcrred from objective factual c ire u instances'. But what of the défendant who was insufficîently 
worldly to recognise the indicators? 
1 7 9 Reports of suspicious transactions made to the National Criminal Intelligence Service have risen from 1,981 in 
1990 to 11,300 in 1992. 
Paul Durman, "Bankers face jail over laundering: Institutions will need Systems to deal with suspicious transactions". The 
Independen!, London, 28ih October 1993. 
See also lan Watson's interview with lan Wall, who heads the Confidential Inquines Unit at the bank of England: 
Money Laundering: ' We receive a mimber of anonymous calis and suggestions of malpraciice in connection to money 
laundering and ail thèse have to be looked at seriously,' he says.... Watt's unit acts as a conduit to the NCIS. 
lan Watson. "City: The Bank's fraudbuster", The Sunday Telegraph, London. 20th June 1993. 
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is covered. , s 0 
These provisions breach the previously fundamental rule of Common Law - that every accused 
person is innocent until proven guilty. They also turn just about every member of staff in every 
financial institution into a part-time policeman. 
Therefore the sudden mass of paperwork required to open a bank account in this country. The 
traditional two references are no longer enough. It is necessary to produce passports, driving 
licences, and so forth, to establish full proof of identity. Identity numbers from these documents 
are kept on file for future inspection. 
Such safeguards as exist in the modern legislation are to protect the banks, not their customers -
therefore the relieving of banks from civil liability to their customers for any disclosure of 
information to the authorities, or for not informing their customers of any such disclosure.m 
A l l these regulations are intended for the detection and prevention of serious crimes - few of 
which, terrorism aside, are connected with attacks on life or property. But their extension, to 
allow an inspection and supervision of everyone, can be expected to follow as a matter of course. 
This is the opinion of Dr Michael Levi, Reader in Criminology at the University of Wales. He 
says: 
It appears... as if the foundations of the international finance-police state are being 
l i a > Michael Curtis and Christy Sinclair. "Law Times: Obliged to act on suspicion". The Times, London. 25th August 
1992. 
1!" Barclay's Bank v Taylor; Trustee Savings bank of Wales and Border v Taylor [19891 ' WLR 1066. Banks are no 
longer under any contractual obligation to inform their customers that a production order has been made, or to say what has been 
produced. 
In R v Southwark Crown Court, ex parte Customs and Excise and R v Soulhwark Crown Court, ex parte Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA [1989] 3 WLR 1054, it was held by the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench, and upheld by the 
Court of Appeal, that a Circuit Judge had no authority to prevent the handing over of General Noriega's banking details by the 
British to the American authorities. 
The ambiguous protections contained in the 1980s legislation were resolved in favour of the authorities, there being a paramount 
public interest in an efficient prosecution of the :iwar against drugs". 
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laid. In six years [to 1989], the UK has moved from a legał position in which 
bank account details could be revealed only after the account holders had been 
charged, to one in which routine interchanges - court-authorised or not - take 
place between banks and a plethora of police and regulatory agencies.'82 
The Effect of Such Laws 
"Those with nothing to hide have nothing to fear" - this is the standard ery whevever objections 
are made to the growth of state inspection. Why should we be so worried about letting the 
authorities have access to our financial records? Assuming we are not drug dealers or terrorists 
or whatever, how can such powers be used to harm us? 
The reply to all this is simple, and increasingly obvious. Even assuming the "War on Drugs" is 
worth fighting, there is no evidence that these laws will bring victory any closer. Let a criminal 
gather a large enough pile of cash, and there will always be some means available of laundering 
it. Bank officials are corruptible - if not here, then certainly in other countries. American power 
1 8 2 Michael Levi. "The Regulation of Money Laundering: The Death of Banking Secrecy in the UK", The British 
Journal of Criminology, vol. 31 (2), 1991, pp.122-23. 
Things in America may be still worse. According to Mitch Radcliffe of Digital Media - available at dmedia@neicom.com, 
President Clinton is considering an executive order to allow the Internal Revenue Service to monitor individual bank accounts, 
and automatically collect taxes based on the results. This will be presented as saving people the trouble of filing their tax returns. 
Though asked to comment on this rumour the White House has apparently not yet done so. 
For how these various regulations arc applied, see Margaret Stone, "Money: Is it lime to bring back the identity card again?". 
The Daily Mail, London, 25th May 1994: 
The Government has put building societies and banks in the frontline in the fight against drug trafficking, 
and it is now an offence for them not to make rigorous identification checks on anyone wanting to save or 
borrow money. Mortgages can be used to launder money if crooks take out a big loan and then use illegal 
cash to repay it quickly. 
See also Liz Dolan. "Why the Halifax wouldn't play with the bingo caller"'. The Times, London, 18th June 1994: 
Julio Bruno, a Spanish national who has lived and worked in Britain since last September, was branded a 
possible money launderer when he tried to open an Instant Xira Plus account at his local branch of the 
Halifax Building Society in Croydon this month. 
Mr Bruno says that all he wanted was a safe place for f 1.000 cash and a cheque for £500 from the Inland 
Revenue, but his unwitting ignorance of tougher rules on opening accounts set off alarm bells with the 
building society. The cash was from his accumulated salary his employer pays all employees in cash and his 
landlord advised him to open a building society account because he was worried about burglars. 'They gave 
me the money back over the counter.' he said. 'The place was full of customers staring at me. I felt really 
embarrassed and insulted. 1 am sure the other customers thought 1 had tried to pass off counterfeit money, 
or something.' 
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and determination are still great enough to force most govemments to go through the motions of 
passing money laundering legislation. But it cannot obtain uniform enforcement. So long as 
there are countries like Thailand, where different notions of privacy and dignity prevail, the 
means will remain - if at a price - of converting dirty cash into nice. clean share certificates and 
real property. 
Of course. we are moving towards the abolition of cash transactions. Downward alterations, 
combined with inflation, will eventually reduce the present effective limit of £10,000, to force 
all but the most trivial purchases through the banking system. Long before then, however, the 
partly autonomous development of "digital cash" will have turned banknotes into museum 
exhibits. Then, it will in theory be possible to monitor every transaction, and thereby stop the 
sale of drugs and laundering of its proceeds at every point. The practice, I am sure, will be 
different. Where a trade this lucrative is concerned, human ingenuity will always find a way 
through or round the law. 
This being said, the real victims will be us, the honest public. The enforcement of the money 
laundering laws will impose a totaL if largely invisible, control over our lives. 
First, there is an indirect control of the kind already possible. To be watched is in large measure 
to be deterred. Most of us desire the approbation of others - or, at worst, wish to avoid their 
condemnation. We therefore prefer to do in private many things which, though perfectly legał, 
might lower us in the opinion of others. The gathering and storing of information on us for 
commercial purposes is already far advanced. If ever they wanted, the Police could use their 
existing powers to learn from my bank or the record shops that I like classical musie. Before the 
end of the century, they will be able to learn what I buy every Friday evening at my local Asda. 
In the same way, my generał practitioner might be able to learn if I buy cigarettes, or alcohol, or 
foods containing lots of cholesterol. After all, the National Health Service is short of money, and 
it must establish orders of priority for treatment. Already, smokers are sometimes denied access 
to treatment. As soon as it becomes possible to check if we are telling the truth about our 
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lifestyles, I take it for granted that the power will be demanded and given. 
The effect of knowing that our purchases are being - or simply can be - monitored will tend most 
of us to an obsessive conformity. It will produce a secular variety of Calvinism, where every life 
is made into a play - with not God as the audience, but our doctors and bosses and political 
masters. 
Second, the final abolition of cash will allow direct controls. Cash has the advantage not only 
of anonymity, but also of fungibility - it can be used to make any payment. If I wanted, for 
example, I could draw out the money reserved for my next gas bill, and spend it ail on silk 
underclothes. "Digital cash" allows ail manner of purchases to be blocked or limited. It clears 
the way to lifestyle engineering on a scale that our présent health activists can scarcely imagine. 
Pregant women can be prevented from buying alcohol. Smokers can be put on a tapering ration 
of cigarettes. We can ail be prevented from gambling away - or perhaps failing to save - more 
than a certain share of our incomes. With regard to our own earnings, we can be reduced to the 
status of an underage heir faced with a set of mean and inflexible trustées. 
To deny that any of this will happen is at best to lack imagination. If history shows anything, it 
is that any power that becomes cheaply available will be taken and used by the authorities. No 
matter how ghastly or absurd, there has never yet been an exercise of power beyond plausible 
justification. 
Conclusion 
So far. the debate over illicit drugs has largely been a matter of arguing for or against the right 
to do with ourselves as we please. The making of laws against money laundering have turned 
it into an argument for or against the survival of our civilisation. People may continue to believe 
- against the best évidence - that the individual taking of drugs leads to a gênerai social 
démoralisation. But they must now also décide which is the greatest evil - to leave drugs alone, 
or to push the war against them to its logical conclusion. 
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An Analysis of Two Books 
on Money Laundering 
by Sean Gabb 
1,805 words 
First published in Free Life, 
issue 23, London, August 1995 
International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering 
William C. Gilmore (ed.) 
Grotius Publications Limited. Cambridge, 1992, 335pp, £48 (pbk) 
(ISBN 0 521 46305 X) 
Money Laundering: A Practical Guide to the New Legislation 
Rowan Bosworth-Davies and Graham Saltmarsh 
Chapman & Hall, London, 1994, xii and 304pp, £49.50 (hbk) 
(ISBN 0 412 57530 2) 
The first of thèse books is a collection of treaties, plus other documents, concerned vvith the 
international fïght against money laundering. The second explains how thèse treaties have been 
enacted into, and are enforced under, the laws of the United Kingdom. Both works will repay 
the closest study. In clear detail, they show the growth of what must be called a New World 
Order, and how, without some interposing cause, this may produce a universal slide into 
despotism. 
The fight against money laundering begins with realising that the "War on Drugs" has been lost. 
When goods are portable and easily concealed, and when demand for them is strong enough to 
bear almost any cost of bringing them to market, the main effect of prohibition will be to put a 
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bounty on crime. For ail the efforts of the past three générations, illegal drugs are available in 
most high security prisons. In much of the West, street priées have been stable or even falling 
since 1980. 
The officiai response, however, has not been to give in and légalise the trade, but to expand the 
War to a front where previously there had been few hostilities. While keeping up their efforts 
against the trade itself. the authorities have turned ïncreasingly to confiscating its proceeds. This 
new approach has three alleged benefits: 
First, it will deprive criminals of their incentive to enter and remain in the trade; 
Second, it will allow the punishing of those in charge of the trade - people who never touch or 
see illegal drugs, but to whom the main profits ultimately flow; 
Third, it can make the War on Drugs self-supporting, and perhaps yield a surplus for other public 
spending. 
There is, however, one practical difficulty. Before the authorities can confiscate the money, they 
must find it. To do this, they must keep it from being merged beyond recall into the gênerai flow 
of investment. This involves ending bank secrecy and imposing a mass of financial régulation. 
Now, most people - especially the rich - dislike having their lives pried into. Nor do banks like 
higher costs and limitations on what business they can do. And so, given the présent freedom 
of capital markets, no government acting alone can afford a strict policy of confiscation. It 
would, sooner or later, cause a flight of transactions to more liberal places. 
The solution has been to try making everywhere in the world equally illiberal. Such was the 
purpose of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Narcotic 
Substances, signed in Vienna in December 1988 [füll text in Gilmore, pp.75-97]. This is one of 
the most important international treaties of the past 50 years. It not merely requires its signatory 
states to criminalise the laundering of drug money. and to confiscate it where found. but lays 
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down so far as possible a common wording for the criminal Statutes, and a common mode of 
enforcement. It also requires füll and prompt coopération between the signatory states for the 
enforcement of thèse laws anywhere in the world. 
The Convention had little direct or immédiate effect on British law. Many of its requirements, 
indeed, had already been met in the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. Most others were only 
met in the Criminal Justice Act 1993, which enacts the European Community Directive of 1991 
on the Prévention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering [füll 
text in Gilmore, pp.250-67]. This itself derives from the Vienna Convention only through the 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime 1990 [füll text in Gilmore, pp. 177-91]. Even so, this country is fast becoming a 
financial police state of the kind agreed at Vienna - and where the process cannot be traced to the 
Convention, it can be traced to the same international pressures of which the Convention is itself 
a resuit. 
Let me explain. When I talk about a New World Order, I do not mean some grand conspiracy 
of bankers, or Jews, or Illuminati, or even - with far more probability - the American 
Government. There are countries where polícy is largely dictated from outside. But for rich and 
powerful countries, the truth is more complex. Most international obligations imposed on this 
country, for example, were not only consented to by our rulers, but were usually proposed by 
them, and are enforced by agencies in which our own countrymen often occupy senior positions. 
Where others see conspiracies, I see public choice économies. Whenever a government tries to 
do something dangerous or unnecessary, like banning drugs or educating the poor, it must set up 
an agency through which to spend the allocated funds. Once employed, the agents will - as if 
directed by an invisible hand - Start to find more and more justifications for expanding their 
status and numbers. They collect the statistics. They know which ones to publish and which to 
hold back. They are the politicians' first and favoured source of advice. They have their pet 
joumalists. They trade favours with the relevant interest groups. They know exactly how to give 
themselves a pleasing life, and how to see off threats to it. Unless the money runs out, or the 
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public tums really nasty, they can write their own budget cheques. 
By natural extension, the same is now happening at the international level - though with 
potentially far worse conseąuences. In the first place, there is limitless money: budgets would 
need to swell unimaginably large to reach even one per cent of gross planetary product. In the 
second, public anger seldom crosses borders; and, if all else fails, the politicians and bureaucrats 
in one country can shelter behind the excuse of treaty obligations that cannot be unilaterally be 
cast off - not, at least, without conseąuences more horrible than words exist to describe. Third, 
the enforcement of international treaties means the growth of what is in effect an international 
bureaucracy. The local enforcers of a treaty may be citizens of the signatory states, who will live 
and work in their home countries, and may even occupy positions in the domestic administration. 
Yet these are people who, by virtue of the agreements they enforce, and the contacts they make 
and maintain in other countries. are members of an international order. And, in at least the case 
of money Iaundering, they will share an agenda that is often deeply hostile to their native 
institutions. 
This can be seen - expressed with almost naive honesty - in the book by Messrs Bosworth-Davies 
and Saltmarsh. Both are British police officers: the latter is a departmental head at the National 
Criminal Intelligence Service. Both take it for granted that the world needs an international 
police force. Both are unable to believe that anyone can disinterestedly object to the necessary 
harmonisations of law, and the corresponding abolition of Common Law protections. They 
"know one senior clearing banker who has described this [money Iaundering] legislation as the 
nearest thing he has experienced to 'McCarthyism'...".[p.l72] Of course, they see things 
differently. The legislation 
discloses, on maturę reflection, a set of carefully structured laws which, with 
good will, due diligence and a modicum of responsible attention from the industry 
as a whole, should not prove too burdensome. tndeed, the authors believe that 
some of the regulatory requirements have been diluted too much already, in a 
misguided attempt to placate the sensibilities of certain sectors of the 
industry.... [Ibid] 
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With people like this advising the politicians and lecturing the rest of us. Utile vvonder the Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act predates the Vienna Convention by two years! Though they will hotly 
disagree - and even perhaps consider a libel vvrit - Messrs Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh cannot 
be regarded as our countrymen. More at home in a gathering of Bulgarian or Filipino police 
chiefs than with any of us, they are foreigners with British passports. 
Somewhat less honest, though still interesting, is the Explanatory Report of the Committee of 
Experts who drafted the Council of Europe Convention [full text in Gilmore. pp.192-237]. 
Though formally subordinate to a committee of the various European Ministers of Justice, thèse 
experts plainly saw their first duty as lying elsewhere. Call it "the international community" or 
their own order, their duty was collective and not to any single country. 
Look at their dislike of the narrow focus of the Vienna Convention. They wanted something diat 
would also allow confiscation for 
terrorist offences, organised crime, violent crimes, offences involving the sexual 
exploitation of children and young persons, extortion, kidnapping, environmental 
offences, économie fraud, insider trading and other serious offences. [Gilmore, 
p.204] 
But they had to concède that not every European country might like its own laws against thèse 
acts to be written by an international committee. And so Ihey allowed each signatory state to 
reserve whatever of thèse acts to its own législative process. 
The experts agreed, however, that such states should review their législation 
periodically and expand the applicability of confiscation measures, in order to be 
able to restrict the réservations subsequently as much as possible. [Ibid] 
And this is only the beginning. As yet. the shape of world government exists barely in outline. 
But the tendency ought to be plain. Power is moving from national - and mostly démocratie -
governments to unaccountable and even invisible bureaucracies. Libéral institutions that are 
often the work of âges are being hammered into the transmitters of unlimited power. We are 
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beginning to known how people in the Greek city states felt after absorption into the Roman 
Empire. 
When the American militiamen cry out that the United Nations is about to invade in black 
helicopters and plant microcomputers in their bottoms. I am at least sceptical. This is not the 
New World Order that I see. What I do see is actually worse. We can shoot the helicopters 
down, and dig out the microcomputers, and put the ringleaders on trial. We can go about playing 
the hero of our choice from Star Wars. But in the real world, there is no Death Star to blow up -
no Darth Vadar to push into the void. There is just a huge, elastic network of people, ail acting 
in what they believe is the public good, most with some degree of public support. 
How this kind of despotism can be resisted is another question, and I have said enough already. 
But I will repeat - the books here reviewed do repay a very close study. At the very least. it is 
useful to see the enemy's future plan laid out in such detail. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Düring the next fifteen years, it is almost inévitable that the newly liberated nations of Eastern 
Europe will seek and obtain admission to the European Community.183 There are some statesmen 
to whom this is a gloomy prospect. Until the autumn of 1989, it seemed that the Community had 
reached the limits to its further expansion. Al i that seemed to remain was to merge its constituent 
parts into a single political whole, fédéral in name, but bureaucratie and centralised in fact. The 
collapse of the Soviet Empire has frustrated this plan. The nations of Eastern Europe are already 
applying for membership. Who will be able to resist them more than a few years? As Margaret 
Thatcher has said: "We can't say in one breath that they are part of Europe, and in the next our 
European Community club is so exclusive that we won't admit them".184 She has already 
committed the British Government to their support. When once before she described her vision 
l l t 3 Thcrc are in fact threc Communitics - the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy 
Community, and the European Economic Community. These three vverc amalgamated in 1967, since when the official title has 
been the European Communities. The title European Community, or its contraction by dropping the adjective. has no forma! 
basis, and was first used in this country by the iederalisis. In spite of this. its use by the Prime Minister may be taken as having 
legitimised it. 
m From her speech of the 5th August 1990, given at Aspen in Colorado, as reported in The Daily Telegraph, 6th 
August 1990. 
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of how the Community should develop, she was variously laughed at and denounced. Now, it 
looks as if that vision will become reality. Our children may grow up not in a United States of 
Western Europe, but in a vast Europe of nations, exlending from Lisbon to the Urals, 
independent but also joined by a common faith in democracy, free enterprise and the rule of law. 
In the same speech, Mrs Thatcher also proposed that there should be a "European Magna Carta". 
to "entrench for every European citizen, including those of the Soviet Union, the basic rights 
which we in the West take for granted".18:>This is a splendid proposai, and one that ought to be 
taken up without delay. We suggest only one altération to it. The Prime Minister's intention 
appears to be for for this document to be adopted at a meeting of 35 European nations, East and 
West. With ail respect, we recall that the Helsinki Déclaration of 1975 was adopted at a similar 
type of international gathering; and, notoriously, it remained a mass of fine words on paper. The 
Balkans apart, it may be that tyranny has vanished. or is vanishing, from the Continent. It may 
be that Déclarations will in future be paid more respect than in the past. But an entrenched Bill 
of Rights, by its nature, requires constitutional machinery for its enforcement. Accordingly, it 
strikes us as by far the most economical and durable arrangement for the Bill to be incorporated 
into the Treaty of Rome, then to become part of the national law of each new member state. The 
obvious time and place for doing this is at the Community intergovernmental conférence that is 
to meet this coming December to discuss political union. Beyond this one altération, the proposai 
is without fault. It is the noblest réponse by any head of government to the Glorious Revolution 
in the East. It is not for a Magna Carta, but for a Maxima Carta. Given effect, it would mark the 
real beginning of the new Europe. Beyond its declaratory value, it would produce two benefits. 
, w Ibid 
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THE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS 
Eastern Europe 
In the first place, it will fix the liberties of Eastern Europe. The peoples there have just 
overthrown some of the most hateful tyrannies that ever existed in the civilised world. They want 
freedom and they want the prosperity that only freedom brings. But désire by itself may not be 
enough. Freedom. if it is to last, requires a strict rule of law. It requires a willingness to govern, 
and be governed, in accordance with laws definite in meaning and universally applicable, laws 
published in advance and interpreted by independent courts - laws that it will not in every 
particular case seem advantageous to observe186. It requires essentially an avoidance of 
government by short eut: and in no other part of Europe will govemments be so tempted as in 
the East to take short cuts. 
There are political criminals to be punished. There is confiscated property to be put back into 
private hands. There are innumerable other problems to be solved. At any time - but above ail 
after a révolution - what is expédient may not always be what is just. Unless reinforced in some 
way, the désire for a great but unspecific benefit, enjoyable over time, is often weaker than the 
désire for a lesser but more spécifie benefit, enjoyable at once. Certainly, new constitutions are 
On this point, see David Hume: 
The happiness and prosperity of mankind.... raised by the social virtue of justice and its 
subdivisions, may be compared to the building of a vault. where each individual stone would, of 
itself. fall to the ground; nor is the whole fabric supportcd but by the mulual assistance and 
combinat ion of its corresponding parts. 
Ail the laws of nature, whieh rcgulate property, as well as ail civil laws, are gênerai, and regard 
alone some special circumstance of the case, without taking into account the characiers, situations 
and connexions of the person concemed. or any particular conséquences which may resuit from 
the détermination of thèse laws in any particular case which offers. They deprive, without scruple, 
a benificent man of ail his possessions, if acquired by mistake, without a good title; in order to 
bestow them on a sclfish miser, vvho hasalready heaped up immense stores of superfluous riches. 
Public utility requires that property should be regulated by gênerai inflexible rules; and though 
such rules are adopted as best serve the same end yf public utility, it is impossible for them to 
prevent ail particular hardships, or make bénéficiai conséquences resuit from every individual 
case. It is sufficienl, if the whole plan or scheme be neeessary for the support of civil socicty. and 
if the balance of good, in the main, do thereby preponderate much above that of evil. 
(Appendix III to An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1749), Oxford University 
Press, 1957. p. 305) 
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being drafted in the East. Doubtless, they will contain all the usual guarantees of due process and 
individual rights. But written constitutions alone have never restrained power. If amendable, they 
will be amended. If not, they will be swept aside by a fresh révolution. The expérience of the past 
two centuries, if it has shown anything, has shown this repeatedly. 
The best reinforcement by far of the rule of law is that provided by tradition. There is in the 
average human mind a strong and often useful association between what always has been and 
what always must be. Nothing eise has ever served so well to keep not merely a government but 
an entire people to the path of right and justice. Where such a tradition exists, it is the clear duty 
of any liberal to défend it and hold it up for populär vénération. Where one has previously existed 
but been lost, the duty is to seek by all means possible to revive it. 
But Eastern Europe has no tradition of constitutional government. That part of the Continent was 
always the least populated and the most backward. Even when benevolent, its rulers were always 
despotic. Only towards the end of the last Century were free institutions allowed to develop. 
Without exception, thèse were quickly destroyed. 
Düring the first half of this Century, the constitutional traditions of almost every European 
country were submerged by a great flood of tyranny. But those of the West were old and solid. 
Those of the East were new and flimsy. The West had National Socialism. the East had both 
National Socialism and Soviet Socialism. In the West, the waters soon receded, leaving the 
buildings damaged but largely intact and capable of repair. In the East, the waters were dammed 
in for two générations. When after a great struggle, the dam was broken and the land drained, 
nothing was found but rubble. A new beginning must be made. This will be made alt the sooner 
for what help can be given from the West. 
It must be made absolutely clear to the new legal governments of Eastern Europe that there are 
certain standards of conduct to be met before their countries can be admitted to the Community. 
A Community Bil l of Rights would allow no mistake to be made as to thèse standards. Just as 
at présent a country prépares for entry by imposing V A T and subsidising its farmers, so in future 
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one will prépare by adopting and scrupulously observing the Bill of Rights. The restraints that 
cannot be provided by tradition must be provided instead by economic interest. 
Western Europe 
In the second place, the liberties of Western Europe are in need of fixing. For, despite their age 
and solidity, the constitutional traditions of the West have been subject to érosion. Though great, 
the evils of National Socialism were transient. But the lesser evils of démocratie socialism have 
been more continuous. In many respects, the twin doctrines have corne close to prevailing - that 
the immédiate will of a majority should never be frustrated, and that the best government is the 
one that governs most. No Western country has yet been transformed into a majoritarîan tyranny; 
nor is it likely that one will be so transformed in the forseeable future. But it cannot be denied 
that neither economic freedom nor the rule of law is fully respected in any of the member states 
of the Community. 
Great Britain 
The Existing Safeguards of our Liberty 
Perhaps the worst offender in this respect is Great Britain. Unlike all of our Community partners, 
we have no formally entrenched laws. In the past, we had no need of them. Without a written 
Constitution or Bil l of Rights, we enjoyed a wider and more secure freedom than any European 
people187. The rule of law that they have been, and are, struggling to realise, we once enjoyed as 
an immémorial birthright, and in its füllest and most perfect development. Some of that birthright 
we still possess. It has always been the main protection of our rights. 
1 1 , 7 We do actually posess a Bill of Rights. This was passed in 1689, following the Glorious Revolution. But, unlike 
the first ten amendments to the American Constitution, it is neither entrenched nor gênerai. Instead. it enumerates and couderons 
the illegal acts of James II. It is of greater histoncal than legal importance. 
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We have, for example, no explicit right of freedom from arbitrary arrest and détention. But in 
England, it is still generally the case that no one may be punished or made to pay damages except 
for a distinct breach of the law established in the normal legal manner before the ordinary courts. 
No public officiai, for whatever reason, is permitted to exceed those powers. If he does exceed 
them, he becomes liable to an action for damages in the civil courts or to a criminal prosecution. 
For there is in our law no general discrétion allowed to the authorities. Neither administrative 
practice nor even state necessity is accounted a good defence by the courts. But each interférence 
with life or property is excused only if it can be justified by statute or by some principie of the 
common law. In defect of justification, it is accounted a trespass no différent in nature from any 
similar committed by a private person. 
Again, there has never been an explicity stated right of free speech. No aggrieved editor has been 
able to go into Court and produce a Constitutional guarantee of his right to publish. Instead, there 
is no spécial law relating to the press. No one is required to take out a licence before starting a 
newspaper, or provide a bond for any damages that might be awarded against him, or submit 
copy in advance of publication to a govemment censor. There is no legal distinction between the 
Editor of The Times and anyone who sticks a poster in his front window. Either who breaks the 
law is answerable in the ordinary courts by exactly the same process.188 Otherwise, publication 
is entirely free. 
The Chief Danger to Our Liberty 
Above the courts, however, stands an absolutely sovereign Parliament. It possesses, said Dicey, 
"the right to make or unniake any law whatever; and... no person or body is recognised by the law 
l s s "The law of England is a law of liberty. and consistcntly with liberty we have not what is called an imprimatur: 
there is no such preliminar)' licence necessary; bul if a man publish a paper, he is exposed to the legal conscqucnces. as he is 
in every other act" (per Lord Ellenborough in R v Cobbett (1804) 29 State Triáis 1). 
This is no longer entirely truc. The Law of Libe] Amendment Act 1888 and the Defamation Aet 1952 both extended the 
protection of privilege lo various classes of report published in a newspaper or broadeast. The 1888 Act also frees the press from 
prosecution for any blasphcmous or seditious libel except with the leave of a High Court Judge given in chambers. Thus The 
Times has a greater freedom to comment on public evenis and persons than a poster writer. But it remains the case that our law 
has no equivalen! of the special status accorded to the press even in most Europcan countries. 
{159} 
Chapter Ten 
of England as having a right to override or set aside the législation of Parliament.189 It could put 
a man to death today for having done yesterday what was not illégal. It could repeal the Act 
giving India Independence and appoint a new Viceroy. It could enact that the square of the 
hypoténuse was not equal to the square of other two sides. Thèse laws would ail be accepted as 
binding in the British courts. 
During the 1 Sth and 19th centuries, thèse incompatible doctrines, of the rule of law and of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, were held together by political self-restraint. Though Parliament could 
do as it pleased, it seldom passed laws in dérogation of rights protected by the common law. But 
this self-restraint derived from a set of traditions that have throughout this century gradually 
decayed. Today, the two doctrines stand in mutual opposition. Whoever holds one cannot in ail 
consistency hold the other. Anyone who supports the rule of law as it has developed in England 
and been admired and often copied throughout the world - and that means ail libérais and many 
members of the Conservative Party - is bound to fear the unbridled législative supremacy of 
Parliament. 
The Structure of Parliament 
To be sure, formai sovereignty rests with the Crown in Parliament as a whole; and the old theory 
of the Constitution placed much emphasis on the limitations on power produced by its séparation. 
But the Lords have not been co-equal with the Commons since the 17th century. The Acts of 
1911 and 1949 onfy effect by statute what had long ago been largely effected by convention. No 
Monarch since Queen Anne has rejected a Bill that has passed through both Houses. No Monarch 
since George III has intervened to procure the defeat of a Bill in either House. No Monarch since 
William IV has dismissed a Ministry. A i l thèse powers remain to Her présent Majesty. But they 
m A.V. Dicey, The Law ofthe Constitution (1885), Macmillan, London, 8th cdn 1915, p 38. Again, this is not entirely 
true. In 1610. Lord Chief Justice Coke set aside an Act of Parliament on the grounds that it breached the common law principie 
that no man shouid bejudge in his own cause. "In many cases" hc declared, "the common law will control Acts of Parliament, 
and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and rcason. or répugnant, 
or impossible Lo be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such Act to be void" (Dr Bonham's case, in Coke 's 
Reports, volume 8). In 1702. Lord Chief Justice Holt set aside another Act - though the report of this is too brief for his reasoning 
to be studied with any surety. Ail the recent cases have contlrmed Dicey's opinion. But it may one day be possible, given an 
extreme instance of misgovernment, for the old common law supervisory power to bc revived. 
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are powers that could be used only in a crisis. and only after it was clear that the existing 
Ministers had lost all public confidence. Practically, sovereignty is and has long been possessed 
by the House of Commons. 
Polétical Convention 
There is the more récent doctrine, that our rights are protected by the conventions of everyday 
politics. 
First. Members of Parliament are said to keep a close and jealous watch on the Bills that are 
brought before them. Their duty is to have at heart the interests of their constituents and of the 
people at large. But this has become another constitutional fiction. The average Member is a 
political appointée. His seat is, by means more or less direct, in the gift of his party leaders. He 
is paid a salary that may constitute his entire income. He probably wants office; and that is earned 
as much by docility as by ability. Accordingly, he will vote for or against Bills just as his leaders 
tell him. There are some independent spirits on the back benches. But thèse are unable to keep 
more than a perfunctory watch on what is enacted. The current Parliament adds at least 3,000 
pages every year to the Statute book, and allows another 2,000 separate Statutory Instruments. 
No one can absorb ail this torrent of paper. Quite often. no one so much as reads it for logical or 
grammatical flaws; and the Judges are left to find a meaning in an Act where the drafters 
themselves would have trouble explaining one. 
Second, Members are said to keep watch over the executive. No one may go into court and call 
a particular Act in question on the grounds of its répugnance to some fundamental law. But he 
may seek through his Member to have a grievance aired in Parliament and have the relevant 
Minister or Ministers called to account. In 1987, Stuart Bell MP was approached by a number 
of parents whose children had been taken away frorn them by the Cleveland Social Services 
Department. On investigation, it was revealed that they had been taken without good cause. His 
investigation led to a füll judicial inquiry and the disgrâce of the doctors and officiais resposible. 
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As a direct conséquence, the law was changed in 1989 to prevent similar abuses of power.'90 
But the Cleveland Affair was an exeption to the rule, not an illustration of its working. ït remains 
that most members are not in fact independent. One who sits on the Government benches will 
not gain what is accounted by the Whips a good name if he passes his time in exposing abuses 
of power, or in supporting calls for their investigation and suppression. One who sits on the 
Opposition benches will usually have more freedom of action. But it must be remembered that 
his leaders, while they have an undoubted interest in embarrassing the Government, have none 
in undermining or diminishing the powers that they hope in time to have for themselves. Nor has 
at least the Labour Party any wish to draw attention to those many kinds of abuse that are perhaps 
inséparable from overgovernment. 
Even allowing that members do occasionally follow the dictâtes of conscience, it does not follow 
that redress will invariably be obtained. Accountability can be avoided by a Minister's invoking 
the rule that where the national security is concerned - and the définition of what is the national 
security is for him alone to make - no explanation can be required. In itself, the sinking of the 
General Belgrano during the Falklands War was a wise and proper act. But the succeeding 
prévarication over why and when the décision to sink it was taken shows the ineffectiveness of 
even the most single-minded détermination to have a question aired in Parliament that a 
government does not want aired. 
General Elections 
There is one check that cannot be ignored. At least once in every five years, a new House of 
Commons must be elected. If the Government is incompétent or pays too little regard to public 
opinion, it will find itself out of office. But, while our représentative system does tend to prevent 
excessive misgovernment, it should not be mistaken for more than it is, Democracy and limited 
government are usually found together, but are not synonymous. Except in those countries where 
The new law has not prevented what looks like a vcry similar abuse in Rochdale. 
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backwardness and modernity are mingled in the wrong proportions - where none but the stupid 
can honestly advocate the introduction of democracy - a majority will not trample on its own 
favourite rights. It can and often will trample on those of a minority. 
Here, certainly, voting will not restrain mild misgovernment. If anyone is discontented with a 
Conservative Government, his only real alternative is to vote for a Labour Party that for all its 
most recent contortions is still recognisably and dangerously socialist. 
Judicial Review 
There is one reasonably effective check on Parliament. This is provided by the courts. Of course, 
they cannot set Acts aside or do other than give effect to the will of Parliament as stated in an 
Act. But they are often able to interpret the will of Parliament in ways that no government would 
have expected. This ability has not been diminished, but has even increased during the present 
century. 
The greater part of our modern law is not contained in Acts of Parliament, but is made by 
Ministers under powers conferred by enabling legislation. This delegation is justified on the 
grounds - first, that Parliament is troubled enough nowadays by discussing the principles of a 
new statute, without considering its minute applications; and second, that these applications are 
more efficiently made by the relevant officials than by the politicians. It is doubtful whether we 
really need as many as a hundredth part of the new laws made since around 1914. But, granting 
for the moment that they are needed, there can be no objection in principle to the manner of their 
making. 
For a time, until about the 1950s, an effort was made to exclude the supervision of the courts 
from this species of executive action. Powers were conferred on Ministers - or in practice on civil 
servants - to make regulations closely affecting the rights of the subject. Any dispute as to the 
meaning of these regulations was generally referred to an administrative tribunal run by the very 
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officials who had made and who were applying them. Few accusations were made out of corrupt 
or incompetent adjudication. Yet a great breach had been opened in the principle, that it is for the 
courts to decide whether a certain power has been lawfully exercised. The enabling Acts of the 
day regularly included the words or equivalent - "and the decision of the Minister shall not be 
called in question in any court of law". 
But this dangerous course has been blocked. In their courts, in the House of Lords, and on one 
notable occasion by pamphlet191, its final destination was exposed and wamed against by the 
Judges. Enabling Acts were inventively construed to permit appeals from the administrative 
tribunals to the courts.'92 Finally, with the passing in 1958 and 1971 of the Tribunals and 
Inquiries Acts, the supervisory power of the courts over the whole administration was reaffirmed. 
Today, there is an established right of appeal from a tribunal to a special panel of Judges drawn 
from the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court. One effect of these reforms has been to give 
to the courts a limited power to set aside bad legislation. 
If any attempt is made to enforce a delegated law against him, an aggrieved subject has two 
means of seeking redress. He can argue before the relevant tribunal that it does not apply in his 
particular case, and is then able if he thinks fit to make an appeal to the courts. Or he can go 
straight into court and contest the validity of the law. If its substance or form is held not to have 
been sanctioned by the enabling Act, or it is held in any other way to be procedurally defective, 
it may be set aside. Thus, in 1969, the House of Lords set aside the Industrial Training (Hotel and 
Catering Board) Order 1966, made by the Minister of labour under the powers conferred on him 
by the Industrial Training Act 1964. The Order was held to have gone beyond what had been 
allowed by the enabling Act. 1 9 3 
I y i Lord Hcwart of Bury (Lord Chief Justice of England). The New Despotism, Ernest Bcnn Limited, London, 1929. 
1 9 2 See, for example. Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969], All England Reports 208. The 
Plaintiff applied to the Defendant to be compensated for the loss of its property in Egypt during she Suez crisis. Its application 
was rejected. The Foreign Compensation Act 1950 had sought to block appeals from the Commission by declaring that its 
decisions should "not be called into question in any court of law". An appeal was made even so. Finding that the Commission 
had in this case exceeded its statutory powers, the House of Lords held that the decision was void on the grounds that it was not 
really a decision. By clever construction, a principal clause of the Act was disregarded. 
193 Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board v Automobile Proprietary Ltd [1969], 2 All England Reports, 582. 
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The growth of judicial review has been one ofthe most heartening developments in our modem 
law. It is even possible that, left alone, the courts will eventually bring Parliament under effective 
control. But they are far frorn having doen this yet; and it is unlikely that they will be left alone 
to chip away at the legislative supremacy of Parliament. In any likely contest between the Judges 
and the politicians, it must never be forgotten that the latter have the final say. They cannot 
protect their delegated laws. But, if they feel so inclined, they can always re-enact it as primary 
law, and stop every judicial breach by regulär amendment. So far, the only real contest has been 
over financial législation. But this alone shows how little real protection the courts can provide 
against a determined majority in the House of Gommons. 
Omnipotent Government 
The old traditions are not dead. There remains in this country a strong regard for the rule of law. 
But it is very largely an abstract regard. When it cornes to the making of specific desisions, the 
talk is more of the object immediately in view than of the gênerai conséquences. People are often 
alarmed when they hear that some vital principle of the Constitution is being violated; but almost 
equally often are quieted by a few emollient words from the promoters of the violation about how 
nothing essential is being changed, and by a view of what is allegedly to be had in retum. At first, 
90 or 100 years ago, the violations seemed trifling and the gains enormous. But, as the précédents 
accumulated, and the old tradition faded, the balance of cost and benefit tended towards equality. 
Now, the balance has been reversed, and the most arbitrary means are tolerated for the 
achievement ofthe most commonplace or superluous ends. The Government nowadays is both 
allowed and expected to take short cuts. 
It may be a British Prime Minister who is calling for the rule of law to be entrenched throughout 
Europe. But there are many Acts of Parliament proposed by her and her colleagues that would 
undoubtedly be Struck down by any court interpreting a Bill of Rights. They have begun to take 
away the right to silence. They have reversed the bürden of proof in a large class of criminal 
prosecutions. They have allowed the imposition of penalties without any kind of trial. They have 
established a censorship in respect of video recordings without précèdent since Stuart times. It 
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would be very much in our interest to place some kind of check on the legislative supremacy of 
Parliament. 
The Impossibility of Entrenched Legislation 
But the question is, how such a check could be placed. Parliament is sovereign; and the corollary 
of this is that it cannot abridge ils sovereignty, which is absolutely transcendent of any particular 
Act. An individual may put himself in handcuffs and throw away the key. Parliament cannot bind 
itself. 1t can do anything eise, but it cannot do that. No matter what bonds it might place on its 
future action, it could throw them off as if they were no more than cobwebs. It might enact the 
most perfect Bill of Rights that ever existed. It might provide that no Article of that Bill should 
be repealed or amended but in a specific manner. It would all be useless. Amendment or repeal 
would remain possible by ordinary législation. For the courts will apply any Act of Parliament 
except one abridging its sovereignty. Where two Acts conflict, they will always give effect to the 
most récent one; and they will do so regardless of whether it was passed in an irregular manner. 
They may check the Parliament roll to see whether it has passed both Houses and received the 
Royal assent. They have no power to enquire beyond that. They will not look into the internal 
procédures of Parliament. "If an Act of Parliament has been obtained improperly" said Mr Justice 
Willes, "it is for the législature to correct it by repealing it; but, so long as it exists as law, the 
courts are bound to obey it". 1 9 4 
Nor could a Bill of Rights be safe even from accidental repeal by an ill-drafted later Act. The 
courts would follow a rule enjoining them to construe any later Act so far as possible not to 
conflict with the Bil l . Beyond that limited restraint, they would apply the later Act. "The 
Législature cannot, according to our constitution" said Lord Justice Maugham, "bind itself as to 
the form of subséquent législation, and it is impossible for Parliament to enact that in a 
subséquent Statute dealing with the same subject-matter there can be no implied repeal".193 
194 Lee v Bude & Torrington Railway Co (1871) 6 Common Pleas Cases, 582. This doctrine was reaffirmed by the 
House of Lords in 1974; in the case oí Pickin v British Railways Board, ([1974] Appeal Cases). 
Elten Street Estales Ltd v Minister of Health [1934] / King 's Bench Reports, 753. 
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Under better cire um stances, a Bill might still be worth enacting. Though legally unenforceable, 
it might still provide a certain moral restraint on a Parliamentary majority. Its provisions could 
still be overridden. But the explicitness of the violation of rights involved might limit the number 
of such overridings. A white line dividing one garden from another may be less satisfactory than 
a wooden fence. But any boundary mark that shows where lawful enjoyment ends and trespass 
begins is better than nothing at ail. A Conservative government might well have trouble in 
persuading its supporters to pass a contravening Act. Cire ums tances, though, are not better. The 
Conservatives are not the only party of government. There is also a Labour Party strongly 
opposed to the putting of any limits on Parliamentary sovereignty. It is realised - and correctly 
- that any such limitation would hold up the transformation of this country into a socialist state. 
In the 1960s, Alex Lyon, then the Labour Member for York, opposed the introduction of a Bill 
of Rights on the grounds that the resulting "inflexibility of our machiner)' for changing the law 
when obvious social injustice appeared, would make it a gravely retrograde measure for human 
tiberty" (sic!).196 More recently, Roy Hattersley, the Labour Deputy Leader, has claimed that "true 
libeity requires action from the government", and that a Bi l l would obstruct the achievement of 
"positive freedom"197. One might restrain a Conservative government. It would be laughed at by 
a Labour government. 
It is always open for our présent absolutely sovereign Parliament to abolish itself - to adopl a 
wholly new constitution, in which it would be reconstituted as a less powerful body. Then its 
Acts could be reviewed by the courts, just as those of Congress are open to review by the 
Suprême Court of the United States. But to do this would be to break one of those precious 
threads of continuity that bind the génération now alive to every other that has lived in this 
country back into the high middle âges. Radical change of this nature is something to be flinched 
from except where clear and présent danger requires it, and where it can be achieved largely by 
consent. Perhaps this first condition is satisfied. As we write, it appears highly likely that the 
1 % Quoted. Michael Zander, Bill of Rights?. Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1985, p. 4. Chris R. Tarne also quotes this 
in his powerful essay, "The Case Againsl a Bill of Rights", in South African Freedom Review, Summer 1988, pp 19-33. Wc will 
iry to eonsider his main arguments later in this paper. 
197 The Guardian, 12th Deccmber, 1988, cited Tamc, op. cit., p. 28. 
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Labour Party will form the next government. The second, oviously, is not satisfied. Any changes 
made by the présent Government will be seen as Conservative législation, to be resisted now, and 
then somehow to be repealed. There is no hope, so far as our domestic politics are concerned, of 
a good and lasting seulement, 
But there is an external hope. Our membership of the European Community cuts through these 
Problems. The debate over entry was long and extremely painful. But that debate is over, and we 
have entered. The British Government has signed the relevant treaties, and we are all bound by 
them. There is now in Europe an authority that Parliament cannot remodel or abolish, and of 
which it must take notice. 
C O M M U N I T Y A N D BRITISH L A W 
The main object of the Community is the promotion of free movement between the member 
countries, of goods, services and persons. To achieve this object, a central Commission, together 
with a Parliament and Council of Ministers, is established in Brüssels. The various ordinances 
issued from here take precedence over national law throughout the Community. In the event of 
any dispute conceming these ordinances or the founding treaties, the European Court of Justice 
is established in Luxemburg. Comprising 13 Judges - one from each member State plus one other 
- it has Jurisdiction throughout the Community, and its judgments take precedence over those of 
any national court. We are bound to obey the décisions of these foreign institutions. Sections 2( 1 ) 
and 2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972 provide that 
Al l such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time 
created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remédies and procédures 
from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the 
Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the 
United Kingdom, shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, 
allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression "enforceable Community 
right" and similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to which this 
subsection applies. The provision that may be made under subsection (2) above 
includes, subject to Schedule 2 of this Act, any such provision (of any such 
extent) as might be made by Act of Parliament, and any enactment passed or to 
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be passed, other than one contained in this Part of this Act, shall be construed and 
have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this section; but, except as may 
be provided by any Act passed after this Act, Schedule 2 shall have effect in 
connection with the powers conferred by this and the following sections of this 
Act to make Orders in Council and regulations. 
By this first sub-section, all those provisions of Community law which are to be applied in this 
country are to be given the force of law in our courts. By the second, these provisions are to be 
given precedence not merely over those Acts of Parliament passed before the coming into force 
of this Act, but also over those passed after it. Any conflict between these sub-sections and 
another Act are taken before the courts by the same procedure by which a judicial review is 
sought of administrative action: application is made to the Queen's Bench Division. 
It is untrue that our membership of the Community has ended the ultimate sovereignty of 
Parliament. The European Communities Act is not entrenched legislation. It may be repealed or 
amended like any other Act. It must, however, be regarded as politically untouchable, To repeal 
or amend it, except as required by Community law, would be to leave the Community. It may be 
that withdrawal combined with a policy of unilateral free trade would be greatly in our interest. 
But no likely British government will ever believe this. Pending withdrawal or substantial 
reform, Parliament has chosen to lend some part of its legislative power to the Community.198 
Nothing, then, may have changed so far as the strict legal theory of the Constitution is concerned. 
Even so, there are now the practical means available for placing restraints on the laws that 
Parliament can make. 
The Supremacy of Community Law 
No British court as yet has struck down an Act of Parliament on the grounds that it conflicts with 
" 8 This, at least, is the view taken by Mr Justice Hoffmann in the cases of Stoke-on-Trent City Council v B &Qplc 
and Norwich City Council v B & Qplc (Chancery Division), reported in The Daily Telegraph, 18th July, 1990. Sec also per Lord 
Denning MR in McCarthys Ltd v Smith: "if the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the 
intention of repudiating the Treaty |ol Rome] or any provision in it or intentionally of acting inconsistently with it and says so 
in express terms then 1 should have thought that it would be the duly of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament" 
([1979] 3 All England Reports, 325). 
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Community law. But the principle, that the courts of each member State have this power, has long 
since been established in the case law of the European Court of Justice.1991t can only be a matter 
of time betöre it is applied in this country. In one respect, indeed, the way is unambiguously open 
to its application. 
Early in 1989, a group of companies, incorporated under the laws of the United Kingdom but 
owned or controlled by Spanish interests, began proceedings in the High Court against the 
Secretary of State for Transport. The companies were the owners or Operators of 95 fishing 
vessels registered in the Register of British Vessels under the Merchant Shipping Act 1884. The 
System of registration was altered by Part II of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 and a subséquent 
régulation made pursuant to the Act. The intention of the new law was to prevent the fishing in 
British waters by vessels flying the British flag but lacking any real link with the United 
Kingdom. The companies claimed against the Secretary of State that, by discriminating between 
one class of Community Citizens and another, Part II of the 1988 Act was in breach of 
Community law, and should therefore be set aside. Since it was expected that some while would 
pass before final judgment in their application - since the case was to be referred to the European 
Court for a preliminary ruling on the issues of Community law raised - the companies sought an 
interlocutory injunction, to suspend Part II of the Act and permit them to continue fishing. 
Had the Défendant been any party but the Crown, an injunction would have been granted. The 
companies had an arguable case. If they succeeded in their claim, but had been forbidden to fish 
meanwhile, no grant of damages would compensate them for their loss. To let them continue 
fishing was to préserve the status quo. An injunction was granted by the High Court. On appeal 
by the Secretary of State, however, the Court of Appeal applied the traditional rule, that no 
British court could suspend an Act of Parliament. On further appeal, the House of Lords upheld 
the Appeal Court judgment, adding that at common law no injunction could lie against the 
Crown. These questions were then submitted to the European Court, for answers to be given 
l9"' See, for examplc, Costa v ENEL [1964] European Community Reports. The Italian government had nationaliscd 
the production and distribution of clcctncity and tranferred ihe assets of the old private companies to a a State monopoly. Costa, 
a sharcholder in one of the old companies, sued in Luxemburg, claiming that, although passed subscquently, the nationalisation 
breached the Treaty of Rome. The Court agreed. Community law was hcld to prcvail over subséquent incompatible national law. 
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independent of the main case already referred to it. 
In its judgment. given on the 19th June 1990200, the European Court held that it was for the 
national courts to ensure the availability of the legal protections to which people had a right under 
Community law. It held that any national law or practice that prevented the national courts from 
ensuring the availability of thèse legal protections was incompatible with Community law. It held 
that any national law or practice that prevented the granting of intérim relief to ensure the füll 
effectivenes of a judgment to be given on the nature of thèse legal protections was also 
incompatible. Where questions of Conimunity law were concerned, it was held that the common 
law rule preventing the grant of an injunction against the Crown was to be set aside. Applying 
this décision, the House of Lords granted the injunction, and the Act is now suspended. 
The Protection of Freedom under Community Law 
The great majority of Community décisions binding on us have been grossly illiberal. In 1989, 
for example, the Council of Ministers decided to ban the sale within the Community of any 
cigarette with a tar content of more than 15mg.20' To corne into effect from the end of 1992, this 
ban will prevent the sale of Senior Service, Capstan, Gold Flake and many other fine and historie 
brands. Again, the Germans are currently pressing for a Community law against Sunday trading 
more restrictive than any that has ever existed in English law, and that no British government 
could by itself hope to soften.202 These are laws that should not be made nationally, let alone by 
the central institutions of the Community, they, and hundreds and thousands of others no less 
objectionable have done much to weaken the regard in which the Community ought to be held 
by libérais. But there have been a number of judgments handed down from the European Court 
significantly extending or preserving freedom. 
200 Regina v Secretary of State for Transport Ex Parte Factortame Lid and others. Case C-2 ! 3/89. reported in The 
Times, 20th June 1990. 
201 The Daily Telegraph, 14th November 1989. 
203 The Daily Telegraph, 29th September 1990. 
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According to section 42 of the Customs Consolidation Act 1876 
[t]he goods enumerated and described in the following table of prohibitions and 
restrictions inward are hereby prohibited to be imported or brought into the 
United Kingdom. save as hereby excepted. 
A i l that now remain in this table are 
indécent or obscène prints, paintings. photographs, books, cards lithographie or 
other engravings, or any other indécent or obscène articles. 
This section gives the Customs and Excise a wider power over what we may read or look at or 
use than the Police enjoy. The Police are obliged to proceed under the Obscène Publications Act 
1959. and must convince a Jury that the article in question has a tendency to "déprave or 
corrupt". The Customs and Excise need only persuade a Magistrate that it falls into the looser 
category of what is "indécent or obscène". They are able, moreover, to prosecute anyone who 
deals wîth the article after its importation. In conséquence, in many questions involving allegedly 
pornographie material, the authorities gave up seeking enforcement of the 1959 Act in favour of 
the 1876 Act. 
In 1982, a company called Conegate tried to import into this country from West Germany a 
number of inflatable rubber dolls. Thèse when inflated became life-size replicas of a woman's 
body, complète with three orifices. They were seized by the Customs and Excise as "indécent or 
obscène articles". The seizure was upheld in the condemnation proceedings before the 
Magistrates and on appeal to the Crown Court. But Conegate appealed next to the High Court, 
claiming that the seizure contravened Articles 30 and 36 of theTreaty of Rome. Article 36 allows 
the placing of restrictions on imports for the sake or preserving "public morality, public policy 
or public security". It does not, however. allow restrictions to "constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States". It was claimed that 
since there was no prohibition of the manufacture and sale of inflatable dolls in the United 
rCingdom, there ought to be none of their importation from elsewhere in the Community. To 
allow otherwise was to allow an "arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade 
{172} 
Chapter Ten 
between Member States". The High Court referred the matter to the European Court, which 
found for Conegate.203 
In itself an important case, this immediately had a wider effect than on the right to import aids 
to masturbation. Conegate had the money to mount a long and expensive appeal for its right to 
do business. But its victory established a principie that automatically governed all similar cases. 
In 1985, 37 customs officials entered into Gay's the Word, a small bookshop in Bloomsbury that 
imports literatura by and about homosexuals. This entry - codenamed "Operation Tiger" -
resulted in the seizure of books by Oscar Wilde, Gore Vidal and Christopher Isherwood among 
others. 70 of these books were selected for prosecution under the 1876 Act. It was beside the 
point that many of them had been openly on sale here for generations. A l l that mattered was that 
they had been imported and might therefore be eased into the category of the "obscene or 
indecent". The proprietors of the bookshop if found guilty faced sentences of up to two years in 
prison. The prosecution was dropped as soon as the Conegate decisión was announced. 
Our authorities have thus been restricted in their use of the 1876 Act. Formally, they need only 
liberalise imports from within the Community. But it would be impracticable to apply different 
tests to imports from different parís of the world. Even if they did, the American suppliers would 
simply reroute their goods through Holland or Germany. The Customs and Excise have duly been 
ordered to apply the more liberal test regardless of the exporting country. The European Court 
has done for the cause of liberty what no recent Parliament has shown the least inclination to do. 
Given a Bill of Rights to interpret and enforce, we are convinced that it would have both will and 
ability to do still more. 
OBJECTIONS T O A E U R O P E A N B I L L OF RIGHTS 
There are those who doubt this - who are íirm liberáis yet who also say that the notion of a 
European Bil l of Rights cannot or ought not be realised. They offer two main objections. 
13 Conegate v Commissioners of Customs and Excise (No 121/85) Queen s Bench (1987) 254. 
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The Argument from Redundancy 
First it is argued that a Bil l of Rights can be drafted and passed into law only when there is no 
need of safeguards; and that, when needed, they turn out to be useless for stopping a government 
with strong public support. This is a neat dilemma. The American experience is cited in support. 
Chris R Tame argues that 
[i]t was not the paper checks and balances of the American Constitution that 
maintained American Freedom. It was the invisible, but actually more real ones 
manifest in the ideas and actions of millions of Americans. The fact that people 
would rather go hungry than accept state welfare, that individuals simply would 
not put up with the sorts of interventionism now accepted as commonplace by 
contemporary Americans - this is the real power of ideas as social forces. It was 
the power of the social order, of civic society, and not scraps of paper that limited 
the American state.204 
As soon as the American mood changed, he continues, not all the paper in the world could 
restrain the state. The Constitution was amended. What was not amended was interpreted away 
or turned on its head. The intention of the Founding Fathers was to entrench freedom behind 
legal defences that would endure for ages. It took less than 80 years for those defences to be 
sapped and the United States transformed into a "quasi-corporatisf' superstate. 
Even in those cases where the Constitutional safeguards appeared to work, it was usually only 
as a temporary break on the transformation. Robert Dahl has studied the 77 instances between 
1803 and 1956 where the Supreme Court set aside Congressional laws as unconstitutional. In 
almost a third of these instances, the aims of the laws set aside were achieved by other means. 
In a fifth of these instances, the aims were achieved within four years. In only four were more 
than 20 years needed. "There is" he concludes, "...no case on record where a persistent 
lawmaking majority has not, sooner or later, achieved its purpose".205 
2 W Tame. op. cit., p. 21. 
2 0 5 Robert A. Dahl, "Decision Making in a Democracy: the Supreme Court as a National Policymaker", in B. 
Vanderhoef, The Fiber of Democracy, Harper and Row, San Francisco, 1970. p. 332 - quoted Tame, op. cit., p. 24. 
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But, in spite of its neatness, the dilemma is not entirely real. Governments are always in need of 
restraint, no matter who is in them or who elects them. It was not solely out of concern for the 
future that the first ten amendments to the American Constitution were adopted in 1791. It was 
also feared that the Fédéral Government would no sooner be settled than it wouid begin to 
encroach on the liberties of the people. As as early as 1803 - while many of the Founding Fathers 
were not merely alive but also politically active and even in control - the Suprême court asserted 
its inhérent right of setting aside répugnant Congressional laws. Moreover, while Dahl's statistics 
are undeniable, the Court has still in more than two thirds of cases permanently restrained the 
executive; and in many of thèse it has enlarged or preserved American freedom. It has prevented 
prior restraint of the press. and narrowly defined the grounds on which anyone may be brought 
to account after publication. It has set aside Acts permitting officiai discrimination against 
unpopulär political and racial groups. It has ensured the observance of due process in criminal 
prosecutions. Paper safeguards may lose much of their strength when the spirit from which they 
derived has vanished. But the Suprême Court and the documents that it is there to Interpret 
cannot be described as redundant. 
The Argument from Impracticaliry 
Second, it is argued that no really effective Bill of Rights will be adopted by any government that 
habitually breaks the majority of its articles. We might just as well expect a thief to put himself 
into prison. The Government and public of the United States accept a Constitution and Bill of 
Rights that often stand annoyingly in their way. They accept them because they are there and 
have been there as long as the United States has existed. Offered fresh, unsurrounded by ail the 
associations that now commend them, both might well be rejected. Our own government. 
whatever may be said at foreign gatherings, will never put itself voluntarily under restraint. As 
for the other governments of the Community, the nearest document to a Bill of Rights in which 
they have shown interest has been the dreadful European Charter - satisfying to a body of 
opinion, certainly, that wants the right to dote money and paid holidays and free télévision 
licences for the old, but hardly a new Magna Carta of freedom. 
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This may be so. But Mrs Thatcher has made a serious and perhaps a long considered proposai. 
Whatever may be said about other politicians. she can be trusted. When she décides firmly 
enough that something ought to be done, she will do it, regardless of her short term popularity 
in the country or the opinions of her colleagues. In the late 1970s, she decided that inflation had 
to be brought down by a tight control of the mohey supply. The defeat of inflation was the 
greatest achievement of her first term - in spite of repeated advice to change course and the 
apparent collapse of the manufacturing sector. She defeated Galtieri. She defeated ScargiH. She 
carried through the abolition of the metropolitan authorities. She carried through the reform of 
the rating System. If she décides that Europe - of which we are for the time being a part - is in 
need of a Bil l of Rights, that is what she will set the British Government about pressing for. 
While they have so far shown little enthusiasm for the notion, the other govemments of the 
Community may have no objection to it in principle. Without exception, they are already 
restrained by written constitutions, and most of thèse contain an enumeration of fundamental 
rights. The présent French Constitution, indeed, has in its preamble a complète récital of the 
famous Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen of the 26th August 1789 - a flawed but 
still impressive Statement of liberal ideals.206 Already used to restraint by their own courts, thèse 
govemments may not greatly resist further restraint imposed by the European Court. 
There is also the matter of our national pride to be considered. A Community Bil l of Rights 
would restrain not only our own Government but also any central institution of the Community. 
This paper is written on the assumption that the Community will not become a Fédération. Even 
so, there may remain central institutions with considérable legislative and administrative powers. 
The British public as a whole may not mind what intrusions are made by the British Government, 
and may therefore regard a domestic Bi l l of Rights with indifférence or irritation. But it does 
mind what laws are made in Brüssels, by foreigners. It will look favourably on any scheme to 
limit the power that French or German politicians can exercise in this country. It may at the same 
time - by a natural extension of the argument - be brought to an acceptance of restraints on our 
m This is not entrenched against express repeal. But it does contain a number of "gênerai principles'' that govem the 
interprétation of laws. It is also an object of almost gênerai vénération. 
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own politicians. 
THE FORM OF A EUROPEAN BILL OF RIGHTS 
A l l this being said, we novv turn to the matter of how a Bil l should be drafted - vvhat plan its 
content and form should follow. Now. there is a good case for not drafting one at all. but instead 
for adopting one that already exists and is binding to some extent on all the countries of the 
Community plus nine others. 
The European Convention on Human Rights 
In 1951, mindful of what had been done by the National Socialists and of what was being done 
by the Soviet Socialists, the free nations of Europe came together to adopt a Convention on 
Human Rights. Drafted by the Senior Legal Adviser to the Home Office - Great Britain then for 
obvious reasons being seen as the one dry rock of liberty this side of the Atlantic - this was 
intended, unlike the Helsinki Déclaration of 24 years later, to be an effective restraint on the 
subscribing governments. To ensure its observance, a European Court of Human Rights was 
established at Strasbourg.207 This Court has power to try cases brought by one government against 
another, and - save by Cypriots, Greeks, Turks and the Maltese - by private persons against their 
government. It has no power to hear cases at first instance, but an aggrieved party must have 
exhausted all domestic means of redress. If it finds for the Plaintiff, it can award damages and 
costs. Governments are obliged to comply with adverse judgments by appropriate changes to the 
law, compliance being supervised by a Committee of Foreign Ministers. The Convention lacks 
the binding force of the Treaty of Rome. Our Government is under no pressing obligation to give 
effect to the judgments of its Court. But those judgments have generally been given effect, if 
usually after some considérable delay208. 
2 0 7 This Court is not to bc confused with the European Court of Justice at Luxemburg. The two are quitc separate. The 
former is part of the Council of Europe, the latter of the European Community. That the two abbreviate to European Court is 
an unfortunate coincidencc. 
20SThe Whole Text of the Convention is printed in lan Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents of International Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1983, pp.320-48. 
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The Court has over the past 20 years. sínce it began hand down adverse judgments against the 
Government, had a decided liberalising effect on our law. Following judgments of the Court, 
governments have legislated - to stop the torture of terrorist suspects in Northern Ireland and to 
legalise homosexual acts there, to allow journalists access to documents read out in open court, 
to curb lawless surveillance by the Pólice and secret services, to enlarge the rights of prisoners, 
parents of children in care and the inmates of mental hospitats. 
In most other countries of the Community, there is no need for the Convention to be invoked at 
Strasbourg, since it has been incorporated into their domestic law, and can be applied at first 
instance by their own courts. Such consensus as there is here on the need for a Bill of Rights is 
in favour of incorporating it into British law. In 1979. a Bil l passed through the House of Lords 
to do this, but was rejected by the Commons on Government and Opposition insistence that 
nothing must restrain the executive. Another attempt was made by Lord Scarman in 1985. His 
Bi l l had the support of politicians from all the main parties, and of more than 20 organisations 
joined together in the Rights Campaign. The Front Benches were still too jealous of their actual 
or potential freedom even from moral restraint. His Bill failed. However, now that the Prime 
Minister has been converted to the notion of a European Bil l of Rights, and that the most 
practical means of realising this is through the Community, this obstacle may have been raised. 
If the Convention were to be incorporated into the Treaty of Rome, it would automatically 
become part of British law. Also, it would be more effectively entrenched than if it were merely 
incorporated by Parliament. 
The Convention has much to commend it. It exists. It applies already throughout the Community. 
It has been used to redress grievances. Its incorporaron has wide support in this country. It is 
already incorporated throughout most of the Community. We should not be discontented if it 
were made the European Magna Carta. It would enlarge and preserve our freedom. It would 
allow the courts not only to review delegated legislation on procedural grounds, but also to 
review the enabling Acts themselves in the light of fundamental principies. It would keep 
Parliament from exceeding its proper authority. 
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But. for all this, it is defective in its content. It is the product not of a liberal age but of the social 
democratic and soft authoritarian hegemony of the post War years. It does contain some definite 
protections. Take, as an example of this. Article 3. 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in 
detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
© to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to 
be given it free when the interests of justice so require; 
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him; 
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or 
speak the language used in court.209 
This does not cover all the rights of an accused person that have evolved in the Anglo-American 
tradition. There is no security against double jeopardy. There is no right to silence or against the 
compelling of self-incrimination. Also, it may go too far, in granting a right to free legal 
assistance. There are times when the resolution of a point of law is of public importance; and 
then it may be appropriate for the court to assign counsel for that point to be argued. But no one 
has a greater right under normal circumstances to a free lawyer than to a free doctor. If the Article 
requires a legal aid scheme to be run by the contracting governments, it is defective. Even so, it 
is on the whole a good Article. It states certain basic principles of procedural justice for the courts 
to apply in deciding the lawfulness of any prosecution. 
Again, take Article 5: 
2 0 9 The whole text of the Convention is printed in Ian Brownlie (ed.). Basic Documents of International Law. Oxford 
University Press, 1983. pp 320-348. 
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Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. 
This would be better if it used the formula "life, liberty and property" - from the 14th 
Amendment to the American Constitution - than the vague "security of person". But no other 
objection can be made from a liberal point of view. There are, however, six limitations on this. 
It continues: 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in 
accordance with a procédure prescribed by law: 
(a) the lawful détention of a person atter conviction by a compétent court; 
(b) the lawful arrest or détention of a person for non-compliance with the 
lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any 
Obligation prescribed by law; 
(c ) The lawful arrest or détention of a person effected for the purpose of 
bringing him before the compétent legal authority on reasonable 
suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably 
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing 
after having done so; 
(d) the détention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational 
supervision or his lawful détention for the purpose of bringing him before 
the compétent legal authority; 
(e) the lawful détention of persons for the prévention of of the spreading of 
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or 
drug-addicts, or vagrants; 
(f) the lawful arrest or détention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action 
is being taken with a view to déportation or extradition. 
We say nothing against sections (a) to (d), or section (f). But section (e) is in part objectionable. 
There i s no reason why alcoholics, drug-addicts or vagrants need to distinguished from any other 
cfass of persons. If an alcoholic breaks the law, by driving while drunk, or appearing drunk in a 
public place, or whatever. why not justify action against him by référence to the other sections? 
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Equally, if a drug-addict breaks the law. by possessing an illegal substance, his offence is already 
covered by the other sections. The same applies with vagrants. There is no need to mention thèse 
classes of person separately from any other. Section (e) appears to allow action against members 
of them not for what they might have done but for what they are. This is undeniably bad. 
But our most pointed objection has to do with Article 10: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interférence by public authorority and regardless of frontiers. This 
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, télévision or cinéma enterprises. 
2. The exercise of thèse freedoms: since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
démocratie society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prévention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, for the protection of the réputation or rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
It is very hard from reading this to see exactly what freedom is protected. No government may 
shut down opposition newspapers just to save itself in the poils. But it may rely on this Article 
to suppress opinion under virtualiy any other pretext. The "protection of... morals" might justify 
the shutting down of most of our national press. The "protection of the réputation or rights of 
others" obviously justifies the English law of defamation and copyright and so forth. But the 
clause is so vague that it might also justify the banning of arguments against the right of women 
to be ordained in the Church of England. It may well justify the récent French law, in which it 
was made an offence to deny that the German National Socialists murdered six million Jews. 
This is undoubtedly both a false and offensive déniai. But falsehood and the giving of offence 
do not justify the suppression of opinion. 
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An Alternative Draft Bill of Rights 
In view of thèse defects, while the Convention is certainly better than nothing at all - and in spite 
of its defects may even be what we ought finally to advocate - we would offer the following 
alternative: 
A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
ARTICLE I 
No person shall suffer punishment for breach of any law or other ordinance, whether made by 
the Community or National authorities, or any person or body exercising power delegated 
therefrom, that shall not: 
i apply to ail other persons, without distinction of rank, sex, sexual orientation, 
religious persuasion or national or ethnie origin; 
S A V E THAT this clause shall not prevent the making and enforcement by the 
National authorities of such laws as shall be required to protect the persons and 
traditional dignities of their Heads of State; 
SAVE ALSO THAT this clause shall not prevent the making and enforcement by 
the Community or National Authorities of such laws in respect of aliens as shall 
be required for the defence of the Community or any of its member States or the 
préservation of public order therein; 
ii have been made and clearly published in advance; 
i i i be enforceable by an independent court of law situated in the Country and district 
wherein the offence shall have been committed, and in which court the accused 
a) shall have the right to a speedy and public trial, 
b) shall have previously been informed (in a language known to him or her) 
of the nature and cause of the accusation, 
c) shall be presumed innocent until found guilty, 
d) shall be confronted by the wilnesses for the prosecution, 
e) shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses for the defence, and 
f) shall have the right of assistance by counsel in ail points of law and of fact. 
ARTICLE II 
No law or other ordinance shall be made, whether by the Community or National authorities, or 
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by any person or body exercising power delegated therefrom, prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, save as shall be required 
i for the protection of rights determinable under the laws of torts, of contract, of 
intellectual property and of confidence; 
ii for the preservation of public order in the light of a clear and present danger; 
iii for the effective conduct of legal proceedings; 
iv for the preservation of official secrecy, it being for the prosecuting authority in 
any proceedings sanctioned by this Clause to show (where necessary in camera) 
why the matter in dispute ought not to be revealed, and stating on oath or 
affirmation the nature and extent of the harm to be expected from revelation. 
ARTICLE III 
No person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty or 
property; nor shall the accused of any offence be compelled to give evidence for the prosecution. 
ARTICLE IV 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted. 
ARTICLE V 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
ARTICLE VI 
No person, having been arrested, shall be detained for an unreasonable length of time before the 
laying of charges; nor shall any person, while in custody, be denied access to legal advice, or be 
subjected to cruel or degrading treatment. 
ARTICLE VII 
No private property shall be taken for public use except on payment of its open market value, 
such value to be determined in the event of dispute between the parties by an independent valuer 
mutually agreed, or, in default of agreement, by a valuer to be appointed by a court of law on 
application. 
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ARTICLE VIII 
The citizens of each Member State of the Community shall have the right to visit, settle and 
follow any lawful occupation within the other Member States of the Community; nor shall there 
be any restrictions on the movement of money within the Community or on the movement of 
such goods as may lawfully be manufactured or traded within any one Member State of the 
Community into any of the other Member States of the Community. 
ARTICLE IX 
A l l of the rights recognised in this Bill of Rights shall belong to the citizens of each Member 
State of the Community, together with such aliens as are for any reason within that Member State 
(subject only to the Second Proviso to Article I,i hereinabove), without distinction of rank, sex, 
sexual orientation, religious persuasion or national or ethnic origin. 
ARTICLE X 
Al l of the rights recognised by the laws of each Member State of the Community shall belong 
to all of the citizens of that member State and of all such citizens of the other Member States as 
are for any reason within that Member State, together with all such aliens as are for any reason 
within that Member State (subject only to the Second Proviso to Article I,i hereinabove), without 
distinction of rank, sex, sexual orientation, religious persuasion or national or ethnic origin. 
ARTICLE XI 
Any person whose rights recognised in this Bil l of Rights shall have been violated shall in all 
cases have an effective remedy on application to the courts of the Member States or to the 
European Court of Justice. 
A BRIEF COMMENTARY 
Article One 
This Article attempts a fuller statement of the rule of law than was given earlier in this paper. 
While much of it needs no commentary, there are parts of it that may be open to question 
Non-Discrimination 
Clause i looks like part of a recruitment advertisement for one of the more disreputable local 
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authorities. But it seeks to impose no obligation on any employer to be more tolerant than he 
wishes. It gives no one the right to a job or or house or university place or any benefit. It seeks 
simply to close an obvious loophole in the rule of law. 
For F.A. Hayek, freedom and the rule of law are very nearly synonymous concepts. He defines 
freedom as "independence of the arbitrary will of another".210 He contends that "when we obey 
laws, in the sensé of gênerai abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to us, we 
are not subject to another man's will and are therefore free".211 He adds that, apart from this 
requirement - that every law should be universal and intended for application to an unknown 
number of future cases - there is no need for a Bill of Rights.2 1 2 
Hayek is right in so far as the rule of law is a necessary condition for freedom to exist for any 
length of time. But when he appears to regard it as a sufficient condition, he overstates his 
argument. Where there is no rule of law, there is generally no freedom. It is untrue that freedom 
is always a conséquence of the rule of law. If it were enacted that every adult person on reaching 
the âge of 65 should be put immediately to death, it would be hard to find a less liberal law. But, 
so long as it applied equally to all within the Jurisdiction, and were made and enforced according 
to the correct procédure, it would be fully in conformity with the rule of law. It is, of course, 
extremely unlikely that any législature would make such a law, knowing that its provisions would 
apply to the individual legislators as well as to the ordinary population. However, there are 
gênerai laws that would bind those making them, but only hurt others. Hayek does accept this 
objection, but gives it less attention than it deserves. He says that 
[i]t is not to be denied that even gênerai, abstract rules, equally applicable to ail, 
may possibly constitute severe restrictions on liberty. But when we reflect on it, 
we see how very unlikely this is. The chief safeguard is that the rules must apply 
to those who lay them down and to those who apply them - that is, to the 
2 i n F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1960, p. 12. 
211 Ibid, p. 153. 
2 1 2 See Volume 3 of his Law, Legislation and Liberty, Routledge and Kegan Paul. London, 1982, p. 109. 
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goverment as well as the governed - and that nobody has the power to grant 
exceptions. If all that is prohibited and enjoined is prohibited and enjoined for all 
without exception (unless such exception follows from another gênerai rule) and 
if even authority has no special powers except that of enforcing the law, little that 
anybody may reasonably wish to do is likely to be prohibited. It is possible that 
a fanatical religious group will impose upon the rest restrictions which its 
members will be pleased to observe but which will be obstacles for others in the 
pursuit of important aims. But if it is true that religion has often provided the 
pretext for the establishing of rules feit to be extremely oppressive and that 
religious liberty is therefore regarded as very important for freedom, it is also 
significant that religious beliefs seem to be almost the only ground on which 
gênerai rules seriousty restrictive of liberty have even been universally enforced. 
But how comparatively innoeuous, even if irksome, are most such restrictions 
imposed on literally everybody, as for instance the Scottish Sabbath, compared 
with those that are likely to be imposed only on some!2lJ 
Now, this is not so. In the first place, religion is not the only ground on which gênerai restrictions 
affecting only a minority have been placed. In the second, religious restrictions in themselves are 
often productive of more pain and disorder than the fairly trifling matter of sabbatarianism. 
About a fifth of the Bulgarian population is Moslem. More than three quarters of Albanians are 
Moslems. Both of these countries will sooner or later be admitted to the Community. In each of 
them, the dominant religion has been and largely remains subject to persécution from an atheist 
State. Once the persécutions are lifted, and the majority has a say in government, there is likely 
to be an assertion of religious values. Public worship will again be legal. Religious property will 
be restored and buildings reconsecrated. There is nothing wrong in this. But the assertion may 
easily go further. The persécution of all religion may be replaced by the persécution of minority 
religions. A Bill of Rights containing only what Hayek recommends would not prevent an 
extremely bitter persécution in these countries. 
Imagine a Bulgarian law that read as follows: 
Any child or person who in any public place and on any occasion shall appear 
with covered head commits an offence, and on conviction therefor shall be liable 
2 1 3 Hayek (i960), pp 154-5. 
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to a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years or unlimited fine or both. 
In any circumstance, this would be a monstrous law. It requires what no government has any 
business to require. It imposes an extremely high penalty for non-compliance. But it could easily 
be obeyed by Christians and atheists, though they might find compliance a nuisance in cold or 
very sunny weather. But, for Moslem women, as we all by now should know, it would mean a 
choice between apostasy and house imprisonment. It would prevent the education of girls from 
devout households. It would, while staying formally within Hayek's category of permissible 
legislation, impose a religious discrimination leading insensibly to a lowering of social and 
economic status. 
Many demands of the gay movement are variously to be deplored or laughed at. Homosexuals 
are not to have laws against making fun of them. They are not to be given privileges under 
housing or employment law. But some of their demands are perfectly just. They labour at present 
under a vast mass of discriminatory legislation. Except in Denmark, they cannot marry. In 
England, Scotland and Ireland, even private contracts amounting to marriage are unenforceable. 
Except in Denmark and Holland, they cannot inherit in the event of a partner's intestacy. Their 
disabilities under the civil law will be treated in Article X. For the moment, we deal only with 
the disabilities of male homosexuals - lesbian acts never having been criminal in any of the 
member states - under the criminal law. They cannot make love with the same freedom as 
heterosexuals. In the Irish Republic, they are absolutely forbidden by law to make love. In this 
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country. as in Germany and Luxemburg, their âge of consent is différent.214 Each of thèse burdens 
is drafted so as to apply to the whole population. Julian Clary cannot sleep with a man in an 
English hôtel bedroom. Neither can the Editor of The Sun. There is no formai discrimination.215 
For thèse reasons, it needs to be made explicit that when a law is required to apply to everyone 
without distinction, the way is not left open to informai persécution of an unpopulär minority. 
But this, it must be emphasised, is ail that is intended. There are inevitably laws that can by a 
little sophistry be claimed to discriminate against a certain group. The criminal statistics might, 
for example, show that Catholics are more likely to déclare fraudulent bankruptcies than are 
Protestants. But no reasonable person would infer from this that the British Insolvency Act 1986 
is the modem successor to the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity. The accidentai tendency of 
a law might be to discriminate. But anyone who would have it set aside must show that its 
purpose is to discriminate. 
2 1 4 Ages of Homosexual Consent throughout the Community 
Country Heterosexual Homosexual Year of 
légalisation 
Belgium 16 16 1792 
Den mark 15 15 1930 
Germany 14 18 1969* 
Greece 15 15 na 
Spain 12 12 1822 
France 15 15 1791 
treland 16 — — 
Italy 14 14 1889 
Luxemburg 14 18 1792 
Holland 16 16 1811 
Portugal 16 16 1852 
UK 16 21 1967 
(Source: Peter Tatchell, Oui in Europe, A Guide to Lesbian and Gay Righls in 30 European Counlries, Channel Four 
Books. 1990) 
* In East Gcrmany: the age of consent was equalised at 14 in 1968. We do not currcntly know whelher this 
law has been retained or whether Fédéral law now obtains throughout the new States. 
2 1 3 Hayek himself gives a further example: "A good illustration from another field of how a non- discrimination rule 
can be evaded by provisions formulatcd in gênerai ternis... is the German customs tarif!" of 1902.... whîch. to avoid a 
most-favoured-nations obligation, provided a spécial rate of duty for 'brown or dappled cows reared at a level of at least 300 
mètres above the sea and passing at least one month in every summer al a height of at least 800 mètres7"' (ibid. note 20 in Chapter 
Fourteen, given p. 489. 
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Protection of Heads of State 
It is often said that an âge as enlightened as our own has no need of monarchy or monarchical 
privilège. Wliat is it, people ask, about "a shot of murky water" that singles anyone out for power 
and vénération? The answer to this is simple. There is nothing that cannot be made to look absurd 
or worthless by the right choice of descriptive language. We can describe sexual intercourse as 
the rubbing together of two small areas of flesh. We can describe the gold standard as the digging 
of yellow metal out of the ground only to bury it again in a bank vault. We can describe a Bach 
Partita as a collection of sounds made by a man dragging a hundred horse hairs over half a dozen 
lengths of animal gut. These can all be very witty sayings. But they have no other use. The value 
of monarchy lies not in how it might appear to some droll visitor from Mars, but in how it 
appears to those living under it. 
Ours is not a particularly enlightened âge. It is certainly not an âge of republicanism. 
Constitutions and country names may state otherwise, but the greater part of mankind is subject 
to what the Greeks called monarchia, or the rule of one man. Saddam Hussain, Colonel Gaddafi, 
Michael Gorbachev, Kim II Sung, Robert Mugabe - each is called a President. Each has more in 
common with a Roman Emperor of the third Century than with an American President. Each may 
also be a tyrant. But tyranny is only the corruption of monarchy, not its antithesis. True 
republicanism is very rarely to be found. Where it is to be found, the Head of State is surrounded 
by strict legal and conventional safeguards. Only in the United States have thèse safeguards been 
effective for any significant length of time. Everywhere eise, they have been periodically broken 
through. 
The British monarchy is one of the strängest institutions known to us. It is one of the strängest 
and most bénéficiai. It could never have been consciously designed. Once lost, it could never be 
recreated. Because of it, we have during the past three centuries enjoyed both représentative 
governmentandpolitical stability. On the one hand, the Queen can in normal circumstances do 
nothing but what her Ministers advise. On the other, she fills a position that is closed to any rival. 
She is head of state not by right of popular élection or military force, but by prescription. In this 
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country, a question is firmly settled that in most others remains actually or potentiaily open. 
The monarchy has not prevented us from losing many of our freedoms. But it has saved us from 
what is equally bad - the ultimate ambition of the corrupt gênerai or politician. The Queen is both 
privileged and disabled in law. She pays no taxes. She cannot in her personal capacity be taken 
before the courts. To kill her is more than murder. To attempt her life is more than conspiracy 
to murder. She cannot change her religion. Her choice of marriage partner is circumscribed by 
law and convention. But, in so far as they define and protect her title, the continued existence of 
thèse privilèges and disabilities is in our interest. They must be exempted from the gênerai 
requirement of equality before the law. 
Much the same is to be said concerning the monarchies of Spain, Holland, and Belgium, and the 
Grand Duke of Luxemburg. To a much lesser extent, the same may be said concerning the 
various Presidencies of the other countries of the Community. 
The Separate Legal Status of Aliens 
So far as possible, aliens residing or travelling within the Community are to enjoy the same 
protection from this Bill of Rights as the Citizens of each member state. But it will inevitably be 
necessary from time to time to impose restrictions on the Citizens of certain foreign states which 
are at war with some or ail of the member states of the Community or with which relations are 
for some other reason strained. It is to be hoped that thèse occasions will be very few. But they 
must be anticipated. 
The Ban on Rétrospective Legislation 
Rétrospective législation has been called a sure sign of tyranny. It robs the law of certainty. It 
requires the prudent not only to find out what the law is and to obey it, but to do whatever the 
government seems to want on the assumption that it will eventually be expressed in a law. It is 
both shameful and alarming that the British Government has made rétrospective laws. 
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The Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 was passed to restrict the ownership of pump-action 
shotguns and semi-automatic rifles. Under section 21, the Home Secretary was empowered to 
make a scheme of compensation for those surrendering their newly prohibited weapons. Under 
the scheme eventually made, there was to be a flat payment of of LI 50 per gun, or a payment of 
50 per cent of its average retail price during the summer of 1987. This was an act of confiscation, 
and would as such be forbidden under Article VII of this Bil l . But Sections 21 (a) and (b) provide 
for compensation only to those owners who lawfully purchased their guns before the 23rd of 
Septemebr 1987. The Act becaine law in the Summer of 1988. Section 21 was brought into force 
on the 30th of April 1989. No one who bought one of the restricted firearms during the preceding 
year and a half was breaking the law. Yet he was punished as if he had. He was fined by a déniai 
of compensation for not having consulted the mere wishes of the Government before doing what 
was at the time perfectly lawful. 
Article I, 9:3 of the American Constitution expressly forbids the making of laws ex post facto. 
Our own unwritten Constitution evidently does not forbid them. This Clause would supply the 
deficiency. 
The Requirement of Due Process oflaw 
The wording of Article I,iii is taken mostly from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the 
American Constitution and parlly from the European Convention. It should be neither 
controversial not in need of any elucîdation. 
Article II 
The right of free speech may well in particular instances seem both vexatious and dangerous. ït 
is, even so, the most important of all our Uberties. Take this one away, or seriously abridge it, and 
every one of our others is immediately threatened. The wording of this Article follows the First 
Amendement to the American Constitution, which reads as follows: 
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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to pétition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
This is far better than Article 10 of the European Convention. It states that the right shall not be 
abridged, not that it may in an indefinitely large number of circumstances. But where the 
Convention goes too far in one direction, this goes too far in the other. There can be no absolute 
right to freedom of speech. Congress and the Suprême Court have always accepted this. The First 
Amendment does not prevent the bringing of actions for defamation, or breach of copyright, for 
reasons of essential state security, or any number of other reasons. It has always been read as a 
restraint on the censorship of of comment on matters of legitimate public concern. Therefore, 
while the wording of our second Article broadly follows that of the American First Amendment, 
the exceptions are clearly stated. 
The Law of Torts 
Libel 
It has been said that a person's réputation is nothing more than an idea existing in the minds of 
others, and that no one can legitimately expect to have a property right in the contents of 
another's mind. It is, however, true that people do consider themselves to have such a right - and 
that, if the law denied them any redress, they might be inclined to seek it themselves, in duels or 
in other acts of violence. In addition, the right is capable of clear statement and application: 
"[t]he law recognises in every man a right to have the estimation in which he stands in the 
opinion of others unaffected by false Statements to his discrédit". 2 1 6 
2 , 6 Per Mr Justice Cave J Scott v Sampson (1882) S Queen 's Bench Division 503; quoted in Gatiey on Libel and 
Slander(\9%\ ed.), London, Sweet & Maxwell, para. 1. 
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Injurious falsehood 
Here. it is required that actual fïnancial damage musi be proved, as opposed 10 the less tangible 
loss of réputation invoïved in übel. If A were to publish a daim that Captain Flint's last treasure 
vvere buried under B's back lawn, and a mob came and turned B's garden into something 
resembling a shell crater, he would have an obvious cause of action against A. 
Breach of Contraci 
If someone contracts not to publish a book until after a certain time, or agrées to any other 
limitation, it would be monstrous if he wcre able to avoid performance by invoking an abstract 
righl to freedom of speech. Accordingly, there is no such protection under English or any 
European law; and there is none recognised in this Article. 
Copyright 
Unlike throughout most past ages, it is currently believed that certain arrangements of words or 
sounds or other common éléments constitute distinct and potenlially valuable works of the raind 
which deserve th? same protection as more tangible forms of property. No one has the right to 
use what he has not lawfully acquired. He cannot profit from the sale of anothers stolen 
property. He cannot, without permission, publish what he has not himself written or obtained the 
right to publish. 
The Law of Confidence 
"The law has long recognised that an obligation of confidence can arise out of particular 
relationships. Examples are the relationship of doctor and patient, priest and penitent, solicitor 
and client, banker and customer. The obligation may be hnposed by an express or implied term 
in a contract but '*+ may also exist independently of any contract on the basis of an independent 
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équitable principle of confidence".217 This obligation clearly binds the person to whom 
information has been imparted. It also binds any third person to whom it might be passed. 
Anyone who publishes such information, unless it can be shown already to exist in the public 
domain, or that it is of a nature so iniquitious that its disclosure becomes a duty, is rightly liable 
to civil remédies. 
Public Order 
We tum now to the laws of sédition, blasphemy, obscenity, incitement to racial hatred, and ail 
those others that are currently justified at least in part on the grounds of keeping the public order. 
None of thèse is a matter affecting any spécifie individual. In each case, aprosecution must be 
undertaken either by the state or by a private person who needs prove no more injury to himself 
than is alleged against the public as a whole. The argument, that certain kinds of writing have a 
tendency to déprave or corrupt the reader, may or may not be correct. What we deny is the normal 
conclusion to this argument, that the circulation of such writings should be forbidden. People are 
adults or they are children. If they are the former, they are to be treated as rational beings, capable 
of interposing some process of thought between suggestion of evil and acceptance of it, and then 
between acceptance of evil and action in obédience to its promptings. Otherwise, it they cannot 
be trusted with temptation, it seems rather strange to trust them with the vote. If they cannot 
govern themselves, they most certainly ought not have the right to govern everyone else. 
There are, however, circumstances in which the publication of certain views - or perhaps their 
publication in certain forms - might provoke a breach of the peace. It seems at présent very likely, 
for instance, that the appearance in a Bradford or Parisian newspaper of a cartoon showing the 
Prophet Mahommed, or the late Ruholla Khomeini, fornicating with a pig would lead to wild 
rioting. In the case of this rather extrême instance, it can be argued that the publisher of the 
cartoon ought to be answerable at law. True, the existence of a law before which he might be 
answerable would encourage many of the commotions which it was designed to prevent: if 
2 , 1 PerheadnoteinAG. v Guardian Newspapers(No. 2) (HL(E)) 3 WeeklyLaw Reports [1988| 777 (the "Spycaicher 
judgment). 
{194} 
Chapter Ten 
throwing petrol bombs really could produce the withdrawal of offending material, it would be 
only reasonable for some people to throw them. But public order must be kept. Laws must be 
made and enforced against disturbances. It would be foolish to prevent such laws or rob them of 
their effectiveness. The only proper limitation on the various governments of the Community 
ought to be on the grounds of proximity of danger. It should be for the courts to décide whether 
any particular Statute or action was required "in the light of a clear and présent danger". 
Contempt of Court 
If trial by jury is to be retained or introduced in any part of the Community, it follows that the 
press should be restrained from seeking to influence potential Jurors with sensational, and 
perhaps incorrect, accounts of the évidence to be offered in pending criminal proceedings. To this 
extent, the law of contempt of court is justified. It is needed to secure justice for individuals 
accused of having broken the law. But most civil proceedings within the Community either are 
not or never have been tried before a jury. Even in England and the Irish Republic, interlocutory 
proceedings and appeals always have been decided byjudges. That a judge cannot disregard 
irrelevant or biased press comment in his deciding an issue ought to be incredible. The présent 
English law, contained in the Contempt of Court Act 1981 appears to have gone too far. It allows 
the déferrai, or even outright prévention, of discussions that often involve matters of great and 
pressing importance. 
Oficial Secrecy 
While the State exists, it will continue to have secrets in need of protection. At présent, there are 
many things that ought not to be made public. For example, a newspaper editor might take it into 
his mind to discover and publish the names and addresses of informers against the various 
Northern Irish terrorist groups. The conséquences of this are so easily predictable, that to do it 
would be almost to commit murder. The civil damages payable in any action for breach of 
confidence would be grossly inappropriate. For this reason, then, some law of officiai secrecy has 
a proper function. 
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But this is not to endorse any law so wide as the British Official Secrets Act 1911. now repealed, 
or its present successor, which remains largely a means of protecting governments from public 
ridicule or execration. It must in each prosecution be made clear to the court what must be 
protected and why. It must be for the courts to decide what ought to remain secret, not a 
government minister. 
Article III 
The wording of Article III is derived from the Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution, 
and supplies a deficiency already noted in the wording of the European Convention. Its purpose 
is to confer a procedural right not generally recognised in most Community countries, and to 
preserve one currently under attack in our own country. 
Under section 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987, the Serious Fraud Office was set up. Section 
2 allows this body to require a person under investigation for serious or complex fraud, or any 
person who is reasonably thought to have information relevant to such a fraud, to attend before 
it and answer questions or furnish other information. Anyone who fails to comply commits an 
offence. Though statements made under compulsion can be used only to contradict other 
statements made later by the defence in court, documents surrendered can be used by the 
prosecution for such purposes as it may think fit. The writers of the standard commentary on this 
Act are driven to say: "Thus significant inroads are made on the privilege against 
self-incrimination and the maxim that 'no one shall be required to be his own betrayer".218 
Article IV 
The wording of Article IV is copied directly from the Eighth Amendment to the American 
Constitution, which is copied in turn from our own Bill of Rights of 1689. Its function is to 
prevent any clever manipulation of the law into a weapon of persecution. Just such a 
- I K Emmins and Scanlan, The Criminal Justice Act ¡988. Sweel and Maxwell. London, 1988, p. 6. 
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manipulation was made by the English Judges following the accession of James II in 1685. While 
still Duke of York, James had begun civil proceedings for defamatory words against the 
unspeakable Titus Oates; and the Jury had awarded the fabulous sum of £100,000 - in our own 
debased currency about £8 million. Unable to pay. he was committed to prison for debt. As soon 
as the new reign began, he was unlawfully put in chains. He was then brought to trial for several 
perjuries, or which he was notoriously guilty. He was convicted. Now, while he had perjured 
several lives away, his crime in English law ranked only as a misdemeanour. He was liable to be 
burned on the hand and fined. But he was sentenced to be stripped of his clerical habit, to be 
pilloried, and to be whipped from Aldgate to Newgate then back again. If he survived this, he 
was to be imprisoned for life and pilloried five times every year in various places about London. 
It was to prevent abuses of this kind that Parliament in the next reign first enacted the Clause. 
The American colonists retained it. We do likewise. 
Article V 
Except for the dropping of a few capital letters, the wording of Article V is copied directly from 
the Fourth Amendment to the American Constitution. It is a codification of the English common 
law as stated in the various cases connected with John Wilkes. In the most famous of these, 
Entick, a printer, had sued two officials for having broken into his house and seized his papers. 
They pleaded in defence a warrant signed by one of the Secretaries of State. The warrant was 
extremely vague and appeared to sanction what is called a "fishing expedition": The Government 
wanted to prosecute Entick, but first had to find enough evidence to support a prosecution. 
Passing judgment, Lord Chief Justice Camden of the Common Pleas declared the warrant 
unlawful, in that is was permitted neither by the common law nor by statute.219 For the next 170 
years, general searches and seizures were to remain illegal in this country. 
But, since their first staturory authorisation, in the Public Order Act 1936, they have become 
219 Entick v Carringion, ( 1765) 19 State Trials 1030. 
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increasingly common and accepted. The current law is stated in section 19 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984: 
(1) The Powers conferred by subsections (2). (3) and (4) below are 
exercisable by a Constable who is on any premises. 
(2) The Constable may seize anything which is on the premises if he has 
reasonable grounds for believing -
(a) that it has been obtained in consequence of of the commission of an 
offence; and 
(b) that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent it being concealed, 
lost, damaged, altered or destroyed.... 
(3) The Constable may seize anything which is on the premises if he has 
reasonable grounds for believing -
(a) that it is evidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating, 
or any other offence; and 
(b) that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent it being concealed, 
lost, damaged, altered or destroyed.... 
(5) the powers conferred by this section are in addition to any powers 
otherwise conferred. 
The whole section justifies seizure without warrant. The italicised clause justifies the seizure of 
material not specified in any warrant even if one is taken out. French and German law is no more 
restrictive in this sense than our own. If people really are to be secure in their persons and 
properties, they must have a proper written safeguard such as our Article V. 
Article VI 
The only member state of the Community particularly lax in respect of Article VI is Greece. This, 
of course, is reason enough for its inclusion. It will also be needed for the Eastern countries, 
which, despite the best will in the world, will have police forces trained under the Old Regime, 
People are not to be held uncharged in custody without proper cause. Nor are they to be tortured. 
Nothing further ought to be said on this matter. A European Bil l of Rights is not the place for 
elaborating a code of procedure. Each legal system in the Community has its own notion of what 
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is an unreasonable length of détention. It will be for the European Court to décide whether each 
of thèse notions is generally acceptable. 
Article VII 
It is to be regretted that every member state of the Community has a law of compulsory purchase; 
and that none is likely in the foreseeable future to put an end to it. But this must be accepted. 
Rather than try abolishing a power that will be fiercely defended, it seems much better to regulate 
it. 
Article VIII 
The Community is to be a free trade area. Already, the Continental member states are removing 
all the fences and other controls at their mutual borders. The French and Italian border is now 
marked by nothing more physically impeding than the brass meridian strip at Greenwich. The 
clear intention is the removal of ail other impediments. Article VIII confirms this, condensing 
the relevant Articles of the Treaty of Rome. It is to be noticed here that whatever may lawfully 
be made or sold in any one of the member states of the Community must be accepted into ail the 
other member states. The purpose of this is to standardise the laws of the Community in line with 
those of the most liberal member state. 
Articles IX and X 
Articles IX and X simply close any loophole not closed by Article Every person in the 
Community is so far as possible to be equal before the law. 
Article XI 
The purpose of Article XI is make it explicit that the Community law of which this Bill of Rights 
is proposed to be a part shall apply throughout every member state of the Community. As has 
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already been expfained, it does apply in this country, and the means are in place by which it may 
be invoked. An aggrieved person applies to the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of 
Justice for a judicial review of executive action, citing the relevant Community law. At présent, 
except where injunctions against the Crown are concemed, the matter is referred to the European 
Court in Luxemburg for a preliminary ruling. With each ruling, however, the need for future 
referrals diminishes; and the day will come when the whole body of Community law is routinely 
applied in our own courts. But it would help if the need for any future referrals - since they are 
immensely expensive - could be eliminated. It would help also if the new member states to be 
admitted from the East were to have the obligation clearly imposed on them to make every 
remedy contained in Community law immediatety available to their subjects. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
It should not be supposed that the adoption of this draft Bill of Rights or any other would produce 
an absolute equality of rights throughout the Community. It would not. The two kinds of legal 
system established in the member states differ not only in their incidentals but also in some of 
their essentials. In England, Scotland and the two Irelands, the common law is established. 
Throughout the rest of the Community, the Napoleonic Code is either established or followed 
more or less closely. The common law permits the granting of injunctions and civil 
imprisonment. Continental law does not. Continental law makes an absolute distinction between 
public and private law. The common law, for all its récent development of judicial review, 
remains a unified System that makes a dwindling number of distinctions between private persons 
and the public authorities. One practical effect of this différence is that while in the common law 
countries, every officiai must act within the law under pain of personal liability, in the code 
countries officiais may do largely as they please, subject only to an obligation on the State to 
make compensation. It has already been said that the notion of what is reasonable will differ 
among the various member states. It is highly likely - if to a smaller extent that now - that what 
is legal in Germany will remain illegal in Great Britain and vice versa. The only means by which 
uniformity could be ensured would be to destroy each national System of law and impose a 
common model in its place. This neither will nor ought to be done. 
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In spite of this, the opportunity is presently before us to make a new Europe, of unrivalled 
freedom and prosperity, in which the old hatreds will have truly vanished, in which the unique 
potential of our common civilisation will be fully realised. We have only to follow where 
Margaret Thatcher has led. 
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The Right To Smoke: 
A Christian View 
by Sean Gabb 
15,515 words 
First published by the 
Freedom Organisation for the Right 
to Enjoy Smoking Tobacco (FOREST), 
London, 1989, 
ISBN: 1 871833 05 1 
If the trumpet give an uncertain Sound, who shall prépare himself to the battle? 
(1 Cor., 14:8) 
Introduction 
I do not wish to deny that there are health hazards associated with smoking - just as there are 
health hazards associated with virtually all activities people find pleasurable, from drinking to 
jogg^g. 
Around two fifths of the adult British population do smoke. This has been a declining fraction 
of the whole during the past thirty five years, or ever since the first hard évidence of the likely 
risks to health were published. In 1970, 128 million cigarettes were smoked here. By 1984, this 
figure had fallen by 22 per cent, to 99 million. 2 2 0 9 9 million cigarettes, even so is still enough 
M. A. Plant, Drugs in Perspective, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1987, p. 66. 
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laid end to end to stretch between New York and Babylon. Two fifths of the adult population 
is still around 18 million people. 
Not surprisingly, then, smoking and tobacco are a public issue of considerable importance. Its 
importance has grown in recent years with each new revelation of the dangers involved. Some 
part of this, to be sure, has to do with the possibility that non-smokers might be at risk from 
inhaling the allegedly carcinogenic fumes of others' cigarettes. But, in the absence of anything 
approaching definite proof, talk of 'passive smoking' must be thought for the moment of 
secondary value. Easily the largest part of the issue concerns the degree to which smokers should 
be allowed to harm themselves. What debate, therefore, is currently taking place may be seen 
as a specific skirmish in a more general struggle. This struggle is between the advocates of 
authority and the advocates of freedom. On the one side, there are the British Medical 
Association, representing the doctors, and the small pressure group, Action on Smoking and 
Health, representing itself. These want, if not the outright prohibition of tobacco, then certainly 
very severe restrictions on its consumption. This involves, at the least, tight controls on the 
advertising of tobacco products, and progressively heavier taxation of them. Their propaganda 
ranges from the solidly factual to the absurd. Sometimes pictures are handed round, showing the 
effect of tar on the average pair of lungs. Occasionally, someone like the anti-smoking expert. 
M . A. H. Russell, goes about proclaiming such arrant nonsense as that "[o]nIy about 15 per cent 
of those who have more than one cigarette avoid becoming regular smokers."221 On the other 
side is an as yet loose coalition of committed smokers and libertarians. The interest of these first 
is evident. They enjoy their habit, and resent any threat to their right to go on doing so. The 
members of the second may or may not themselves enjoy smoking. What moves them is a 
passionate belief that no one should be forced to do what others regard as in his or her best 
interest. Following John Stuart Mi l l , they assert that "[o]ver himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual is sovereign."223 
2 2 1 M. A. H. Russell in 1971, quoted in Heather Ashton and Rob Stepney. Smoking: Psychology and Pharmacology, 
Tavistock Publications, London, 1983, p. 140. 
2 2 2 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 'Everyman1 Edition, .1. M Dent & Sons Ltd., London, 1977, p. 73. 
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As yet, the political parties are largely unaligned in the debaîe. True, the Labour Party inclines 
to the anti-smoking lobby. It is on record as having proposed bans on cigarette advertising save 
at the point of sale,323 and on the placing of cigarette vending machines.224 But the Conservatives 
cannot be regarded as inclining to the other side. It was Sir George Young, then a junior health 
minister in the first Thatcher Government who said in 1980 that "[t]he traditional rôle of 
politicians has been to prevent an individual causing harm to another, but to allow him to do 
harm to himself However, as modem society has made us ail more interdependent. this attitude 
is now changing."225 Young was moved elsewhere very shortly after. But the Government still 
spends about 3.5 million per year on anti-smoking campaigns. It still pressures the tobacco 
companies into further 'voluntary' restrictions on their advertising and promotion. My own 
suspicion is that its continuing tolérance of the industry owes less to the ideas of J. S. Mi l l than 
to the £5,000 million or thereabouts raised each year from taxes on tobacco products. 
This is, however, beside my current point. What I propose here to discuss is whether there can 
be any specifically Christian view of the matters raised above. There are Christians who also 
have decided views on smoking. A couple of years ago, for example, what the newspapers 
described as "two hundred church and Community groups" joined in calling on the Government 
for a significant increase in tobacco duties.226 Again, it would be incredible if, of the eighteen 
million Britons who smoke, none was additionally a devout churchgoer. But, in both thèse cases 
- and especially in the former, judging from its context - the taking of sides in the argument has 
not been connected with any fundamental point of theology. Rather. it has been an instance of 
what Edward Norman calls the "politicization" of religion. 2 2 7 It shows the adoption by 
churchmen of whatever political ideology may currently be the gênerai fashion, and its being 
213 The Times, London 3rd April 1986. 
124 The Times, London, 12th July 1986. 
2 1 i Quoted in Ashton and Stcpney, op. cit., p. 144. 
H* The Times, London. 27th January 1986. 
2 2 7 Edward Norman, Christianity and the World Order (being the BBC Reith Lectures for 1978), Oxford University 
Press, 1979, p. 2. I do not, in this essay, adopt Dr Nomian's position, which is that there is no political ideology inhérent in the 
doctrines of Christianity. But I do admire the force and clarity with which he exposes the pretcnsions of today:s political clerics. 
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given a religious gloss subsequently. Arguments purely over the extent of individual harm or the 
nature of individual rights in society are secular matters. They can nave no validity to a 
Christian, deliberating as such, unless they can be first connected with some precept of the 
Divine Law. Before any answer can be attempted, our proper objeets of enquiry must be stated. 
These are: whether smoking tobáceo is contrary to this Law, and, if so, whether there is any 
implied right or obligation to use the coercive power of the State against smokers. Since thèse 
are largely subsumed in the wider question, of what scheme of human politics is most compatible 
with the Divine Law, this also ought to be examined. But first to be discussed is smoking as a 
matter in isolation. With this I shall begin - though not until I have dealt with a number of 
preliminary issues which I feel it my duty not to avoid. For, addressing myself as I am to an 
audience which is, at least in part, hostile or indifferent to Christianity, I must first answer the 
inevitable question in reply to my own - of whether it matters what God is supposed to think 
about smoking; or, more generally, of what religion has, in the modern world, to do with politics 
and morality. Many atheists do ask this, and seem to think it a clever question. It has two 
ans wers. 
I Religion, Politics and Morality 
The first is simple and obvious. Sacred and secular matters always have been connected in the 
popular mind, and probably always will be. And, sad though perhaps it is to mention, the history 
of Christianity has been, to an extent uncommon even with religion, a history of persécution. Its 
first legal récognition came in the year 313, with the Edict of Constantine. This was a grant of 
toleration, on a basis of complete equality with every other faith in the Roman Empire. It was 
not enough. The Christians were a minority, but they had the Imperial family as converts. Their 
bishops were both able and eager to influence the direction of State policy in religious affairs. 
Eighty three years later came the Edict of Theodosius, suppressing the Pagan cérémonies. The 
performance of rites which had come down in unbroken séquence since before the time of 
Homer, and which formed the agreed basis of classical civilisation, was made a capital offence: 
and the laws were rigorously enforced. It was not until the year 529 that the Athenian schools 
of philosophy were closed by the Emperor Justinian. But Paganism by then had been effectively 
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dead for generations. Its wiping out remains a very impressive achievement. 
Then there were the heretics - or those rival Christians who in any doctrinal argument had the 
weakest forcé of arms. Few people seem greatly worried today whether Christ is homoousios or 
homoiousios; whether his substance is identical to that of the Father, or merely similar to it. 
Those Christians in the fourth century who spoke only Latin were somewhat perplexed, since the 
two Greek words both translated as consubstantialis. But, in the eastern half of the Empire, it 
was a question of the highest importance. Street mobs fought pitched battles over its correct 
resolution. Bishops kicked each other to death. So far from its eventual subsiding, further 
questions carne to depend on it. If Christ were homoousios, had he two natures, or one, or two 
and one? If he had the two and one, might he still have only one directing will? The Arian and 
Monophysite and Monothelite controversies together continued during more than three centuries, 
blasting the Uves and happiness of millions. 
As a regular issue, heresy became prominent in Western Christianity only with the revival of 
learning. But the struggle, when it carne, was even more frantic than it had been in the east. One 
of the minor controversies in early Bysantium had concerned whether the body of Christ were 
incorruptible. In early modern Europe, the greatest one concerned whether, or to what extent, 
it might be edible. The wars of religión, fought ostensibly to settle this point, lasted more than 
a century, ending only in 1648. The internal persecutions died out only in the century following 
this. The point had not been settled. What happened was that the educated classes for the most 
part found other interests. Toleration was, at first, the child not of agreement, ñor of mutual 
charity, but of indifference. 
An obvious reply to this, of course, is that the spirit of persecution is now almost entirely alien 
to Christianity. So, in doctrinal matters, it is. To a Catholic, Protestants are no longer damnable 
heretics. Since the Second Vatican Council, it has been felt more appropriate to cali them 
"separated brethren". Few Protestant leaders have appeared unwilling lately to be photographed 
beside the Pope. No respectable divine now blames the Jews for having killed Christ. Moslems 
and Hindus are invited to ecumenical services, and are even welcomed when they occasíonally 
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tum up. This flabby syncretism may have done much for the public order. It has certainly been 
carried to an extent embarrassing to the more thoughtful Christians. If He can be approached by 
other paths, which are equally valid. why should God have sent His only begotten Son to be 
scourged half to death and then nailed to a cross? If the Hindu can have a thousand gods, what 
vvas so bad about the Classical Panthéon? Doctrinal persécution is certainly alien to the larger 
of the modem churches. But this kind of it is only the more noticeable - because, since the 
Enlightenment, the more shocking - half of what Christianity has been taken as standing for. 
The gênerai case for persécution was most clearly stated by Ambrose, Archbishop of Milan in 
the fourth century. To have - or to be able to acquire - the means of suppressing what is 
abominable to God, and not to use them, he told the Emperor, is to partake of its guilt.2 2 8 
Evidently, this applies in any dispute as to the nature of Christ. It applies equally with regard to 
observing his moral teachings, apparent or inferred. Following from this second conclusion, 
politics, already subordinated to religion, becomes wholly fused with it. For example, in the 
Pagan Empire, divorce was easy; suicide carried little reproach; homosexuality was variously 
honoured or ignored. Each is said to be a sin. In Christian Europe, each was at least discouraged 
by law. And, if they have explicitly rejected the ftrst conclusion, most Christians continue to 
argue and behave as though they still accepted the second. Few seem willing to disclaim the 
right to impose their moral code on others. Perhaps the Hierarchy in Catholic Ireland might 
never dream of trying to hold an auto da fé in Phoenix Park. It has. nevertheless, opposed every 
effort made to légalise birth control. The Church of England hires its buildings out for every 
purpose, from revivalist baptisms to Rastafarian pot parties. Some of its ministers have even 
tried giving religious sanctuary to a Trotskyite atheist. When the question arose, of letting the 
shops open on Sundays, it took up the fu.ll jargon of the Oxford Movement, and proclaimed 
England still to be a "Christian country". 
If, then, a Christian of the above kind could be persuaded that smoking were in some respect 
sinful, he would be logically obliged to advocate measures against it. He would be obliged to 
u x Sec Edward Gibbon, History of the Décline and Fal l of the Roman Empire (1776-87), 'Everyman' Edition, J. M. 
Dent and Sons, London, 1962, vol. 3, p. 119 (or, in any édition, the first paragraph of chapter XXVII). 
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become more extremely and fanatically intolerant on the issue than Action on Smoking and 
Health and the British Medical Association combined. The secular case against tobacco is that 
it leads to illness. More or less its grimmest claim is that 'patients vvho ultimately die from 
chronic bronchitis or emphysema usually endure about ten years of distressing breathlessness 
before they die'. 2 2 9 This is sad. What is it, though, compared with the sufferings of the damned 
- in that place 'where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched'?230 This is what may 
lie in wait, either for the sinful smoker, or for the undutiful brother in Christ who left him 
unsupported in his weakness. 
II Is Smoking Sinful? 
Anyone finding this unlikely might care to note that smoking actualiy has in the past been 
regarded as sinful. In the seventeenth Century, Catholics were threatened with excommunication 
if caught pipe in hand. In Calvin's Geneva, it was not only banned, but the ban was placed 
among the Ten Commandments. The secular arm gave its usual support. German smokers faced 
the death penalty until the end of the Century. In France, Louis XIII, though not so drastic, still 
tried forbidding the use of tobacco except by medical prescription. 
If smoking really were a sin, and the advocacy of persécution were a requirement of the Faith, 
then persécution is what the true believer must, in all conscience, advocate. And this is one 
reason why our présent enquiry is an entirely proper one. It might teil the non-believer what to 
expect should Christianity ever become less languidly militant than it admittedly now for the 
most part is, even in those matters on which it continues to claim a special authority. Or it might 
furnish him with useful arguments. But, as justifications go, it is highly contingent. Ten or 
twenty years ago, when religion seemed on the whole to be a declining force in human affairs, 
it would have been less useful than it is today, when the reverse may be true. In ten or twenty 
years time, it may be of no account whatever, or of buming importance. 
2 3 U Warning tnade in 1971 by the Royal College ol'Physicians; quotcd Whitaker, op. cit., p. 147. 
1 3 0 Mark, 9:44 (repeated 9:46). 
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The second justification is not at ail contingent for the average non-believer. He may laugh at 
religion. He may give deliberate offence to others, by calling it a superstitious frenzy or a device 
for keeping people quiet. Even so, his entire philosophical outlook requires a religious 
foundation. This religion need not absolutely be Christianity. But it must be soniething very 
similar to it. For, without God, there is no morality. I could try supporting this simply by giving 
a short history of the présent Century. Christ had more than trees in mind when saying "by their 
fruits ye shall know them :".2jl But I will adopt a more rigorous proof. 
III The Nature of Morality 
Whatever I feel I know directly. What you feel I can know only by guessing from your outward 
appearance. Given sufficient power of will, you could hide your last agony from me. Even made 
aware of this, I should feel only sympathy for you. This is a sentiment stronger in some of us 
than in others; and it dépends in ail of us on the attending circumstances. Imagine, then, that I 
am bigger than you, and have lured you to a place where 1 feel secure of there being no witnesses. 
Assuming that the act, or its conséquences, gave me enough pleasure to overbear whatever 
feelings of sympathy I might harbour, State one reason why I should not eut your throat. 
You might say that it would be wrong. But this is no final answer. 1 ask what is meant by the 
words 'righf and 'wrong'. Broadly speaking, there are in secular moral philosophy two modes 
of justifying the use of thèse words. 
According to the first, they are terms of shorthand, applied to actions or rules of conduet, in so 
far as thèse are believed useful to the welfare - however this be defined - of a certain group. To 
the main sort of utilitarian, my cutting your throat, leaving aside any distress caused to you, might 
serve as a précèdent to other acts of murder. Indeed it might. It might also be that if life and 
property were held in less gênerai respect than they are, there would be much less of both. Were 
the common good my standard for measuring conduct, killing you would certainly be wrong. 1 
2 n Matt.. 8:20. 
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am not talking generally, though, but about me. If it should stand between me and what I want, 
I see no reason for not ignoring the common good. You might tell me that doing so is in my 
'real' interest; that my setting a bad example raises my own chances of being murdered. None 
of this touches me. 1 am the best judge of what is good for me. If I compare all the advantages. 
présent and remote, of killing you. with the small chance that the finding of your body might 
encourage some stranger to knock me on the head. and they remain positive, I still see no reason 
to put the knife away. As a theory of what the laws should be, utilitarianism is wonderfully 
convincing. For an individual's moral obligation to obey them, it gives no basis whatever. 
You might tum, then, to the second of the two modes. According to this, right and wrong are the 
opposing extremes on a scale of values, the existence of which latter may be deduced from 
observing the order and harmony of the material world. Every existing thing is said to have its 
own natural function. The function of man is to live as a rational being. In other words, my 
harming you would be a breach of the 'natural law', and a violation of your rights under it. I 
could as easily quote Aristotle or Aquinas on this point. Instead. I go to Ayn Rand: 'Rights are 
conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival. If man is to live on 
earth, it is right for him to use his mind, it is right to work for his own values and to keep the 
product of his work. If life on earth is his purpose, he has a right to live as a rational being: 
nature forbids him the irrational.'202 If you could harangue me on this lofty thème, for long 
enough, and with enough éloquence, you might, perhaps, make my heart bleed, and thereby have 
me put the knife away. But you might do this just as well by describing the tears of an imaginary 
wife and a few children. Utilitarian arguments are valid, even if less widely than those putting 
them often claim. This sort of natural rights argument is simply absurd. 
In the first place, since Rand was an atheist, the words natural law as used by her are 
meaningless. They are what Roscelin is said to have called a flatus uoeis - or, to translate him 
crudely, a verbal fart. A law can be one of two things. It can be a command, to disobeying which 
a penalty is attached. It can be a statement of what is seen invariably to happen. The words ' i f 
2 3 2 Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, quoted in Ayn Rand ei ai, Capitalisai: The Unknown Ideal, New American Library. 
New York, 1967, p. 323 (her italics). 
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a man lie with a beast, he shall surely be put to death: and ye shall slay the beast'233 constitute a 
law. The words 'a projectile having an escape velocity of less than seven miles per second 
cannot be sent beyond this planet's gravitational field' constitute a law. The words 'cutting mv 
throat would be a violation of natural law' constitute ten words. I expect no punishment if I kill 
you. I expect no difficulty in killing you. 
In the second place, the whole natural law tradition, atheist or religious, is based on a détective 
epistemology. It begins with Aristotle. He claimed not only that "the beginning of our 
knowledge lies in the sensés", but also that what we perceive with them is an objectively existent 
reality. To the left of my wordprocessor keyboard, I see a cup of coffee. Let me confirm this 
with a few basic tests, and, in Aristotelian terms, I have reason to believe that this object exists, 
and will continue in existence whether I look away, or leave the room, or drop dead.234 
Following this view of sensory perception, Aquinas went so far as to assert that, while the highest 
knowledge cornes from God alone, "there are some truths which the natural reason also is able 
to reach, such as that God exists."235 Ayn Rand, though she never formulated anything so 
brilliant as the five empirical 'proofs' by which Aquinas sought to show this, was no less 
ambitious. From her belief in an objectively existent reality, she claimed to dérive an objectively 
binding moral theory.236 While arriving at radically différent conclusions, the Marxists begin 
with the same presumption. To them, at least some people are able to know what reality is. 
Nearly every other rationalist scheme is similarly based. 
Yet it should be obvious that no conclusion is ever more secure than the premises on which it 
rests. Imagine that I land on a désert island and, coming across a bone, say "I think this may be 
2 i - Lev.. 20:15. 
m Aristotle. Metaphysics I. 1, and Posterior Analytics 11, 15, et passim. 
2 3 5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. 1, cap. iii. Al! translations from this work are my own. Thosc from 
the Summa Theologice are either compared with those of the Dominican Falhers or are folio wed entirely. As for this rationalist 
claim, it is still formally upheld by the Roman Catholic Church. Sec H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum. 1806: "Ifanyone 
shall deny that the one and true God our creator and Lord can be known through the création by the natural light of human reason 
let him be anathema." 
2 3 6 For the clearest and longest development of Rand's epistemology, see David Kellcy, The Evidence of the Sensés: 
A Realist Theory of Perception, Louisiana State Univcrsity Press, 1986. 
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part of a human skeleton. Therefore civilised men once lived here". My argument would be 
invalid. For the same reason, so are those of the rational moralists. To see this as clearly as 
possible, let us State the premises of their argument. These are that we perceive things as they 
really are, and that we use our reason to understand their nature. Let us take them in reverse 
order. 
What allows us to make sensé of the external world is the notion of cause and effect. Believing 
that event A is the cause of event B is our means of explaining or predicting the one from 
observing the other. I wake and measure the température outside. It is five degrees Centigrade. 
I see a thick frost on the ground that was not there the previous night. I believe the cause of frost 
to be sub-zero températures. Therefore. the température in the intervening time has been lower 
than it is now. Likewise, I measure the outside température at midnight. It is minus five degrees. 
I anticipate frost in the morning. Everyone uses this kind of reasoning. Yet it has itself no 
rational basis. 
I paraphrase David Hume. One billiard ball that is in motion strikes another that is at rest. The 
first loses its motion. The second acquires one. If we examine thèse events, we reach three 
conclusions. First, they occur in a particular order of time. One ball is in motion before the 
collision, the other one after it. Second, the balls touch for their changes of behaviour to occur. 
Third, if we recall every previous like situation known to us, events have always proceeded in 
a like manner. Beyond this, we see nothing eise. When we talk about the communication of 
force, we are not describing anything that we have seen, but only a collision of billiard balls. Nor 
are we stating a logical necessity. Anyone never having seen such a collision, or anything 
analogous to it, could just as easily imagine the two balls stopping or bouncing back from each 
other. Force is an inference from the constant conjunction of thèse events, not an explanation 
of it. If we predict their continued subséquent juncture, we are assuming that the future will be 
like the past - an assumption which, by its nature, we cannot prove. I now quote Hume: "[Tjhere 
is nothing in any object, consider'd in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a 
conclusion beyond it; ... even after the observation of the fréquent or constant conjunction of 
objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which 
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we have had experience."237 What inferences we do draw are the product of an habitual 
association of ideas, rather than the conclusions of our reason. 
This said on the relationship of objects to each other, I turn to their existence. I think again about 
my cup of coffee. What do I know about it? If I wish, I can make myself see a pattern of colours. 
I can feel a warm, smooth solidity. I can smell something. I can taste a pleasant bitterness. At 
no point do I ever perceive a cup of coffee. I experience sensations of one. This is not playing 
with words. Sensations are separable from objects, and, so, are not necessarily dependent on 
them. When asleep, I have known very satisfactory cups of coffee without one ever having been 
'really there'. It is easily conceivable that the whole universe is no less a figment of my 
imagination. If a sceptic never acts on this doubt, it is because the habit of believing in reality 
was securely fixed before he could begin reasoning about it. 
Finally, there is the matter of whether the self can be proven to exist. It might be thought, 
following Descartes, that the assertion "I think, therefore I am" is "so certain and so assured that 
all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking 
it." The syllogism cannot be false. If it were, I should be mistaken; and, to be mistaken, I must 
still exist.2 3 8 That it is true I can scarcely deny. But it is only true at the moment of its 
conception. I exist now. I have no proof that I existed yesterday. In the film Blade Runner, one 
of the characters believes that she is a real person, and that she has memories extending back 
about thirty years. In fact, she is an android, at most a few months old. The memories were 
programmed in by her maker. I have no assurance that I am any different; that, when I woke this 
morning, I had not just been brought into being complete with memories of a past existence. For 
that matter, I have no assurance that I was not brought into being an hour ago, or five minutes 
ago, or one second ago - or at any moment prior to the one of which I am immediately aware. 
Memory can be tampered with. Also, the future is entirely unknown and unknowable. I have 
no more certainty that I shall still exist then than that I existed in the past. In just what 'the 
" 7 David Hume, A Treatise of Hitman Nature (1739), Book i, Part III, section xii. 
" K René Descartes - Discours sur la Méthode (1637), part four. See also Augustine (354-430) - De Ciuitate Dei, Lib. 
XII, c. 26: Si fallor sum. 
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présent' consists no one understands. It may be an irreducible but definite particle of time. It 
may be an infinitely fine division between past and future. In either case, rational knowledge of 
personal existence is far less certain than it may at first seem. 
IV The Limits of Reason and Scepticism 
"Which of you" said Christ, "by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?"239 Which 
of us indeed? For ail the claims made on its behalf, reason, by itself, tells us nothing about the 
world. Aware of this. we are free to choose two courses. The first is to retreat into absolute or 
moderated scepticism. We can take the mental habits referred to above as our sole guide, and 
not worry about their lack of rational basis. We can carry on talking about morality, and 
sometimes even half believe ourselves - but only in so far as we wish to influence the behaviour 
of others who still believe the concept to have any clear meaning. Otherwise, we can accept that 
God exists. and that questions about His purpose in having placed us here are entirely proper. 
I should stress that I am not proving His existence in any gênerai way. I am simply asserting its 
logical necessity for certain kinds of thinking. If we want to use the words 'right' and 'wrong' 
and 'rights' and 'nature', and want them to mean anything, we must understand that reason is not 
a self-contained entity, but a méditation on faith. It need on this account be no less powerful, nor 
usually any less deadly against credulous stupidy. It must nevertheless, be considered as a strictly 
secondary force. Credo ut intellegam, said Anselm - "I believe so that I may understand."240 
V Fundamcntals of Christian Thcism 
Let us, then state what it is necessary for us to believe before we can hope to understand. In 
doing this, we also state the minimal assumptions of Christian theism: 
First, there is a God, who is the suprême, benevolent Governor of the universe. 
!3" Matt.. 6:27. 
1 4 0 Anselm (1033-1109), Proslogion, cap. 1. 
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Second, He has established a code of morality, and dispenses punishments and rewards according 
to how we conform to it. 
Whether or not either of thèse is true - or, if true, can be proven - is presently of no account. A 
Christian is defined by adhérence to them. They underpin the thought of neariy everyone eise. 
From the first, we deduce the existence of an orderly external world, and of ourselves within it 
through time. Being Suprême, God can be "the Maker and Préserver of ail things, both visible 
and invisible".241 Being benevolent, He is that Maker and Préserver. Otherwise, there must be 
a chance of my being a deluded spark of instantaneity, and everything eise, including you, 
nothing at ail. This would be incompatible with the Divine Nature as stated. From the second, 
we dérive both an absolute morality and a firm reason for keeping to it. 
VI Natural Law and Morality 
Furthermore, the existence of the world having been shown a necessary conséquence of the first 
assumption, it seems reasonable to suppose that the various articles of this morality might be 
revealed to us, not merely by the directly inspired Word of God, but also by the fundamental 
nature of His Création. We can seek guidance from Paul's Letter to the Romans - "Thou shalt 
not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, 
Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this 
saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."242 Or, although our paths of reasoning 
merge only after having sprung from différent sources, we are perhaps able now to agrée with 
Aquinas that 
there is in man a first, innate inclination to good, which he shares with everything 
so far as it desires the maintenance of its existence according to its own nature. 
Through this, the natural law pertains to ail that serves the continuation of human 
life and ail that impedes death. Second, he is inclined to certain more specific 
ends according to the nature which he shares with the other animais. Those ends 
2 4 1 From the First of the 39 Articles of Religion to which ail Anglicans are supposée! to assent. 
2 4 2 Rom.. 13:9. 
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are termed part of the natural law 'which Nature has taught ail animais' - such as 
the attraction of the sexes, and rearing of children, and like things. Third, he is 
inclined to good according to his rational nature, which nature is proper to man 
alone. So he is inclined by nature to seek knowledge of God, and to live in 
society. Under the heading of natural law come all acts pertaining to this 
inclination - chiefly that he should avoid ignorance, and be honest in his dealings, 
and all other such actions.243 
VII Reason and Révélation 
These both might seem on first glance very différent approaches to morality. But the first 
premise of our current scheme of arguing is that there is a fundamental harmony of reason and 
révélation. According to Aquinas, the specific nature of man is to use his mind, and to observe 
a morality which is rationally deducible by a process of observation. It is with regard to his 
reason that man is distinct as a species from the other animais. This is no necessary déniai of 
those parts of his nature which are generic to him and all other things, in so far as thèse are 
required for his sustenance as a moral individual, or to the propagation of his species. According 
to Paul, we are obliged as God's créatures to a certain course of action. Some aspects of this he 
states explicitly. Others he leaves to our own fmding, having indicated a method of finding them. 
It is evident that, if we are to follow this course, we must do whatever is conducive to following 
it most effectively. This surely means that, unless directed otherwise by our primary purpose as 
moral beings, we are to seek the continuation of our lives. Therefore, by whichever of the ways 
we care to proceed, there is no contradiction of the other. According to either, an act can be 
sinful in itself - directly against God or against nature - or, though apparently indifferent in itself, 
connected by association with whatever sin to which it might tend. To return to the example 
given above, my cutting of your throat for pleasure or gain would be a contravention both of 
Paul's injunction against killing, and of our natural requirement to be honest in our dealings with 
others. My merely producing the knife, on the otherhand, would be indifferent or sinful 
depending on what use for the thing I had in mind. 
Î 4 J Thomas Aquinas ( 1226-74), Summa Theotogice, I-II, 94, 2. The cmbcddcd quotalion, Qua natura omnia animalia 
docuit, is unidentificd in my lexl. 
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Al l which having been said, we move to an examination of the first part of our question posed 
initially - namely, of those ways in which smoking might be held contrary to nature, or to the 
otherwise known will of God, and therefore in both cases sinful. 
VIII Smoking and Natural Law 
Now, if there is any fact about smoking more certain than its dangers, it is that people find it 
enjoyable. Its very dangers, indeed, are testimony to its pleasures. Smoking kills, people are 
told; and they continue to smoke, even if in diminishing numbers. I recognise that I am 
discussing pleasures which I have never experienced, and which no person who has seems able 
to describe to me. But I am quite sure that they exist. Anyone who makes it his business to go 
about denying this is an unimaginitive fool. Tobacco has many pleasant effects, and their type 
and degree is oddly contingent on what they are wanted to be. It can soothe the nerves after they 
have been strained. It can steady them when some particular act of judgment or resolve is called 
for. It makes the company of friends more cheerful. It makes up for lack of company. Smoking 
can be very enjoyable. 
It is, moreover, the most universal of those pleasures which we do not also share with the 
animals. Just when and by what means the American Indians discovered to what use the cured 
leaf of the plant nicotiana tabacum could be put is unknown. But its use was the one Indian 
custom which the conquering Spaniards not only never tried suppressing, but actually themselves 
adopted. Once revealed to the world, it spread within a few decades to every part of humanity 
not absolutely shut away from foreign trade. Tobacco was smoked in England and in Spain, in 
Mecca and in Rome, in Russia, in China, in Japan. Peoples utterly dissimilar in every other 
respect of manners had tobacco smoking in common. No kind of religious observance, nor 
eating bread, nor drinking alcohol, were so widespread. Even in those times and places until 
recently where smoking was difficult or unfashionable, tobacco was instead chewed or ground 
up and sniffed. Use of the plant has been no passing craze. It is no custom, like eating 
hamburgers or wearing jeans, which has been associated with any particular way of life, and is 
often embraced or rejected as part of that greater whole. It is a pleasure common to the whole 
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of mankind. No one who identifies pleasure with sin could ever fail to notice it. And that there 
have been, and still are, Christians who believe in this identity is undeniable. 
IX Pleasure and Sin: The Christian Case Against Puritanism 
While there had been a small ascetic movement throughout the first three Christian centuries, it 
had its real beginning and most spectacular phase in the period following the conversion of the 
Roman Empire. Their faith no longer persecuted - and soon, indeed, became a condition for 
public advancement - the more severe Christians began withdrawing in great numbers into the 
Syrian and Egyptian déserts. They saw the pleasures and conveniences of city life as so many 
snares of the Devil. Their belief was that, the greater the misery they could suffer on earth, the 
more certain and the sweeter their bliss would be in Heaven. Their biographies stagger the mind. 
How much is recorded truth, and how much wishful thinking or plain falsehood, is often 
impossible to say. One Macarius of Alexandria is said to have slept in a marsh for six months, 
and to have welcomed the continuai mosquito bites there as so many Divine gifts. Others of his 
kind are said to have carried iron weights strapped on their bodies, or to have passed whole 
months in clumps of thorn bushes, or to have fasted themselves into blindness, or to have eaten 
only filth, and that very seldom. They never washed or changed their clothes. Some crawled 
round under the Egyptian sun, naked except for their long hair. Of ail thèse, though, nonc was 
so mémorable as Simeon Stylites. A youth of thirteen when he left shepherding and became a 
monk, one of his penances was to tie a rope about himseif so tight that parts of his body began 
putrifying. According to Antony, his devoted biographer, "[a] horrible stench, intolérable to the 
bystanders, exhaled from his body, and worms dropped from him wherever he stood, and they 
filled his bed."244 At last, persuaded to leave his monastery, he ascended to the top of various 
columns, the last of which being sixty feet high and six wide. There he remained until his death, 
thirty years later. He is said once to have stood for an entire year on one leg, the other covered 
by open ulcers. Antony perched beside him, picking up the maggots that feil down and replacing 
2 i i Quoted in William Edward Hartpole Lecky, History of European Morals from Augustus ro Charlemagne (1869), 
Longmans, Green & Co.. London, )911, vol. 2, p. 112. 
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them. "Eat what God has given you", said Simeon.2 4 5 He was among the most celebrated men 
of his âge. Pilgrims visited him from as far away as India. The Emperor Theodosius II consulted 
him on affairs of State. His funeral procession was followed by the Patriarch of Antioch, a 
government minister, six bishops and a small army. His image is still to be seen, painted on 
church walls throughout the Eastern Patriarchates. 
Our own history offers nothing quite so colourful as this. Thomas Beckett and Thomas More, 
our most famous ecclesiastics, both had ascetic turns of mind. But our closest national 
approximation was made by the Puritans of the seventeenth Century. Some never closed their 
eyes without visions of hellfire crowding into their minds. Their loathing of everything frivolous, 
or even tending to enjoyment, amounted at times to a mania. "The Puritan hated bearbaiting" 
said Macaulay, "not because it gave pain to the bear, but because it gave pleasure to the 
spectators."246 Their political ascendency no sooner began than was over. Their influence 
continued to be felt. It has certainly bequeathed us the most unendurable Sunday in the free 
world. Its afterglow may provide much of the energy to the anti- smoking pressure groups, 
Virginia Woolf s matemal grandfather was a pleasure-hating evangelical of the simplest kind. 
He smoked a cigar once, "and found it so delicious that he never smoked again."247 This is 
perhaps to be expected. But the same views were held by many Victorians who had abandoned 
every other tenet of their childhood faith. Frances Newman, younger brother of Cardinal John 
Henry Newman, though an ardent free thinker and radical, was just as strongly agaïnst tobacco 
- and, for that matter, alcohol, bright clothes and sex. 
When I was first at school, I came across a boy who seemed as capable as anyone eise of 
observing the world, but who had drawn a very stränge conclusion. He had noticed how, when 
he fell and eut himself, our teacher would rush over and comfort him with plasters and little hugs. 
2 J 3 Ibid. 
2 4 6 Thomas Babbington Macaulay, History of England from the Accession of James H (1848-61), 'Everyman' Edition, 
J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.. London, 1910, vol. I, p. 129 (or, in other éditions, theeleventh paragraph of chapter II). 
2 4 7 Leslie Stephen (the novclist's father). quoted in Gertrudę Himmclfarb, Viclorian Minds, Weidenficld and Nicolson. 
London, 1968, p. 310. 
{219} 
Chapter Eleven 
Sometimes, she would even let him off punishments for what he had done earlier in the day. 
Therefore, whenever he felt neglected, or thought he had done anything slightly naughty, he 
would stab some part of lus body with a compass until he began to bleed. Fifteen hundred years 
ago, he would have grown into a désert saint. Alive today in the Phillipines, he would long since 
have taken to pushing skewers through his cheeks, or cutting his nipples off. As it is, he may 
well currently be a noted puritan in his own little circle. There would be no change of attitude 
required. The association of pain with holiness is one less of logic than of psychology. To hope 
that those martyred in His Name earn some special favour in the eyes of God is perfectly 
reasonable. It is, at any rate, a credit to humanity. To suppose that anyone can gain grâce simply 
by rotting away, of his own volition, on top of a column, or denying himself every bodily 
pleasure, is childishly absurd. In so far as the ascetic State hinders the rational function of 
mankind - and its more extreme varieties certainly must248 - it is against nature. Even the purely 
negative varieties are an abuse of it. Anyone who has laughed for five minutes at a time, or 
chatted awhile with friends, will know how generally good some kinds of enjoyment are to the 
body and soul. There are texts in the Bible which, taken in isolation, approve the self-denial of 
every pleasure.349 But a fine answer to anyone who delights in finding thèse and bringing them 
out when others look happy, is to read from that entire book which opens with the words "[ljet 
him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth: for thy love is better than wine"; 2 5 0 and continue tili 
he goes away or faints with shock. Christ himself appreciated the pleasures of friendship. 
Certain theologians can put whatever bizarre gloss on it which takes their fancy. To any candid 
reader, the Last Supper can only be a touchingly human occasion. Here is a man facing 
inevitable death. Does he pass his last evening in a final round of fanatic penances? He does 
2 4 3 'This voluntar)' martyrdom [of Simeon Stylitcs] must have gradually destroyed the sensibility both of the mind 
and body; ñor can it be presumed that the lanatics who torment themselves are susceptible of any lively affection for the rest of 
mankind. A cruel, unfeeling temper has distinguished the monks of every age and country: their stern indifférence, which is 
seldom molliîied by personal friendship, is inflamcd by religious liatred; and their mercilcss zeal has strenuously adminvsicretl 
the holy office of the Inquisition", Gibbon, op. cit.. vol, 4 [chapter XXXVII), p. 18. 
m See, for a very notorious instance of this, Eusebius, Hisiory of the Church, Book V, c. 8. When about twenly years 
oíd, Origen of Alexandria, an enthusiast from his carliest boyhood, considered the text of Matthew, 19:12- "Eor there are some 
eunuchs, which were so boni from their mother's wamb: and there are some cunuchs which were made eunuchs of men: and 
there be eunuchs which have made ihemselves eunuchs for the kingdom of hcaven's sake. He that is able to receive it, let him 
reccive it.v His mind made up, he immediately castrated himself. He rcalised only some while later that his exegesis had been 
too literal. His story can be taken as illustrating more than one moral. 
:'° Song of Solomon, 1:2. 
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nothing of the sort. He arranges a dinner with his friends. "With désire I have desired to eat this 
passover with you before I suffer" he teils them.25' He tries letting them down gently from their 
expectations of what his kingdom will consist in. Exactly what he would have made of Simeon 
Stylites is rather hard to imagine. Very likely. he would not have approved. Almost certainly, 
he would not have been approved of. 
Pleasure cannot be regarded as bad. In many respects, it is as proper to our nature as is eating 
or sleeping. But, of course, this is no end to the matter. Though pleasure is not in itself bad, only 
certain kinds of it can be thought entirely legitimate; and there are many kinds which are 
absolutely illegitimate. That kind potentially involved in murder has already been discussed. It 
remains open to say that smoking cornes into the class of illegitimate pleasures. 
X The Issue of "Addiction" 
It can, in the first place, be called an addiction - this is to say, a subordination of the rational 
faculty to the purely animal appetites. If indeed this, it could be likened to alcoholism; and "[b]e 
not among winebibbers" says Solomon; for he shall come to poverty.252 Nor, says Paul, shall he 
inherit the Kingdom of Heaven.253 Efforts to prove that smoking really is a similar activity form 
a considérable share of the médical and polemical literaturę on the subject. I return to M . A. H. 
Russell, already quoted above. "Cigarette smoking" he says, "is probably the most addictive and 
dependence-producing object-specific self-administered gratification known to man."254 He 
continues elsewhere that "[n]ot with alcohol, cannabis and possibly even heroin is the addiction 
so easily acquired."2SS "[I]t requires no more than three or four casual cigarettes during 
2 5 1 Luke. 22:15. 
1 5 2 Prov., 23:20-21. 
2 5 3 1 Cor., 6:10. 
2 5 4 M. A H. Russell in 1976, quoted in Ashton and Stepney. op. cit.. p. 53. 
2 5 5 M. A. H. Russell in 1977, quoted ibid.. p. 140. 
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adolescence virtually to ensure that a person will become a regular dependent smoker."256 'Once 
a smoker - always a smoker.' This is only a slight exaggeration. It is unlikely that more than one 
in four smokers succeeds in giving it up for good before the age of sixty. 2 5 7 Certainly, if the 
regular smoker could be identified with the habitual drunkard or opiate addict, the natural law 
verdict would be a foregone conclusion. But it is open at least to doubt whether this has been 
properly done. If we follow the usual medical definition, drug addiction, or - to adopt the 
favoured terminology of the World Health Organisation since 1964 - drug dependence, requires 
for its diagnosis the joint presence of three conditions. First, there is the pleasurable alteration 
of mood. Second, there is an increasing tolerance of whatever substance is taken, with a 
concomitantly required increase of dose to maintain its effect. Third, there is the occurrence of 
pain, mental or physical, on the ending of regular indulgence. Let us see to what extent these are 
characteristic of cigarette smoking. 
Its pleasurable effects I have already mentioned. These are real enough. The plain fact, however, 
is that they differ from what we normally call intoxication not merely in degree, but also in 
nature. The effect of alcohol is to dull or even to suspend the workings of our more rational 
nature. Continued indulgence, on a large enough scale, is enough entirely to destroy them. The 
effect of nicotine is simply to alter them in various, comparatively mild, ways. No person of 
reasonably firm mind will go out of his way to avoid a group of people in the street just because 
he suspects most of them to have been smoking. Nor, if he is driving, will he feel inclined to 
slow down or move into another lane if he notices in front of him another driver who, to his 
certain knowledge, has smoked five cigarettes earlier in the evening. No one - at least, to my 
present knowledge - has ever smoked himself into an ungovernable rage, nor, for that matter, into 
Cardboard City. Assuming decent ventilation, I have never once thought any conversation with 
smokers a waste of my time simply on account of their smoking. It cannot, therefore, be said that 
the pleasures of the activity are in themselves gross and animalistic. 
>6 iVi. A. H. Russell in 1971, quoted ibid. 
'" M. A. H. Russell in 1977, quoted ibid. 
{222} 
Chapter Eleven 
The broad pattern of alcoholism is too well-known to require much telling. It begins usually with 
the drinking in company of ale and beer or the lighter wines. These soon having lost their 
satisfying effect, it then progresses, either directly or through the fortified wines, to spirits. The 
point is eventually reached where, to produce the desired effect, amounts of alcohol are regularly 
consumed which would kill a modérate drinker or teetotaller several times over. This pattern is 
common to many other drugs. Dependence on amphetamine has been known to lead to a 
progressive escalation of dose from a daily lOmg to 1,000mg. The same is often true of heroin 
and the other opiates. It is not the case with nicotine. Many smokers do move on from an initial 
five or ten cigarettes per day to twenty or even forty, but hardly ever go beyond this. True, there 
are practical limits on the number of cigarettes that can be smoked per day: even one every 
fifteen minutes only amounts to sixty in fifteen hours. But it would be possible to increase the 
amount of nicotine absorbed by inhaling more deeply, or changing to stronger cigarettes or to 
cigars or to using a pipe. There is no evidence that this happens to any considerable extent. The 
evidence seems, indeed, to indicate that there is no need for much escalation of dose. After even 
years of regular smoking, those áreas of the brain affected by nicotine retain most of their initial 
sensitivity.258 No hardened spirit drinker will regard a pint of weak lager first thing in the 
morning as anything but distinctly second best - and perhaps not even as that. A smoker tends 
to find one favourite brand of cigarette and thereafter to stay loyal to it; and each morning's first 
lighting up, in the absence of any breakdown of health, remains no less pleasurable. 
Some smokers do come to rely on their cigarettes to an extent where giving them up is an often 
painful effort. Yet giving up typically involves a depression and irritability which becomes fairly 
intense after a day or so, and then steadily reduces. But there is nothing about the initial 
physiological effects comparable with the hallucinations and convulsions that the normal 
alcoholic feels on drying out. It seems, also, that only a minority of smokers are dependent on 
nicotine. According to Russell himself, this becomes apparent only when twenty or more 
cigarettes are smoked per day.259 Yet, in a survey of British smoking habits the results of which 
2 5 8 For a fuller discussion of this point (of which my own is very largcly an abridgement), see Ashton and Stepney, 
op. c¡¡., pp. 58-60. 
^ M. A. H. Russell in 1980, quoted in Ashion and Stepney, op. cil., p. 141. 
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were published in 1980, 25 per cent of current smokers claimed a daily consumption of ten 
cigarettes or less; and 62 per cent of female and 48 per cent of male smokers claimed one of 
twenty or less.260 It should also be said that, in the ten years to 1987. 20 per cent of British 
smokers are believed to have given up.2 6 1 These figures hardly support Russell's bolder 
assertions. Even with heavier smokers, there are too many instances of a sudden stopping 
without apparent withdrawal symptoms for the normal concept of dependence to apply in full. 
XI Is Smoking "Unnatural"? 
In the second place, in the argument over its legitimacy as a pleasure, smoking might be said to 
involve an unnatural use of a bodily function. "If God had wanted us to smoke" the saying goes, 
"he would have given us chimneys out of our heads". Plainly, it requires the drawing of tobacco 
smoke into the lungs, where nicotine can be absorbed into the bloodstream and carried thence 
to the brain. 
Equally plainly, the lungs are not suited to this function; and they quite often fail under the strain 
put on them. But, to the extent that the natural function of the lungs is to introduce oxygen into 
the lungs, and that natural functions represent the will of God, it does not automatically follow 
that smoking is sinful. There was a time when it was believed that it had a useful medical 
purpose. It was thought a good prophylactic against the plague, and a cure for, among other 
maladies, headaches, gout and scabies. As late as 1901, the pharmacological authority, W. 
Hale-White, actually recommended it for the treatment of respirator)' disorders.262 So long as this 
belief could be held, smoking, whatever its general merits, could be regarded as a proper activity 
within certain limits - just as puncturing the veins with needles is not today thought improper 
when its purpose is the maintenance or restoration of health. The present medical consensus is 
that tobacco has no therapeutic value. This consensus can, however, be challenged. One of the 
, 0 Office of Population Censuses and Surveys. 1980, quoted ibid. 
Whitaker, op. cit., p. 153. 
, ! Whitaker, op. cit.. p. 146. 
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main purposes of the anti-smoking lobby, it seems is to link smoking with as many illnesses and 
defects of character as is humanly possible. 
Thus, it has by now been associated with everything from childbeating to sleeplessness, and from 
careless driving to ulcers. Unlike with the various cancers, however, the précise causal séquence 
in thèse cases has not been fully established. It is possible that people who smoke increase their 
chances thereby of suffering thèse things. It might, on the other hand, be that those people 
already likely to suffer them are drawn to smoking; and that smoking might - admittedly at the 
possible cost of more serious problems later - alleviate them. In its essentials, this is no new 
argument. The late T. E. Utley was convinced that tobacco, with its soothing effects, had 
prevented many suicides and the occasional murder.263 Writing some years ago in The Guardian. 
Polly Toynbee declared that "I don't want to scream and yell at the family, so I smoke.1'264 
Around the same time, in the The Daily Telegraph, David Loshak put the same more gênerai case 
as stated above.265 Granting it were a correct one, smoking would not be an unnatural activity 
for such people. As Aquinas said, when discussing the concept of "nature", it may be "that 
something which is against human nature, as it may pertain either to reason or to the health of 
the body, may become natural to a man because of a certain deficiency in his nature."266 
XÏI Is Smoking "Slow Suicide"? 
Even if it definitely were shown not necessary in some people for the préservation of their health 
- or necessary in only an inconsiderable minority - it still would not have to follow that smoking 
were sinful. Going to Aquinas again, he doubts that uses of limbs or organs contrary to their 
apparent fonctions are in themselves bad. It need not be true 'that he sins who, for example, 
walks on his hands, or does with his feet anylhing which is more appropriately done with his 
2 Ù 1 See his article, "Lighiing up for Liberty'1, in The Times, London, 3rd August 1987. 
2 ( A See her article ofthat title in The Guardian, London and Manchester, 25th May 1981. 
3 6 5 See his article, "A Whiffof Consolation for the Snioker", in The Daily Tetegraph, London, 30ih Octobcr 1981 
2 6 6 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiœ, 1-11, 30, 4. 
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hands.'2 6 7 Such acts become sinful only to the extent that they might impede a man's nature. 
Obviously, the tendency of smoking is to shorten life, and this is about as severe an impediment 
as can be imagined. But not every shortening of life is equally a sin, or even actually sinful. As 
an act, it falls into not one but several categories. Before we can decide the status of smoking, 
we must first investigate into which of these its life-shortening tendency falls. 
In 1658, the Jesuit priest, Jakob Baldé, asked in a tract published in Nuremberg against smoking 
"[w]hat difference is there between a smoker and a suicide; except that the one takes longer to 
kill himself than the other?"268 Medicine being then in its infancy, and there being a complete 
lack of any statistical evidence for his claim, Balde should not be seen as some remote precurser 
of the Royal College of Physicians. He wrote at a time when smoking tobacco was a 
comparatively new activity in Europe, and, as said above, was illegal in many parts of it. What 
we have in this instance is, as part of a wider denunciation, a rhetorical flourish decked out with 
supporting evidence drawn from anecdote. Removed, however, from its particular historical 
context, this is an extremely grave allegation, and one which, if ever made out, would be final 
condemnation of smoking in Christian terms. For suicide is unequivocally a sin. It is a crime 
against human nature as defined above. It is held strictly analogous to murder - the separation 
by man of a union of body and soul made by God. 2 6 9 It has, indeed, often been thought worse 
than murder - as a cowardly flight from those apparent sufferings by which God, in His infinite 
mercy, tests and refines His creatures.270 Three and a third centuries after Balde, the harmful 
effects of tobacco have been made out with an often alarming weight of evidence. It might be 
thought that the modem posters which I have seen put up in hospitals - telling me that "Smoking 
is slow Suicide" - had unquestionable authority behind them. They have not. That smoking 
tends to shorten life is undeniable. But, no less undeniably, the mere shortening of life is not 
2 6 7 Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles. Lib. Ill, cap. cxxii. His main topic of discussion here is the interesting, 
and perhaps important, issue of whether fornication and sodomy involve an unnatural emission of sperm, and so hinder 
procreation. 
2 0 3 Quoted, Ashton and Stepney, op. cit.. p. 4. 
2 6 ( 1 On this point, see Augustine, op. cit.. Lib. I. cap. 19. 
2 7 0 For a most inspiring example of Divine benevolence in this respect, see the Book of Job. 
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always suicide. If it were, the conventional judgments in church history would be radically at 
fault. 
The anti-Catholic laws of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are one of the very few reasons 
for an Englishman to be ashamed of his history. Justifications have been attempted. But every 
persecution has been claimed by someone as necessary; and the merits of this one are no more 
nor less than any other. Lay adherents of the old religion were heavily discriminated against by 
law. Any of their priests arrested on English soil were subject, on proof of their status, to being 
hanged, then cut down while still alive, and disembowelled, castrated and dismembered. It was 
a horrible death; and it was made more horrible still when inflicted in the presence of a mob 
screaming its delight, and attended by every means of ensuring that the victim remained 
conscious as long as possible. Despite this, the English Mission was never short of recruits. 
Priests continued volunteering to come into England and perform those rites believed necessary 
for the salvation of those who remained Catholics here. One such was Thomas Macclesfield. 
He was arrested almost as soon as he landed. He was promised his release if only he would take 
the Oath of Allegiance to James I, so acknowledging his ecclesiastical jurisdiction under the Act 
of Supremacy. This was a real offer. It had been made to George Napper, another priest, in 
1589. He had taken the Oath, and had been released. Another priest, Ralph Sherwin, though he 
turned it down, had even been offered an bishopric if he would only save his life. Macclesfield 
refused all inducements. The Pope was head of Christendom without rival or colleague, he 
asserted. He was hanged, drawn and quartered on the 1st July, 1616. He was aged 26. The 
youngest victim of this persecution that \ can find was a youth of nineteen called James Bird. He 
refused the Oath, and was butchered in 1593. They died for their refusal to repeat a few dozen 
words which millions of others had repeated without hesitation, and which hundreds of thousands 
had repeated without believing. They died for what many, then and since, would call a trifle. 
To call their deaths suicide, however, would show not merely a gross lack of principle, but also 
a defective imagination. The Roman Church has canonised or beatified each of them. 
Towards the end of the sixth century, there was a Bishop Salvius of Albi in France. During that 
century, the Mediterranian world had been swept by a wave of the most tremendous epidemics. 
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At Constantinople, on the first appearance of the plague, in the year 542, the historian Procopius 
records that ten thousand people a day had died throughout the four sumnier months.271 Al l order 
had for a while collapsed, as the normal bonds of one person to another were severed by fear. 
The sick were lefi to die untended. The healthy threw themselves into a round of orgies and 
rioting. Even outside the towns, whole regions became deserted, so that the crops rotted in the 
fields, and the cows went unmilked. At the first sign of plague in Albi, the usual panic occurred. 
People fled, leaving the sick behind. Salvius stayed with them. Whether by ordinary nursing or 
miracle, he kept the death rate below the level of catastrophe; and the epidemic abated. But he 
was one of its last victims. 
His example is one chosen at random. There have been countless others, before and since. I 
think of the Belgian missionary, Joseph de Veuster, sent at his own request in 1873 to a leper 
colony in the Hawaüan Islands. He caught the disease himself. and died, still tending the sick. 
in 1889. A man who runs into a burning house to save a chiid is rightly thought brave. There 
are not words to describe someone who voluntarily and with premeditation risks life or health 
in the service of the infectious sick. Salvius was canonised. De Veuster is now called 
'Venerable'. 
But not every life-shortening act has been approved. There was in Africa once an heretical sect 
known as the Donatist Circumcelliones. Its members had conceived such a hatred of life and 
desire for martyrdom, that, driven by joyous frenzies, they would sometimes leap in great 
numbers from high cliffs, so that the rocks below were splashed red with their blood: 
Sometimes, they would stop travellers on the roads, and oblige them to inflict a killing blow, by 
the promise of a reward if they consented, and the threat of murder if they refused. This was 
accounted suicide. 
There was another sect of heretics, this one in France, called the Albigenses. Many of these also 
wanted martyrdom. Their methods of seeking it - at least, before the Papacy took action against 
2 7 1 Procopius, De Bello Pérsico, Lib. XXIII, cap. 1. Sec also J. N. Biraben and J. le Goff, "La Peste dans le Haut 
Moyen Age"', in Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 24 ( 1969), pp. 1484-1510. 
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them - was rather more subtle. If i l l , they would accelerate or provoke death, by fasting and 
occasionally by bleeding. These practices were accounted suicide. 
The clear distinguishing principle in these instances is primary intention. In the first two, death 
was an effect of voluntary action. It was, however, a secondary consequence, a byproduct of 
something done with an entirely different main end in view. The recusants probably had no great 
wish to go through an agonising death. But, faced with this or apostasy from what they believed 
was absolutely true and right, they resolutely chose the lesser of evils. No more can it be thought 
that Salvius and De Veuster were seeking death directly. In the second two instances, it was 
sought directly - not, perhaps, as an end in itself, as the self-overdosing of some jilted shorthand 
typist of our own day might be presumed; but it was still sought for no predominating earthly 
reason. If I put a gun to my head, or lie in a hot bath and open a vein, my primary intention, in 
all probability, is self-destruction. If I light a cigarette, it is to absorb nicotine into my body. The 
one act is to end life. The other, in my own estimation, is to enhance it. If one effect of the 
second is to bring my death forward in some unknowable degree, this is not suicide. If I could 
somehow know that, by lighting up, I should be 'spending' a given number of minutes, it would 
still not be suicide. If I had it on the highest medical authority that one cigarette would kill me 
after five minutes, it would, again, still not be suicide. The same distinguishing principle applies 
as above. There may be no comparison between my own seeking of pleasure at inordinate cost, 
and the laying down by someone else of his life for the sake of others or in praising or holding 
fast to his God. But the sin involved here would be that of addiction - most definitely not of 
suicide. But this is an unlikely situation. In normal circumstances, the seeking of pleasure will 
be at an uncertain and perhaps long-delayed price. 
In truth, the best analogy of smoking is not suicide, but working at a dangerous occupation. Take 
coal miners, for example. They notoriously place themselves in danger. Working at the coal 
face, they risk burial alive by collapsing tunnels; they risk being burned to death or suffocated 
by poisonous gasses. Even without these exceptional events, the environment of a coal mine is 
unhealthy. The air is loaded with silicious dust. Breathing it often leads to pneumoconiosis, a 
fatal lung disease. Crawling about for long periods places unnatural strain on the knee joints, 
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causing arthritis. The wages offered for coal mining reflect thèse dangers. The work is for the 
most part unskilled manual labour. It requires endurance and some strength, but little in the way 
of initiative. In as much, then, as the wages offered are higher than those paid for labour of the 
same gênerai grade on the surface, they incorporate a special premium for risk. They are an 
incentive for a man to put his life or iong-term health in danger. 
Now. whatever may be the State of affairs in other parts of the world, in this country, no one is 
compelled to take up any specific occupation. If a man décides to accept a coal miner s wages, 
rather than those of a shelf-stacker or static security guard, or of whatever other menial 
occupation might be open to him, he does so of his own volition. Perhaps his father and elder 
brothers were miners before him. Leaving aside any sentimental talk of tradition, the real 
meaning of this is that he will have had an excellent chance of learning the dangers of the job. 
Perhaps he is married with children. If so, he might have done well considering how he was to 
fill thèse extra mouths before bringing tliem into the world. And even the worst paid job 
nowadays keeps a family from starving; and the Department of Social Security is often amazingly 
generous with the taxpayers' money. Anyone who goes down a coal mine does so either because 
he is stupid, or because he prefers the présent satisfactions that the extra money can buy to his 
continued health in the future. If he goes down for the money, the only différence between him 
and a smoker is that the smoker combines his pleasure and danger in a single act; and he keeps 
them distinct. I have listened to much invective against the miners. But 1 have never heard them 
called sinners by mere virtue of their occupation, Yet, if to smoke be a sin on the grounds of its 
unnaturalness, so equally must digging coal be one. 
XIII Smoking, Sin and Toleration 
This is my answer to the first part of our main question, then - that smoking, in whatever light 
we care to regard it, is just not sinful. Even, however, if it were - even if it were shown as plainly 
against Scripture and nature as throat cutting, and the smoker unquestionably doomed to the lake 
of black fire - my answer to the second part of that main question would remain unaltered. 
Ambrose and many of the Church Fathers, together with theologians of nearly every Christian 
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sect since, have asserted that to tolerate sin is to partake of sin. That this is not so, however, is 
as necessary a conséquence of oui two minimal assumptions given above as those by which we 
prove our own existence. To see this, we return to those assumptions; and, from them, we dérive 
two further secondary principles. 
The first of thèse is that the human will is free. Now, there is no reason in itself to doubt that 
every event is predetermined, and every soul marked out from the beginning of time for salvation 
or damnation. But, most plainly, it contradicts our first assumption, of a benevolent God. To see 
this, suppose I were to train a child of mine to love starting fires, to love the act of kindling flame 
more than anything else in the world. Suppose then I were to hand him a box of matches and 
lock him into a fuel store. I could, perhaps, blâme what remained of him for the ensuing 
explosion - just as God could damn a murderer, having been knowingly the first cause of the 
murder, and the murderer himself just the final link in the chain of causation. My determining 
influence on the child's actions must be infinitely smaller than that of God on the murderer, yet 
who would call me a just or loving father, except from fear of offending me? To généralise from 
this, careless mistakes aside, there is no action whatever we can call sinfiil where there is no 
voluntary participation. We laugh at Xerxes, who had the Hellespont scourged for washing his 
bridge away. Are we to say God is equally childish and arbitrary? 
Certainly, taking the will as free brings its own problems. It may save the notion of Divine 
Benevolence, but only, it seems, by compromising that omniscience which is implicit in the 
notion of Divine Supremacy. Either God knew, long before Pie created the universe, that a 
certain murder would take place, or He did not. If He did know, then ail our talk of free will is 
so much more flatus uocïs. As with the child and matches, when I see that something will 
happen, there is always an élément of contingency about its happening. When God, in His 
omniscience, foresees an event, it becomes inévitable. To say otherwise is to state a 
contradiction. According to Boethius, this is not a real problem. In his view, God is an 
atemporal being. We exist in time, and are aware of a past and future. God is outside of this 
continuum; and He therefore can have no foreknowledge, everything occurring in an immédiate, 
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eternal présent. 2 7 2 This is an ingenious solution, and it may possibly be the real one. But, 
however we choose to justify it, that the will is free we must believe, or we must abandon the 
concept of God given above. It is a necessary assumption, following on from our first. 
The second question we have already touched, in our discussion of suicide. It concerns what 
facts God takes into account when delivering His Judgment on each soul - actions or intentions? 
Our own earthly law, though it sometimes tries its best to do otherwise, can, by and large, judge 
only according to actions, ail else being too uncertain to sway the verdict. To the Divine Court, 
though, nothing is uncertain. If I were to throw coins at a beggar, hoping without success to 
break his head, the law of the land would have to regard my action as charitable, if suspect. But, 
to God, my intent to commit murder - even my précise degree of résolve in the matter - would 
be perfectly clear, and so a cognisable fact in reaching His Verdict. Tf we have forgotten the 
Name of our God, and holden up our hands to any strange God: shall not God search it out? For 
he knoweth the very secrets of the heart.'273 Hence, we can sin against Divine Law both with our 
bodies and in our hearts. 
Yet, this being said, it seems unreasonable to claim ail breaches of that law as being equally 
serious - a désire to commit génocide, an actual rape, an evil intention bungled and producing 
only good: ail equal grounds for damnation. Go back again to the example of my cutting your 
throat: if I no more than contemplate the action, I harm only my own prospects of salvation. If 
I make my intention actual, I also harm another soul, which I may have prevented from excelling 
in a life of subséquent virtue. To intend is clearly easier than to act; yet, to know myself damned 
already for the former, what more have I to lose by effecting the latter? The notion is plainly 
unreasonable, since, so far from deterring, after a very lovv point, it even encourages sin. 
Granted, anything is conceivable of God, and there may well be some divine équivalent of the 
English conspiracy laws. But to suppose this is again an évident contradiction of our first 
assumption. It seems better to accord putting our sins into an order of gravity, or adopting the 
2 7 3 Boethius, De Consolalione Philosophiœ. Lib. V, cap. 90-105. 
2" Ps.,_ 44:21. 
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Roman division of them inîo venia! and mortal. Or we might instead conceive each to carry a 
given number of points, a sufficient number earned resulting in one's damnation. There can be 
no certainty on détails here, but there can be little dispute whether actual sins are not judged more 
severely than potential ones. 
So we take it that man is a créature capable of freely choosing good or evil, and is judged on how 
he chooses. Now, in the wild, isolated from others, our opportunities for choosing either are at 
best limited. Without others round us, our actions must be morally neutral for the most part, only 
those affecting ourselves and God counting - among thèse being suicide, masturbation, 
blasphemy, and the like. Even those sins we could commit in our hearts would be limited by our 
ignorance of what sins there were to commit. However, it being part of our nature to live in 
society, tins problem seldom faces us. Living in close proximity to others, we find fresh 
opportunities with each new day for shining in God :s eyes, or not. And, in so far as our contact 
with others increases, so increase our opportunities; and, in so far as it is diminished, so our 
opportunities are diminished. Which brings us to the logical outcome of our two assumptions. 
God's mil sanction is reserved for those societies alone of which the members can in the greatest 
degree possible choose good or evil for themselves: any other is a frustration of His Plan. 
This outcome stated, we are able to go on and. in descending order of abstraction, dérive its 
practical conséquences. We first consider the proper rôle of government. Now, it does, by its 
very nature, involve coercion. It exists only by levying taxes, which are had from those who 
might well have used the money otherwise, to secure grâce or damnation. It acts only by 
interfering with what people do, compelling some things, forbidding others. It is inevitably a 
hindrance to the free choice of good or evil by its subjects. But, while evidently God abhors the 
regulating of human action for its own sake. equally He cannot approve the possession of more 
freedom than is compatible with its own survival. Without some government - perhaps only 
protecting life and property - such chaos might resuit that either society would dissolve, or it 
would fall into the hands of some tyrant, who might promise stability, but deliver somewhat 
more. If this were so, there would be a Christian case for government. And since both the 
common sensé of mankind and the overwhelming balance of the philosophers believe it so, 
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reasoning as theologians, we may provisionally accept that government must exist. Moreover, 
letting it keep the internal peace, only a fool would deny it the means of foreign defence. Of 
course, the mode and degree appropriate to each nation differs, and no one kind is suitable to all. 
But it must be said that spending on armaments may never without sin be greater than is needed 
for bare defence against aggression. England needs a great navy, and in the modern world, a 
great air force. Unhappily, we must also have a nuclear deterrent of sorts. But whether we need 
an army of occupation or defence constantly in Germany seems quite another matter - as is 
whether we need bases in Cyprus and Hong Kong. In deciding, we must think as strategists and 
not as theologians; though we require no great depth of learning to see from our own past that 
having so many distant commitments is to cast a net for troubles. 
We come now to the matter of personal conduct, with particular reference to smoking. It ought 
to be clear from what has already been said that the Christian should stand for the absolute 
realisable maximum of individual freedom. The only justification of State interference, apart 
from the protection of others, is the avoidance of collapse into chaos or tyranny. Whether or not 
smoking might be a threat to others is, as I said at the beginning, a matter which falls outside the 
scope of this present study. But, as it affects the soul of the smoker, there is no case for control. 
To be sure, increasing taxes on tobacco products would, in at least some measure, diminish 
consumption of them. Restricting advertising, it is sometimes argued, might have the same 
effect. Such measures might well cause many of those inclined to smoking either to think again, 
or not be reminded so forcibly or often of their inclination. Desiring to sin - always, of course, 
assuming the sinfulness of smoking - yet not actively sinning, they might avoid some of the pain 
decreed by God as their punishment. But holding people from evil holds them also from good. 
No longer are they allowed to confront their sinful longings for cigarettes, to fight them, and 
overcome them by act of will and piety alone, so gaining salvation. Directed with skill and 
effort, the law might vastly diminish smoking; but the resulting virtue would like that of a chaste 
eunuch - derived not from conquest of temptation, but from its absence. Without any overriding 
excuse of the public order, for any government to try encouraging or prohibiting various kinds 
of private conduct, is to frustrate the whole purpose of society - which is to be the stage on which 
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we act under the watchful eye of God. 2 7 4 
XIV The Evil of Moral Authoritarianism 
Moral authoritarianism is far worse than any amount of tobacco product advertising. The 
authoritarian will be held responsible for the damnation of any souls on account of his having 
denied their right to choose good of their own accord, désire to sin overcome. The advertiser and 
his accomplices will find the path to Heaven much smoother. By offering temptation, they 
provoke choice. Therefore, they may cause the salvation of many who would otherwise have let 
themselves fall into Hell for lack of positive virtue. 
Considered only in themselves, restrictions on smoking are bad. In this country, they are bad also 
on account of the means by which they have largely been imposed. Most people, if asked what 
it is that distinguishes a free society from tyranny, will perhaps think first of democracy. As 
modes of government go, this is a very fine one. But it is not the fundamental point of différence. 
Freedom relies above all eise on the concept of what some call bourgeois legality and others the 
rule of law. Everyone who is not completely besotted by its power, knows that the State is a 
frighteningly dangerous institution. It may be a very necessary one. Tolerating its existence may 
be the only means available to us of seeing off or keeping at bay those other smaller dangers 
which threaten us. But it is useful only so far as it is kept within close restreints. In ail dealings 
with its subjects, it must be forced to act in strict accordance with certain gênerai rules of 
conduct, clearly stated in advance. These must apply equally to all Citizens. Any dispute on 
either side as to their meaning must be resolved before independent and impartial courts of law. 
Where restrictions on smoking are concerned, this principle has been repeatedly flouted. 
Twenty years ago, the Wilson Government decided that something had to be done about 
2 H "Human law does not prohiba cvcry vice from which virtuous men abslain, but only the graver vices ... Iwhich| 
... unless prohibiled would makc it impossible for human society to endure". Aquinas, Summa Theologiœ. MI. 96, 2. In 
isolation, this might be taken as stark dissent from Ihe position of Ambrose. In many ways, indeed, Aquinas deserves a high 
place in the history of libertarian thought. But, in spite of this, he was also a Catholic theologian of the thirteenth Century; and, 
though he stood firmly against that insane bigotry which tears societies apart, he did not oppose intolérance in itself. On this 
point, see ibid., 11-11, 8 & 10. 
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smoking. The first undeniable corrélations with disease were being announced; and a 
govemment which interfered in everything eise saw no principled objection to interfering with 
the tobacco industry. But it had no time for making laws. In the first place, the Parliamentary 
timetable was already füll to overflowing. Making laws on one thing meant not making laws on 
something eise. In the second, there was no consensus of opinion, either in the country as a 
whole, or, at that time, in the Labour Party, for anti-smoking législation not to be time-wastingly 
controversial. And so, it resorted to threats. Kenneth Robinson, the Minister of Health, proudly 
recalls how he called the représentatives of the leading companies to discussions with him, and 
bullied them into a "voluntary agreement". "There was always a slight hint that the govemment 
would legislate" he says, "a htnt of blackmail in the background. I used it progressive^ as the 
talks went on and on. 1 used to throw up my hands and say, 'Gentlemen, if you can't agrée, you 
leave me no alternative'."275 From then until now, this has been the chosen method of restricting 
the promotion of tobacco products. 
To say "Do as I tell you, or I will consider making a law to compel you" is the same as saying 
"Do as I tell you". In constitutional theory, no State officiai in this country has any more 
authority than is prescribed by law; and disputes over the use ofthat authority are referable if not 
to the normal courts of law, then certainly to various administrative tribunals which usually 
follow a legalistic procédure. Ministerial "blackmail" is a perfect means of escaping thèse 
burdensome restraints. On paper, they remain as formidable as ever they were. In reality, the 
principles of judicial review become as vital to the governing of this country as the principles of 
heraldry. The way is opened to omnipotent govemment, and the destruction of freedom. 
Before moving on to a gênerai conclusion, there are two clarifications needed, for the avoidance 
of mi sunderstand ing. 
First, to say that people should be left to go to Heaven or Hell by whatever means they see fit 
is not to show any lack of concern for them. Just as no libertarian wishes to see them smoking 
Narrated in Smoke Ring: The Potitics of Tobacco, Peter Taylor, The Bodley Hcad. London, 1984. p. 83. 
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themselves into illness or an early grave, so no Christian can feil to worry about what may lie in 
waït for them beyond the grave. That in neither instance is coercion the required answer is no 
reason to stop caring. In both, the degree of caring is limited only by the requirement that vve 
respect the autonomy of others, and by the normal rules of good taste. To see this, imagine that 
I, believing in the dangers - vvhatever thèse might be - of smoking, vvere confronted by a smoker. 
No one likes being pestered by proselytising strangers, as anyone who has been stopped in 
Central London by Moonies or Iranian refugees will readily admit. The chances of someone's 
being more than annoyed by such an intrusion are so generally low that it would hardly be worth 
the effort of beginning a lecture on the evils of tobacco. A total stranger, then, I would leave 
alone, other than, perhaps, to ask him to put his cigarette out if we were in an enclosed space, or 
whether he minded my opening a window to disperse the smoke. Someone I knew rather better 
I might, with sniffs and sour looks, let know what I felt. With a closer friend l might feel rather 
bolder. With a very close friend or relation - especially one actually suffering from what I had 
reason to believe an illness caused or worsened by smoking - there would be no restraint. I might 
beg him to put the cigarette out. I might try shaming him to put it out. I might force on his 
attention the various costs of smoking. I would do everything short of snatcfùng the cigarette out 
of his mouth and putting it out myself. There is no contradiction between concem for others and 
respect for them, so long as each feeling is kept within its proper bounds. 
Second, just because a law is unnecessary, or harmful, is not normativ sufficient reason for 
ostentatiously breaking it - nor for trying to bring down whatever governnient may have imposed 
it. Every government in history has made or enforced some laws which might be said to have 
failed the test set for them above. Our own Statute book is already blemished. Effective 
measures to curb smoking would be a scandalous blem'ish on it. They would be arguably 
superfluous to the protection of others. In theological terms, they would be evil. Nor, believing 
them improper beyond all common doubt, would there be any strict obligation to obey such 
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commands. We shouid be free in conscience to ignore them as suited our private pleasure.3'6 
But to say aloud to everyone that a bad law may rightly be broken is something eise entirely. To 
make a cuit of civil disobedience - as a whole section of our political class appears to have done 
- is often only slightly less than preaching rébellion. It opens the way to a contempt of law in 
generał, and by chose least able to tell what is bad from what merely inconvénient, This is not 
to condemn ail résistance - certainly not in cases of open tyranny. But, recalling what its effects 
most usually are, it remains that. whatever their deeds or policy, active résistance to the 
authorities shouid normally be a last resort. This is obviously true in England, where, despite a 
Century of increasing misgovernment, we can still call our laws and institutions on the whole 
sound, and can still agrée to accept specific imperfections pending their reform. It applies with 
equal force, however, in the case of foreign countries. For, on the principle stated and explained 
above, in this less than perfect world to daim the Divine Sanction, a society need only enjoy the 
greatest degree of freedom possible, whatever more of it could be thought désirable. And so, to 
any reasonable man who may consider the overthrow of a bad government, the proper question 
is not - as the modem intellectual might occasionally pause to ask - whether he really will be 
assaulting something unspeakably evil, but to what extent his acting can resuit in any better state 
ofaffairs.277 
X V Conclusions 
This, then, is what can be said about smoking. It is not an addiction destructive of will and 
reason. It may or may not even have certain short-term therapeutic merits. In so far as it is 
otherwise an unnatural act, it is no worse than coal mining. On Christian grounds, there is 
nothing to be said against it. It is an indiffèrent activity. On the matter of legislative control, 
2 7 6 This is rio revolutionary assertion of rights. Without going through the constitulional documents of British and 
American history, I turn again to Aquinas: "Laws may for two reasons be unjust. First, they may be contrary to the good of 
mankind ... either with regard to their end - as when a ruler imposes laws which are burdensome and designed not for the 
common good, but his own rapacity or vanily - or with regard to their maker - if, for example, he shouid go beyond his proper 
powers - or with regard to their form, if, though intended for the common good, their burdens shouid be inequitably distributed. 
Such laws corne doser to violence than to truc law ... They do not, thereforc, oblige in conscience, except perhaps for the 
avoidance of scandai or disorder", Summa Theologiœ, I-Il. 96, 4. 
2 7 7 "The overthrow of such governments is not strictly sédition, unless perhaps when accompanied by such disorder 
that the community surïers greater harm than from the tyrannieal government'', ibid., 11-11, 42, 2. 
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those Christian advocates who are not merely putting a religious gloss on their secular views are 
guilty of a fondamental misconception - that it is the duty of government to make people good. 
It is the duty of government to do no such thing. It is instead to maintain an orderly environment 
in which we are able to do such good as we may choose of our own free will. If a Christian has 
any duty to become involved in poiitics. the politics appropriate to his faith are those of what 
used to be called liberalism, and which are today found in diluted form in the Conservative Party. 
If he has any duty to take a position on smoking, that position is surely one strongly opposed to 
any restrictions which have not as their end the protection of others. John Stuart Mi l l was not 
a Christian, but his words on liberty, properly construed, are folly in accord with Christianity. 
Though subject ultimately to God, where secular relationships are concerned, "[o]ver himself, 
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign". 
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